

MILITARY POWER **in a** **FREE SOCIETY**

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The search for the establishment of leading principles—always few—around which considerations of detail group themselves, will tend to reduce confusion of impression to simplicity and directness of thought, with consequent facility of comprehension.

Alfred Thayer Mahan

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by

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In 1949, as Head of the Department of Logistics at the Naval War College, I wrote *Operational Naval Logistics*. After my retirement from active naval service in 1952, my work was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research through the George Washington University Logistics Research Project. Under that sponsorship I wrote *Logistics in the National Defense*, 1959, and *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, 1965.

While conducting elective seminars in military theory and logistics from 1966 to 1974, I had the benefit of association with officers of all the services who had combat experience in Vietnam and others who were well versed in budget conflicts and bureaucratic politics of Washington.

I also wish to thank Mr. George Griffin, formerly of Rutgers University Press, whose encouragement and sound criticism in the early days of this work helped me to develop and clarify my ideas.

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Henry E. Eccles
1 May 1979

PREFACE

Many recent books on political military affairs are compilations of essays or analyses written by specialists, each dealing with various elements of the broad subject chosen. While this practice may satisfy the desire for scholarly rigor, it in no way represents the intellectual synthesis or integration required for a major military political decision in a grave international crisis.

It is, in fact, impossible to anticipate or to write an accurate description of the workings of the mind of the head of government, the chief executive, or the military commander of a major theater or force who, under great stress, must make an evaluation of known facts, uncertain information and intelligence, the advice of specialists, and the importunities, personal pressures and aspirations of others and then decide when and how to use military power and force in order to achieve a desired effect in the support of national interest and even national survival in modern human conflict.

This crucial integration is difficult under any form of government, but because of the peculiar force and uncertainty of public opinion, it is especially difficult in a free society. In the United States, the great public interest in major professional sporting contests, stimulated and exploited by a massive vigorous television and news system, has further complicated the problem. Formal athletic contests are carefully scheduled and conducted under rigid and clear rules. They begin at a designated time, continue for a predetermined period or procedural limit. They are controlled by professional referees and conclude in a recognized and usually wholly accepted decision. There is a victor and a loser or else an officially proclaimed tie. The contest is clear; the public knows who is involved and why. Furthermore, in many of these contests personal physical violence is an essential element frequently stimulated by the entrepreneurs to increase lucrative public excitement and interest.

By some psychological transfer, this attitude and consequent set of expectations influence the manner in which many Americans perceive the protracted conflicts of the modern world. Thus, people frequently think that one's enemies must be clearly

identified; wars should be short and decisive; violations of the rules should be penalized formally; and, finally, our side should always be the victor. When reality does not conform to this image, impatience and frustration set in. Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the opinion that "Democracies cannot fight long wars."

Largely because of the scientific-technological explosion of the last half century, our world is in the midst of a major rapid cultural change which accentuates the contradiction and paradox which always have been part of the evolution of the human species. Part of this change is economic, part political, and part social. Human values and the very concept of authority are both being challenged. These changes are so complex and so extensive that it is difficult to separate them into precise economic, political, and social components or to understand all their implications. There is no doubt, however, that their political military consequences are important even though they may not as yet be fully recognized.

In view of this cultural change and the associated problems of the development, distribution, and conservation of the world's physical resources, several questions arise:

Can a free society function successfully in this world of violent human conflict? In somewhat different terms, can a nation be governed effectively by a system of free representative government and still take an active role in world affairs? What is the role and usefulness of military power in the survival of such free form of government? The first two questions are being settled by the course of events; the issue is in doubt and can be known definitely only for specific periods of history.

The role and usefulness of military power cannot be taken for granted. Linked by modern communication and awed by the power of nuclear weapons, people throughout the world are challenging the concept of formally organized national military forces. Specifically, some social scientists are questioning the legitimacy of the military profession.¹ I will therefore discuss the nature of military power, some of the fundamentals of its organization and use, and its interaction with society, and some of the implications of this interaction.

Conflict of interests is inherent in all organized society. Interest is a matter of *perception* and *perception* is a matter of individuality. Political organization is a means both of establishing a sense of common interest and of accommodating, reconciling, or controlling the differing or conflicting interests of individuals and groups. Culture is also a matter of perception. Differences of

perceptions, of opinions, and attitudes among the peoples of any nation-state produce varying intensities of conflict and these also operate in the cases of conflicts between nations with differing cultures.

The authoritarian society concentrates on the primacy of the interest of the nation-state and seeks to control the inherent human difference through coercion.

The free society seeks to control it by enlightenment and altruism—by enlightened self-interest.

We can see interests in such various categories as:

The Personal Interest

A sense of personal fulfillment.

The right to privacy.

The right to individual enterprise.

The Public Interest

Freedom of information.

Freedom of speech.

Effective justice. An unprejudiced judge and jury.

The National Interest

Security from external domination.

The exercise of sovereignty within its borders.

The Humane Interest

The preservation of environment.

The conservation of resources.

The production and distribution of food.

There are, of course, many more specific interests that can be placed in these simple categories. Some interests also can be classed in several categories, thus establishing harmony.

On the other hand, there can be direct and at times serious conflict between the interests of one category and those of another; the right to privacy, the freedom of information and speech, and the interest of effective justice. This creates disharmony.

The complications, the contradictions, seem endless but for purposes of this work two major points are clear: there must be a reasoned evaluation of interests and of objectives in both the formulation and the analysis of national policy and strategy.

This line of thought provides the linkage between the abstractions and ideals of philosophers and political scientists and the

concrete situation, the work, the reactions and finally the life or death of the individual soldier in combat with a similar man from another nation or another culture; and, indeed, in combat with his fellow citizen or even his brother in a civil war. A similar linkage carries us to the city policeman on patrol in a modern city.

I believe that for the philosophy-soldier sequence this essential linkage can be understood best through the development of a comprehensive coherent military theory. Furthermore, I believe that an understanding of strategy is the single most important element in the understanding of both military theory and of military power.

During the last 25 years I have taken part in many conferences and seminars where the discussions have bogged down in frustrating arguments over the meaning of the term "strategy." I have found that the dictionary definitions are not adequate to make the necessary distinctions between the meaning of the word itself and the numerous aspects and attributes of strategy that must be understood before the subject can be comprehended. Furthermore, few of the many definitions and explanations proposed in conferences and military literature discuss strategy as it must always be associated with the other words and intellectual elements of military political decision and planning at various levels of action and authority.

Therefore, many useless arguments ensue, valuable time is wasted, and constructive results hampered because two men appear to differ radically when, in fact, they, without recognizing the mutual fault, are talking about different kinds of things at different levels of action.

I believe that Herbert Rosinski's account of strategy as presented in Chapter IV herein leads to a brief, coherent, and logical definition: "Strategy is the *comprehensive direction* of power to *control* situations and areas in order to attain broad *objectives*."

If we postulate that this is the definition of strategy, we can make many more true and useful statements about the characteristics and attributes of strategy. While this may appear to some to be pedantic or dogmatic, it provides a sound semantic base that stimulates rather than inhibits creative freedom. In addition, this postulated definition is wholly consistent with and in some instances includes the best of many other definitions or meanings of the term strategy.

Furthermore, it lays the foundation for the useful discussion not only of many forms of power but also the manner in which

the interaction of power and freedom influences the effectiveness of military power.

But strategy cannot stand alone in military thinking. A good definition or even a group of good descriptions of the term and its attributes is only the beginning of understanding. Important as they are, they must always be in harmony with the other military terms with which practical strategy is always associated.

In particular, decisionmakers must intuitively understand the interweaving of policy, strategy, logistics, and tactics and the complex problems of civilian/military relationships that come into terrible focus in the decisions concerning "nuclear strategy."

The enormous power of nuclear weapons makes the social-political-economic consequences of their employment utterly unpredictable other than by the general term, catastrophic. This power, this unpredictability, therefore, gives an inherent contradiction and paradox to any discussion of the actual use of nuclear weapons.

The scientific knowledge and engineering technology that created this power cannot be abolished. Fissionable materials are now so plentiful and widespread that crude and *relatively* small weapons may become available to small nations, to "nonstate actors," and to terrorists, thus making their control by treaty or by world authority and law uncertain thereby spreading the risk.

This situation has created a vast literature wherein some of the ablest people of our time have analyzed the problems, calculated the effects of weapons use, speculated on the consequences of such use, and suggested or actually made plans for weapon employment or for measures to prevent or control such employment. Nevertheless, the contradiction and paradox inherent in the nature of nuclear power still remain. Much of the current literature is merely a reformulation of ideas expressed years ago, restatements with different terminology but offering no reduction in the fundamental intractability of the problems.

In Chapter V, I briefly discuss what I believe to be the central issues to be faced in order to lead up to those further implications that are most significant to this work. I believe the central issues are *détente*, deterrence, defense, nuclear targeting, theater weapons, and command control. The implications are intermingled and recur in various aspects throughout this work. They are:

The importance of the concept of strategy as control;

The limitations on the utility of military power and force, particularly the limitations on the concept of military victory; and

The implications of these for the size, morale and discipline of the armed forces.

At the highest level of thought and of executive authority, interests, objectives, policy, and strategy are so intimately related that it may be difficult to make a clear distinction between them. It is not so much a question of which is which, as it is that they all must be combined in the mind of the executive authority in order to establish and convey to his subordinates a clear purpose toward which to direct military action.

This intimate relation also tends to complicate the question of what is "political" and what is "military." This has important implications for the conduct and the study of civilian-military relations and the proper subordination of military action to civilian control.

This raises the questions: What is the proper role for the military in giving "advice" to the civilian authority? Should such advice be purely "military," never "political"? (If so, what is "military"?) Or should the advice sometimes be political as well as military? (If so, what is "political"?)

While the statements in Chapters IV and VII on civilian and military responsibilities generally hold, there are no final and specific answers to these questions. They depend to a large degree on what is personally congenial to the Chief Executive. What are the personal relations and degree of mutual respect and confidence between the Chief Executive, the Minister of Defense and the chiefs of the armed services? In particular, the intellectual and moral authority of individuals can be a major factor (as was the case with Gen. George Marshall in the United States in World War II).

In spite of these qualifications, however, senior military men must appreciate both the military implications of political decisions, and the political factors in and implications of military decisions and events. Other than that, their vital part in this continuing military political dialogue is to state what the military forces can do and what they cannot do to support the political policy and decisions of the Government.

Furthermore, the political leaders must have understanding enough of these military factors and of the military fundamentals to share the responsibility for mutual accommodation and good sense that are necessary for success. From 1965 to 1968, during the decisive period of the Vietnam war, the major differences among President Johnson, Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commanders illustrate a disastrous failure to achieve conceptual unity in high command.

Finally, as the concept of freedom has always been associated with the maritime world, and as the oceans are not only the foundation of human life itself but also a major element in the conflicting interests of nations and groups of nations, the concept of strategy as the art of control applies most importantly to maritime affairs.

PROLOGUE

The Vietnam Hurricane

First published in 1973

Many readers were on active duty between 1946 and 1965 when the critical decisions were made. Try to think back. How did you perceive the Southeast Asian situation at that time? What were your concepts of the use of military power and force? What assumptions did you make as to the nature and strength of the various factors in the situation? What did you take for granted during those critical times? How did your perceptions, concepts, and assumptions stand the test of time?

The men who made decisions made them in the light of their perceptions, concepts, and assumptions *at the time of the decision*; not by what they were one hour, one week, one month, one year or one decade later.

Fundamental Considerations. Political purpose must dominate military strategy. The use of military force without a clear political purpose is futile and ultimately self-defeating.

Strategy is the *comprehensive direction* of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives.

Tactics is the *immediate employment* of specific weapons and forces to attain the objectives of strategy.

Logistics is the *creation and sustained support* of weapons and forces to be *tactically* employed to attain the objectives of strategy.

Operations are an *intimate blend* of tactical and logistic action to attain the objectives of strategy.

As viewed from the perspective of command, these are the fundamental elements of military thought and action. It is only through understanding their nature, their relationship and their corollaries that we can both establish and carry out fundamental military theory.

The first task of strategy is to state and analyze objectives. Merely stating an objective is not enough, because in our complex world national and military objectives are not simple. In fact, they form a multiple hierarchy of the political, military, economic, and

social; the primary and secondary, the immediate and ultimate, etc.

The enemy's reaction to military action will always introduce unexpected factors that will require changes in the plan. Therefore supervision of the planned action requires continued vigilance to determine if and when the course of events is such as to change the nature and relative importance of the various components of this hierarchy of objectives. Furthermore, the commander must have a clear concept of what constitutes a satisfactory attainment of his objectives.

All this requires continuing analysis and the avoidance of being trapped by a slogan. The single most important cause of military disaster has been the lack of conceptual unity throughout the chain of command. And thus the most important task of high command is to insure such conceptual unity in objectives.

Going back to the concept of strategy as control, control has two aspects. First, control of the external field of action, i.e., the exercise of control *vis-à-vis* the enemy. Second, the control of the internal field of action, i.e., control of the sources of the power applied against the enemy.

This brings out a vital and neglected further consideration. The strategy that is suitable for an authoritarian government that has strict control over news media and the expression of public opinion will not necessarily be suitable for a nonauthoritarian government which does not control the media and opinion.

These are the conclusions I have drawn from my study of the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Bay of Pigs of 1961.

The Major Issues. In the case of Vietnam, there are four major issues:

A. Was the United States wise and justified in taking an active role in Asian politics after World War II?

B. Was the United States wise and justified in supporting the South Vietnam Government established in 1954?

C. Was the United States wise and justified in using overt military force to support the South Vietnamese in 1964-65?

D. Did the United States organize and apply overt military force wisely in the period 1965 to 1969?

Each of these issues has important corollary issues. The first three are primarily political issues that involve important military and economic considerations and consequences. The fourth is primarily military but with very important political and economic considerations and consequences.

How and to what degree did the U.S. decision to use overt military force in Vietnam influence the behavior of other governments and other nations? Until we know more about that we cannot answer the first three questions, which really boil down to should the United States have fought to save Southeast Asia from a Communist takeover?

I think it almost impossible at this time to make a clear and specific allocation of blame for the mistakes of the Vietnam war. Nevertheless, the mistakes must be cited, and the basic principles repeated in order that both civilian leaders and military professionals may learn what to expect and what to avoid in the future.

On the accompanying chart of the Vietnam hurricane (figure 1), there are five basic categories: inherent complexity, intelligence, assumptions, judgment and decision, and integrity of command.

You can select your own categories and make your own arrangement—as long as you list specific items and recognize that they are *related* and *synergistic*.

The General Course of Events. For purposes of this discussion, the most critical dates in the Vietnam chronology are:

September 1945—United States acquiesced in the return of French troops to reestablish control of Indochina.

February 1950—United States recognized the State of Vietnam established by the puppet emperor Bao Dai and French in July 1949.

March-May 1954—United States refused to intervene in battle of Dien Bien Phu.

October 1954—President Eisenhower agreed to send direct aid to South Vietnam.

November 1961—President Kennedy committed 15,000 troops.

1 November 1963—United States acquiesced in coup against President Diem.




Fig. 1—The Vietnam Hurricane

or

The Pentagon in the Eye of the Storm

22 November 1963—President Kennedy assassinated.

February-March 1965—President Johnson decided to escalate war and to do so without declaring national emergency or calling up reserves.

By mid-1966 the situation was out of control. President Johnson had committed us to "Victory" and decided not to declare a national emergency, impose wage and price control, nor conduct decisive military operations. While the "objective" was repeatedly stated by the President and Secretary of State, it was never done so in terms that would produce conceptual unity in the conduct of operations.

In strategic terms the United States had lost control of both the external and the internal field of action. From then until 1969, it

really did not make much difference who said what. Public opinion made it impossible for President Johnson either to withdraw from South Vietnam or to invade North Vietnam.

In essence, by mid-1966 President Johnson had no strategy; all he could do was to improvise in desperation.

After the 1968 election any responsible President would have made the same basic decision as President Nixon; i.e., move closer to Russia and China so as to reduce world tension, and withdraw from Vietnam as fast as domestic politics would permit.

Discussion. With full realization that I am omitting some important factors, there are five major points of discussion:

A. The faulty draft law and how its operation combined with the guns and butter policy of President Johnson to undermine the control of the internal field of action, i.e., the sources of our power.

B. The excessive degree of control exercised by the Secretary of Defense and the President over the tactical operations of our combat forces.

C. The gross failure of our high command, both civilian and military, to understand how a logistic system behaves under the stress of combat with the consequent growth of the logistic snowball.

D. The lack of integrity of command in the civilian leadership by its unwise and dishonest attempts to conceal the true cost of the war, and the loss of integrity among many military commanders.

E. Finally, and perhaps most important, the inability or reluctance to take decisive action coupled with the failure to appreciate and compensate for the effects of this indecisiveness.

The combination of these factors diminished our ability to control the external field of action. The enemy always had the initiative and, what is worse, this to a large degree destroyed the confidence of the American people in their own Government to control the internal field of action. The credibility gap was real and it was justified. Not only did people refuse to believe the official Government and military statements but many seemed to

acquire great faith in the accuracy of all statements from Hanoi.

The draft law as it was in the 1960s might have been suitable for a World War II repetition, but it was disastrously wrong for the Vietnam war. It was shortsighted and unfair in precisely those elements that insured loss of control of the sources of power. By exempting or deferring university students, the Vietnam draft called up disproportionate numbers of uneducated and underprivileged young men. The well-to-do and the well-educated found it easy to stay in college. Remember, while they were well-to-do, and "well-educated," they were not necessarily wise and mature.

This had two bad effects. The class and race antagonism which had developed with the black liberation movement of the 1950s grew strong among the drafted enlisted men. The white elite, who were deferred, developed strong subconscious guilt feelings which were transmitted into antimilitary feelings which in turn led to violent political activism. Our military discipline and our civic discipline both suffered. This situation was further aggravated by the failure to impose wage and price controls which, with inflation, created a sense of grave injustice among many of the people.

This sense of injustice and alienation was further compounded by the feeling among draftees that the "lifers," the professional officers and NCOs, were using the war as a means of personal advancement rather than loyal service to the country. The short tours of duty for commanding officers made this even worse. I will not dwell on the way that Washington fouled up air operations in Vietnam by the stupid selection of targets and detailed orders on how to attack a target. The result was minimum useful effect with maximum loss of pilots and airplanes.

Another grave error was that adequate logistic control was not established in Vietnam until after the logistic snowball had grown out of control. The excessive standard of living, particularly in the rear areas and particularly of the Army and Air Force (example: 9 lbs. per man/day Army PX) harmed morale, corrupted the local population, interfered with combat support, and created major inflationary forces both in Vietnam and the United States. Initially, the whole transportation system was set up on the false premise that you increase logistic system effectiveness by maximizing carrier efficiency. This had been proven wrong both in World War I and World War II.

In 1966 the extent of the enormous cost of the war was being concealed by three measures: spending FY 67 money in FY 66; diverting funds for support and maintenance of Atlantic and

European forces to the Western Pacific and deliberately underestimating budget deficits in presentations to Congress; and concealing enormous expenditures from the Federal Reserve Board.

This fiscal hanky-panky was a major cause of the inflation that is now causing so much concern.

As for the military professionals—they acquiesced in the meaningless and corrupting statistics which purported to show success; in policies that they did not believe in; in the misrepresentation of reports and in slanted intelligence; and in the competition for statistical superiority in sorties and bombloads delivered. What is worse, at times they not only covered up unfavorable events but, as in the case of General Lavalley, actually falsified reports.

By mid-1966 it was clear that we had become trapped in an impossible situation and that major harmful consequences were inevitable. We were losing the political war and we did not have the power in usable form to invade North Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Administration was unwilling to take the decisive action of withdrawing or of declaring a national emergency and deciding on a long war of attrition. Instead, the DOD budget was based each year on the absurd premise that the war would be over the next year!

A free society survives in accordance with the ability of its political processes to resolve the clash of the vested interests that are inherent in any large organized group. This resolution is usually in the form of compromise. Thus the habit of compromise is deeply ingrained. In military affairs, compromise also must take place but with a great difference.

Compromise in operational planning entails a risk that is quite different both in nature and value from the risks of political compromise. Frequently it leads to great disaster. It is better to abandon or not undertake a military commitment rather than accept a fundamental compromise.

The compromise of the Bay of Pigs led up to the Vietnam commitment. Time and again in Vietnam military fundamentals were fatally compromised for reasons of either “policy” or domestic “politics” with harmful consequences that have not yet been fully paid for or even recognized. This kind of “political” dominance is quite different from the proper dominance of strategy by political purpose. In these harmful instances, policy itself is frustrated or defeated by the failure of the military action to be effective.

In spite of this extraordinary mass of misjudgment, thousands upon thousands of officers and men performed their duty with competence, devotion, endurance, and great courage and sacrifice. Nevertheless, these factors, working with the other elements I mentioned, wrecked the combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army in 1969-70 and left an inheritance of bitterness, frustration and hatred, whose full effect we can never fully measure.

Conclusion. It is difficult to dignify U.S. military action in Vietnam by the word strategy.

At no time did any course of action which was adopted pass the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. In each case, particularly after January 1964, the course of action adopted was a compromise and, as such, was an indecisive action based on the hope that the Vietnamese, both South and North, would recognize the strength and virtue of the American cause according to our standards of reason and behave as reasonable people.

One of the inevitable consequences of this lack of decisiveness was that the war was overmanaged, with practically every important decision being studied and argued in great and usually speculative detail. This overmanagement—this excessive control of operational details from Washington—introduced time delays that compounded the other errors in a regenerative manner to produce an ineffective, gigantic but musclebound military effort, national frustration and national division. It was in truth *The Vietnam Hurricane*.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Just as the topics mentioned in the Preface and Prologue are interwoven in the reality of the living world, so too the substantive elements of their discussion are interwoven throughout this work.

Just as the process of decision and action cannot be confined to a set routine of tangible or quantitative factors, so too the discussion must include abstract ideas, moral values, and general principles. A study of the last 25 years reveals patterns of repeated violations of sound principles. This repetition has been costly both in direct and indirect effects. In the long run, the latter may even be more harmful than the former for many are yet to appear clearly.

But what are sound principles? Who determines what is a principle and what is sound and what is unsound?

Military theory includes both the general substance and structure of military knowledge and statements of the cause and effect relationships that constitute military principles.*

The concluding paragraph of *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, published in April 1965 just as the Vietnam war began to escalate, reads:

The methods of planning and decision, the criteria of judgment and the casual ethics that are adequate for the relatively modest risks of most business and domestic political decisions are utterly inadequate for the critical political-military decisions of today's harsh world of conflict. The risks are great. The stakes are high. The challenge is clear.¹

Since then the course of events has confirmed the validity not only of this conclusion but also the concepts and basic military theory expressed in that book.

*The formulation and statement of such theory will always be an imperfect continuing process which should be the primary concern of service colleges.

Therefore, this work will not reformulate these ideas but rather will extend some of them and develop a few further thoughts that reflect some of the most important lessons of our subsequent tragic experience in Southeast Asia.

As in all important problems of humanity, military problems are interdisciplinary. Because they demand the best of our generalists as well as specialists, sound theory is required. Such theory is essential not only to the understanding of these complex problems as they arise but also to an understanding of how the elements of the problems are interwoven in a synergistic manner.

Evaluation of this interaction, in turn, must be highly intuitive as each area of change and each phase of violence, as well as each conflict, is influenced by the nature of the free society in which we live. That free society provides a special and complex political environment. The most demanding requirement a free society makes of its military professionals and its civilian military executives is to understand how this special and complex political environment interacts with military power.

This, in turn, requires a thorough grasp of civil-military relations and of the reciprocal responsibilities of civilian executives and military professionals. In simplified form, this means that the military leader must not only be professionally competent, he must understand politics and the political considerations that so profoundly influence and direct the use of military force. It means that the civilian leaders, both politicians and executives, must understand the broad capabilities and limitations of the military forces. Above all, it means that both civilian and military leaders must understand the nature, structure, and major factors involved in civilian control of the military, particularly as it involves problems of centralization and decentralization in command control and how these factors influence military readiness and effectiveness.

This is easier to say than to do because the mass of technical knowledge necessary to operate military forces today is so great that it tends to obscure the larger, and usually more important, factors embodied in sound theory and principle.

Many military professionals have also been so narrow in their experience and study that until they go to one of the war colleges they remain ignorant of politics. In the same way, many political and social scientists remain equally ignorant of military realities.

To come to grips with these key problems for military power as a free society, we must examine some specifics.

The major elements that influence the use of military power in a free society are: the nature of a free society, the nature of military power, and the nature of the interaction between the military system and the society itself.

This interaction applies particularly to the questions: first, how does a free society create and maintain an effective system of military power and, second, how do the leaders of the nation and the executives in government control the employment of military force in the interests of the society and the nation?

This interaction presents a paradox because some elements in the society that strengthen freedom may also inhibit the efficient creation and maintenance of the military system and the effective employment of military force in the interests of the society.

Throughout this interaction there is the unresolved question: how and to what degree should the noncombat activities of the military system be used to further the social and economic interests of the society and the partisan political interests of the national executives and legislators?

Finally, in the light of the present state of world culture and the nature and rate of cultural change, what should be our expectations for the further development of these relationships?

These matters are neither easy nor simple. Few people have considered them and yet the manner in which they are handled will profoundly affect the ability of a free society to use military power to support its freedom.

Lest we become confused at the outset in looking for answers to these questions, some definitions are required. The nature of certain abstract relationships must be made as understandable as possible.

Any operational decisions by a responsible executive, whether civilian or military, ultimately are based on his view of life, his sense of values, his concepts, perceptions, and cognitive patterns—his intuition. I will therefore briefly discuss such abstractions as: strategic realism, the nature of intuition, the distinction between morality and moralism, the distinction between a “puzzle” and a “difficulty,” and the ultimate source of strategy as being the sense of values of the people of a nation. I believe that anyone who does not understand the abstract and theoretical foundations of political-military affairs cannot deal successfully with the practical operational problems of high-level political-military executive authority.

To begin, although strategic realism requires the analysis of *objectives* and *assumptions* and the appraisal of *expectations*,

political and military objectives and assumptions lie almost wholly in the realm of *intuition*. Yet the knowledge of quantitative analysis as related to operational readiness and combat effectiveness is essential to the realistic practical appraisal of military expectations.

This seeming paradox in turn means that the military professional must be able to combine rigorous quantitative analysis with sound intuitive judgment; that quick, keen insight so important to reasoned and balanced decisions.

Jerome Bruner's comments on intuition illustrate the subtlety of the point:

In contrast to analytic thinking, intuitive thinking characteristically does not advance in careful well-defined steps. Indeed, it tends to involve maneuvers based seemingly on an implicit perception of the total problem. The thinker arrives at an answer, which may be right or wrong, with little if any awareness of the process by which he reached it. He rarely can provide an adequate account of how he obtained his answer, and he may be unaware of just what aspects of the problem situation he was responding to. Usually intuitive thinking rests on familiarity with the domain of knowledge involved and with its structure, which makes it possible for the thinker to leap about, skipping steps and employing short cuts in a manner that requires a later rechecking of conclusions by more analytic means, whether deductive or inductive. . . .

The complementary nature of intuitive and analytic thinking should, we think, be recognized. Through intuitive thinking the individual may often arrive at solutions to problems which he would not achieve at all, or at best more slowly, through analytic thinking. Once achieved by intuitive methods, they should if possible be checked by analytic methods, while at the same time being respected as worthy hypothesis for such checking. . . .

Professional judgment and intuition are almost synonymous. In both, the mental process draw on patterns of experience and study imbedded in the subconscious. The recognition of similarities and differences in these patterns seems completely unpredictable but it also seems dependent on a special kind of involvement that is akin to the tuning of

a radio circuit. An experienced acute mind develops a special feel for a situation which enables it to respond perceptively to an aberration or fault of reason or action which will escape the notice of the untuned mind.²

The intuitive sense of what is practicable is the first essential element of sound military thinking. Particularly required is an understanding of the major logistical and tactical elements of the situation that provide the strategic concept with a sound basis.

The intuitive sense of practicality has been discussed in various ways. For example, B.H. Liddell Hart wrote:

A commander must not lose his own balance. He needs to have the quality which Voltaire described as the keystone of Marlborough's success—"that calm courage in the midst of tumult, that security of soul in danger, which the English call a cool head."

But to it he must add the quality for which the French have found the most aptly descriptive phrase—*le sens du practicable*: the sense of what is possible, and which is not possible—tactically and administratively. It is what we really mean when we talk of "common sense," and what we should mean when we talk of "realism." The combination of both these two "guarding" qualities might be epitomized as the power of cool calculation.³

Human perceptions and cognition are essential parts of intuition. For years scholars have been studying how statesmen have made major miscalculations in international affairs because of the difference between their perceptions of other states and the realities of their intentions and responses. For instance, Wedge and Wedge, using the word cognition to mean "the mental predisposition for organizing precepts in a given way," wrote:

There was just enough evidence . . . to provide a starting point to investigate how the objective realities of national power and force capabilities are linked to national cognition and perception in the international political process.⁴

Accurate perception is a vital matter in all international crises in which the large-scale use of military force may be contemplated. It is crucial to all plans and discussions for procurement and

deployment of nuclear weapons and for all international treaties concerning their limitation or use.

The adoption or rejection of any strategy is itself the product of perception, especially the perception of the moral values involved. Such values as are possessed and perceived by the people of a nation establish "public opinion," which in turn determines the limits of strategy; i.e., the political practicability of a strategic concept or plan. National strategy, to be successful, must operate within accepted moral limits.

Such restraints apply to our present problems in very specific terms, particularly as they underline the relationship between discipline and moral values.

Although the word applies to many things, discipline in its deepest sense means: a sense of values; the knowledge of cause and effect; the willingness to make decisions; the willingness to accept personal responsibility for the results of such decisions. Accordingly, moral values are in fact aspects of discipline; they represent both the control of selfishness and the exercise of responsibility.

Actual moral values and their sham competitor, moralism, should not be confused. After pointing out that rational idealism and historical realism are different perspectives within a commitment to a political order of justice and freedom and that both Jefferson and Lincoln practiced a combination of idealism and realism, Ernest Lefever wrote:

The corruption of realism or idealism can be called *moralism* the most popular rival and imposter of genuine *morality*. . . . Morality has to do with right and wrong. . . . It is a discipline of ends and means. . . . Moralism, on the other hand, is a sham morality, a partial ethic. Often it is expressed in self-righteous rhetoric or manipulative symbols designed to justify, enlist, condemn or deceive rather than to inform, inspire or serve the cause of justice. . . . Morality is a synonym for responsibility. Moralism is a conscious or unconscious escape from accountability.

Soft moralism is highly critical of the exercise of American military power, except in self-defense, and this is often narrowly defined. America has been criticized for throwing its weight around, and even for repressive policies toward the Third World, though solid evidence is seldom adduced to buttress these charges. On the other hand, a few hard zealots have called for a stronger exercise of power to impose an

American order in one part of the world or another. Classical moralists reject both the arbitrary abstention from power and its unrestrained use, and insist that the United States has a responsibility for international peace and order commensurate with its capacity to affect external events. . . .⁵

It would be hard to overstate, in a free society, the importance of planning for and judging the use of military power within the framework Lefever suggests.

These seemingly diffuse ideas can be drawn into a coherent and practical summary in the central theme—strategic realism requires the challenge of assumptions, the analysis of objectives, and the appraisal of expectations. This theme applies equally to problems of adapting to cultural change and to organizing and effectively employing military power.

We should, however, realize the importance of first understanding the nature of the cultural or the military political problem with which we propose to deal.

Two concepts are useful. First, there is the distinction between a puzzle and a difficulty:

A *Puzzle* is an uncertainty that can usually be solved correctly in one way. It always has a solution and the solution is an absolute one. Once the solution is found, its correctness can always be checked by reconstituting the puzzle and solving it again. In principle, at least, there is no reason why machines cannot be designed to solve all puzzles.

A *Difficulty* is another kind of uncertainty altogether. It cannot be solved in the preceding sense. It can be surmounted, overcome, reduced, avoided, ignored; but it cannot be solved. There may be all sorts of ways of dealing with and getting out of difficulties. Some of the ways will certainly be more efficient than others; but no one of these ways will be absolutely and demonstrably correct.⁶

Second, the common maladjustment discussed by Wendell Johnson:

. . . Failure is a matter of evaluation. Failure is the felt difference between what you expect and what you get. It is the difference between what you assume you have to do, what you demand of yourself, and what you actually do. It is

what you feel when your expectations exceed your realizations. If your ideals or goals are too high, in the sense that they are too vague, or too highly valued, or unrealistic, then you are likely to experience a sense of failure. . . .

As your sense of failure deepens, you settle more and more into despondency. You are then not only bored, but also sorry about it. You are forced to evaluate your "failure"—to feel inferior because you feel inferior. . . .

In all this is to be seen the basic design of our common maladjustment. We may call it the IFD disease: from idealism to frustration to demoralization. Probably no one of us entirely escapes it. It is of epidemic proportions. . . .

In "the troubles I've seen" it has predominated conspicuously. In my experience, no other ailment is so common among university students, for example, as what I have termed the IFD disease. It is, moreover, a condition out of which there tend to develop the various types of severe "mental" and nervous disorders, the neuroses and psychoses that fill our "mental" hospitals with such a lush growth of delusion and incompetence. . . .

In this view of maladjusted persons as frustrated and distraught idealists we may glimpse the broad outlines of problems that are common to us all in varying degrees. The IFD disease, as we have sketched it, is not so much an affliction of individuals as it is a reflection of strong semantic forces that play upon and through individuals.⁷

While I prefer to use the term "romanticist" rather than "idealist," in any event this demoralization which reduces our ability to think clearly may be a major cause of violence.

One who confuses puzzles and difficulties is likely to ascribe the inability to "solve" a difficulty to deliberate intent and ill will and when repeatedly so frustrated, his demoralization may lead to a violent reaction. Frequently this violence will be justified on *moral* grounds when in fact it may be an extreme example of *moralism*.

Lefever's further comment is useful:

In this disdain for history, ancient and recent, and their insistence on achieving quick solutions, many romantic

idealists sell the future short by neglecting the disciplines of moral and political calculation. The principal practical test of any political decision is not the intentions of the actor or the means he uses but its immediate and long term consequences. These consequences are also essential in making a moral assessment of the decision . . . critics do not bear the burden of decision, but are they not obligated to consider all the major issues at stake before they pronounce final moral judgment?⁸

In other words, the essence of morality lies in the concern for the consequences and the willingness to accept responsibility for them. This applies particularly to the seemingly intractable problems of international conflict such as those between the Arabs and Israelis where all participants claim moral justification for attitudes that insure continued violence and destruction.

The General Situation. The world situation in which military decisions must be made is extraordinarily complicated. The technological revolution of the mid-20th century has produced many contradictions and paradoxes that add further complexity to the problem of military power in a free society. For example, the speed and volume of global transportation and electronic communication have made the people of the undeveloped nations acutely aware of the economic disparity between them and the people of the developed nations. Within the developed nations these same factors have made the underprivileged segment of a nation aware and resentful of the affluence of their wealthy compatriots.

Technology also has been increasing the disparity between the developed and the undeveloped nations. Part of the unrest so engendered is expressed in an increasing spirit of nationalism—which in turn is encouraged by the political leaders who try to maintain themselves in power by ascribing the nation's troubles to foreign interests. In many of these nations, this strong nationalism is caused by the resentment toward the exploitative nature of their recent colonial status. These factors increase conflict and the forces of disintegration among nations.

By decreasing infant mortality and the ravages of epidemics, technology has increased population pressure, pollution, and the consumption of irreplaceable natural resources. Nationalism has made it more difficult to apply technology to the alleviation of the evils caused by its exponential growth.

Technology has increased the economic disparity, it has increased popular expectations, it has facilitated communication among disaffected groups, it has increased the availability and destructiveness of weapons, it has increased the violence and scope of conflict and of social disruption.

At the same time, the obvious need to avoid thermonuclear warfare, the threat of which springs from this same technology, strengthens the forces of international accommodation and integration.

Thus, we are confronted with serious fundamental problems in all areas of human activity: political, economic, social, and military. Because technological change takes place on a scale larger and at a rate faster than many individuals and organizations can adjust, and because some groups adjust faster than others, great personal, social, and economic inequities, imbalances, and tensions result which in turn create frustration and violence, thus producing a continuum of human conflict.

I have elsewhere presented the concept of such a spectrum of conflict in which the military commander must be prepared to use military force effectively whenever so directed by his superior political authority.

This spectrum, or better still this continuum, begins at one extreme: the romantic absurdity of universal sweetness and light; thereafter with increasing conflicts of interests in international competition and with increasing violence, it approaches the opposite extreme: the inhuman absurdity of unlimited thermonuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.

No chart, no verbal expression can precisely describe this range of human conflict. Nevertheless, if we are to deal effectively with the paradoxes and contradictions of our time, if we are to maintain a civilized society, we must understand the nature and the sources of human conflict, and the use of power and of force in its control.

The Challenge to the Free Society. The free society can be classed as a sociocultural system which encompasses both the system and consequences of the concepts and behavior of the human population in a given period.⁹ For purposes of an admittedly simplified discussion, this sociocultural system can be viewed in three aspects:

The *basic foundation* on which it is built and on which it lives.

The *threats* to its welfare and survival that arise from causes inherent in man's nature.

The *imperatives of action*; areas in which action is necessary not only for the free society to survive but also necessary for civilization, be it free or authoritarian, to survive in a form resembling that in which we now live.

The foundation, the threats, and the imperatives are inter-related, they are interdisciplinary, and their understanding involves not only the abstract and concrete but also logic and experience. In dealing with them we must use our powers of observation, truthful description, objective analysis, and courageous application. Because we can expect to be imperfect in all of these, we cannot hope finally to solve the problems. We can only hope to increase the probability of survival of those qualities of life we value most.

In this overall analysis we should distinguish between two categories. There are cultural changes that arise from the action of basic human drives, emotions, symbolic behavior, and perceptions—changes that cannot be specifically controlled. Examples of this are shifts in behavioral values, language usage and “life styles.” There also are specific areas in which control is possible even though it may be imperfect and very difficult; for example, nuclear weapons.

The Foundation. The structure of government and the organization of society rest on three major elements—the law, the economy, and the language.

The law cannot stand alone. It must be supported by a system of force that must itself be governed by law. The law determines the system of government and regulates its conduct; the law provides a means by which it may itself be changed by the process of government; the law and the government share the responsibility for the organization and administration of a judicial system that, backed by the right and the willingness to use force, administers the law. Both the judicial system and the government seek to achieve justice, but law and justice are not synonymous.

Organized and civilized society rests on and is nourished by an economic system whereby the creations of nature and man's imagination and industry are processed and exchanged first to support life, provide safety and comfort, and thereafter to support

social intercourse, the arts and recreation. In any organized society some form of money must be used to facilitate the exchange of goods and services.

Reasonable stability in the value of money as related to goods and services is necessary to maintain this exchange on an effective basis.

The ideal economy would presumably provide for absolute equity in this exchange, but professional economists differ so widely in their concepts of how this can be attained that there seems little expectation that it can be achieved and maintained except by severe restriction on human freedom; i.e., authoritarian government. Unrestrained monetary inflation upsets the stability of this relation and, in particular, it accentuates all the inequities. It creates excessive hardship and a sense of injustice that diminishes confidence in the government and political system.

Furthermore, excessive inflation stimulates conflict, both domestic and foreign, and thereby tends to cause a dangerous regenerative action. Inflation effects are very pronounced in the procurement of modern weapons and, therefore, the cost of military forces increases rapidly at the very time the increase in conflict accentuates the need for military power. Because the military expenditures are an important factor in the economy, this creates further inflation.

Turning to the third major element, communication in a common language is an absolute essential in law, in government, and in the economy. While students of semantics have for years expressed concern over the harmful effects of verbal distortion, it was generally considered to be both a normal and acceptable practice for anyone engaged in politics or business.¹⁰ However, the press conferences and official press releases of the Vietnam war and the testimony of various witnesses in the congressional hearings and court actions on the Watergate scandal have shocked many.

A nation whose language is in a serious decline may be deteriorating in far more important aspects of its being, said NBC newsman Edwin Newman recently in a speech at the dedication of a communications center at his alma mater, the University of Wisconsin

Mr. Newman attributed the sorry state of the American language to recent historical developments—the decline of the cities, the Vietnam War, the black revolt, the counterculture,

television, and the character of our political leaders. Why, we wonder, did he not mention the rather obvious importance of mastering language? Over the years we have watched sadly the phenomenon of more and more formally educated people speaking literally less and less. For this our educators are to be blamed—who else?

What interests us especially in this critique of contemporary language by a professional wordman is his perception that when language deteriorates other things do too. What is cause and what is effect? Is it faulty education and sloppy thinking and loose morals and bad religion that cause linguistic degeneration, or is it the other way around? . . . We suggest that the interaction between how we speak and how we think and live is reciprocal, so that when we use words poorly we are not thinking as well as we might, and if we aren't thinking straight we may not be living as straight as we should^{1 1}

Richard Gambino wrote:

Whatever the character of the Watergate witnesses, the hearings show that political language has degenerated since Orwell's warning that thought and language decline together. Seemingly more than before in American politics the English language is used not as an instrument for forming and expressing thought. It is used more to prevent, confuse, and conceal thought. Thus we have grown accustomed to calling political lingo "rhetoric." This good word has been so debased to stand for anything from propaganda and nonsense to vicious lies. As the pseudo-language takes hold—even in the process of our determined attempts to regenerate responsibility in political life—it drags us further into chaotic conditions leading logically and inevitably to political nihilism.^{1 2}

In an article "Politics and the American Language" in *The American Scholar*, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. quoted Emerson:

And politics was only an aspect of a deeper problem. Society as a whole was taking forms that warred against clarity of thought and integrity of language. "A man's power to connect his thought with its proper symbol, and so to

utter it," said Emerson, "depends on the simplicity of his character, that is, upon his love of truth, and his desire to communicate it without loss. The corruption of man is followed by the corruption of language. When simplicity of character and the sovereignty of ideas is broken up by the prevalence of secondary desires, the desire of riches, of pleasure, of power, and of praise . . . words are perverted to stand for things which are not."

He then continued:

Other developments hastened the spreading disassociation of words from meaning, of language from reality. The rise of mass communications, the growth of large organizations and novel technologies, the invention of advertising and public relations, the professionalization of education—all contributed to linguistic pollution, upsetting the ecological balance between words and their environment. In our own time the purity of language is under unrelenting attack from every side—from professors as well as from politicians, from newspapermen as well as from advertising men, from men of the cloth as well as from men of the sword, and not least from those indulgent compilers of modern dictionaries who propound the suicidal thesis that all usages are equal and all correct.

A living language can never be stabilized, but a serious language can never cut words altogether adrift from meanings. The alchemy that changes words into their opposites has never had more adept practitioners than it has today We owe to Vietnam and Watergate a belated recognition of the fact that we are in linguistic as well as political crisis and that the two may be organically connected^{1 3}

If corrupt language is tolerated in courts of law, the achievement of justice will be hampered if not made impossible. If it is tolerated in serious military discussion, or analyses and estimates, wrong decisions will be encouraged and bad operational plans produced.

Furthermore, we should realize that, regardless of all other factors, the economy of a free society rests ultimately on the spirit of good faith between the industrialists, the bankers, the producers, the consumers, the managers, and the laborers. When language is debased, this vital element of good faith is weakened.

The Threats. The major threats to a free society are:

1. The society's own inherent tendency toward social and political decay.
2. Economic disintegration caused by uncontrolled inflation.
3. Overt military defeat, either in the form of conquest or disastrous defeat in foreign lands.
4. Subversion, a combination of economic and political pressure, various forms of propaganda with terrorist and guerrilla activity encouraged or actually supported from abroad.

Decay and economic disintegration are closely related and frequently go hand in hand. There are conflicting opinions on the degree to which the cultural changes of recent years represent decay or represent rejuvenation in a healthy reaction to decay. Nevertheless, for thousands of years human society has somehow survived ostentatious luxury and profligate waste side by side with abject poverty. Corruption in business and politics, overweening ambition, the lust for power, bad education and corrupt language are all symptoms of modern life. In free societies these matters generally come to light and are openly discussed in a way that eventually brings some correction.

There is today, however, a significant difference. The national problems are more interlocked with international problems, communication is swift and extensive, modern weapons are devastating, and conflict is more explosive. But why string out the obvious: What is cause? What is effect?

In this imperfect world of imperfect human beings, ideal justice and ideal discipline will never be achieved. Nevertheless, we should know how they are related in order to work more effectively toward the ideal.

In the Hispanic tradition, the military sees itself as the guardian of the morals of the government and hence feels obligated to assume political power when political ineptitude and corruption become excessive. The American tradition is quite different; the military has sworn to defend the constitution, not the morals of the state. It can, however, set an example of competence, dedication, and integrity. Furthermore, the military can even be the core of an overall system of national service that can provide a sense of social responsibility.

This brings us to the importance of the abstract, the intangible factors, the distinction between the puzzle and the difficulty, between morality and moralism, and finally to social-political discipline.

There is relatively little that the national government in a free society can do to correct the social-political faults that in the aggregate constitute cultural decay, for if these faults are symptoms of the state of mind and values of the people, i.e., the *culture of the nation*, a freely elected government will reflect these values.

Reliance on the national government to control and correct all the ills of society not only raises unrealizable expectations, but also diminishes the sense of personal responsibility that must always be the heart of freedom. It is well to remember Toynbee's concept of a civilization depending on the dedicated work of a creative minority.

Thus the best defense of a free society against subversion lies in the excellence of its institutions and in the competence and integrity of its leaders and public officials. This excellence is evidenced among other things by the manner in which officials exercise intellectual and political discipline, including both a sense of and a respect for truth and justice.

Thus, the four threats present a clear and present danger to our free society. My prescription to minimize or lessen these threats may appear nothing more than moralistic exhortation—sounding brass and tinkling cymbals. And, if not supported by an understanding of the realities of world power as related to military operational readiness, combat effectiveness, and military procurement leadtime, it is just that. These form the factual basis for the military analysis necessary for the development of strategy and the force structure to support it.

In this regard, in any particular nation, critical factors will be: first, its degree of economic self-sufficiency and, second, the degree to which it takes an active rather than a passive role in world affairs. These factors will largely govern the manner in which the national leaders perceive the external and internal affairs of the nation and will influence both the sources and occasions of conflict. While I have written primarily from the viewpoint of the United States of America, I have tried to underscore the military-political fundamentals that will apply to other nations who seek to develop and maintain free institutions and a distinctive national culture. For this reason, in the next chapter, I discuss both the internal and external character of freedom.

CHAPTER II

THE FREE SOCIETY

ITS NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS

The term free society represents an idea for which men have fought and died since the beginning of history. In our time this general concept has been not only the focus of much oratory, but also the cause of domestic controversy and struggle, the inspiration for international organizations, and the rallying cry of a great world war. Regardless of the violence with which they may be repressed, the concepts of freedom and of the free society will unfold and develop as long as man exists.

Ideally the free society is one in which freedom is exercised in five major categories: freedom of expression, freedom of enterprise, freedom of electoral choice, a free judiciary, and freedom from external domination. The first four are internal, the last external. This distinction is important. Among the internal freedoms, freedom of expression includes free communication media and freedom of religion. A judiciary free from domination by either the legislative or executive authority is an essential guardian. Freedom from external domination implies both national sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency. None of these freedoms can be absolute or unlimited, for they include contradictory elements such that freedom in one category may frequently be diminished to attain an overall higher freedom or to avoid clear injustice or unacceptable restriction in another category. In practice, each element of freedom is limited in accordance with the situation and the perceptions and basic concepts of the individuals and groups exercising actual power. The nature and degree of the necessary limitations are determined by intuitive judgment exercised amidst argument and controversy. The more each necessary limitation is self-imposed by the people themselves and by the innumerable interest groups in the society, the less will be the controversy. Always, however, each limitation of freedom will have both good and harmful effects which cannot be wholly predicted in advance.

In the United States of America the system of checks and balances, with an independent judiciary deciding disputes between the executive and legislative bodies and with differing length of terms in the Senate and House of Representatives, was designed to protect the basic freedoms and at the same time moderate the swings between extremes of political action. But beyond this kind of need for constitutional checks and balances there must be a process of self-limitation. Such self-limitation is part of an overall quality of social-political discipline, the exercise of which is essential to the continued existence of freedom in any society.

Regardless of the oratory and moralistic exhortation characteristic of the adversary debates of the political process in free societies, one major fact is paramount. The special characteristics of the species *homo sapiens* that produce the great works of science and art also ensure that human conflict will occur.

Furthermore, it is sheer delusion to believe that the concepts of the free society and of representative free government can endure in a static or completely stable social-political-economic environment.

Human development, the fulfillment of human aspiration, means change and change by definition means instability. It is a matter of relative change and relative stability.

The availability of mass-destruction weapons and the finite limits of our planetary biosphere require that this change, this instability, be limited or controlled. And for this reason the nature and use of military power must be understood because it is the key to control.

The achievements of science and art and the problems of change stem from the basic nature of man, particularly as the development of his cerebral cortex produces:

- a. Abstract ideas;
- b. Logical analysis based on a record of history;
- c. Rational projected plans; and
- d. Individual aspiration and need for personal fulfillment.

These factors, particularly the last, cause man's refusal to remain within any predetermined mold. The resulting continuing change creates contradictions, paradoxes, and major inconsistencies throughout society.

No man adapts equally to all changes; no two men adapt at the same rate to change in general. Therefore, tension and continued human conflict are normal. Some change is rapid, noticeable hour

by hour or even second by second; some change is very slow, scarcely detectable over thousands of years. Some is good, some is bad, and it takes wisdom to know the difference. Yet in 4,000 years of recorded history, some very important basic requirements have not changed:

Man's need for maintaining contact and association with the earth itself from whose thin topsoil and deep oceans his species evolved.

Man's need for creative expression, personal fulfillment, and recognition as an individual.

Man's need for human love.

Man's need for belief in and loyalty to something or someone greater and more enduring than himself.

The ancient Greeks recognized that the law of diminishing returns operates inexorably in all human affairs and that when change takes place faster than a man can adapt to it, his resulting confusion and frustration may so demoralize him that he withdraws from reality or lapses into irrational savagery. The ability of an individual to adapt to change in a constructive manner, therefore, depends largely on the understanding of those eternal verities that give man the stability to stand and grow amid the winds of change (see Appendix C).

When men of intellect and moral courage view the natural inconsistency of human behavior, they react as individuals; that is, differently. Some choose dialectical materialism—the ideal of pure communism whose practical application we now see in the totalitarian police states of Lenin and Mao. Others, with perhaps the same basic ideals and aspirations, but a more romantic bent, having become frustrated by man's intractable individuality, created the Fascist totalitarian police state of Hitler. Still others with the same ideals, but with a more optimistic view of mankind's capabilities, believe in the free society with all its obvious faults.

Thus, we in the United States by our political and moral philosophy are committed to the ferment of freedom. With all its obvious frustrations and contradictions, we prefer it to accepting a wholly authoritarian government.

But change introduces another factor that further complicates man's problems: It takes time to determine the side effects of change. In many instances, these side effects create regenerative reactions that threaten to negate all the benefits that supposedly derive from the change itself. This is particularly true in problems involving human biological and social problems.

Thus, we now have the wholly unexpected situation that from the point of view of money and talent, the largest part of modern applied research is being devoted to seeking to offset the harmful results of much successful research and technological development of the past. I cite long-range ballistic missile systems and antisubmarine warfare systems as coming under the heading of very expensive and important countermeasures made necessary by previous technological successes.

In addition, and in the long run perhaps more important, is the major cultural change brought about by a combination of such technological successes in the 20th century as the internal combustion engine, powerful fertilizers and pesticides, and the whole new technology of electronics and information systems. The engine and the fertilizers together revolutionized agriculture and shifted the whole balance of rural/urban living, creating enormous, seemingly intractable, economic and sociological problems in the large cities. The resulting dissatisfaction and frustration have been accentuated by the miracle of television that not only points up the great differences between affluence and poverty, but also provides an inflammatory means of communication and incitement to violence. The resulting tension is alternately relieved and stimulated by cheap powerful modern drugs. The ensuing violence has swamped both our cumbersome judicial system and our self-defeating penal system, neither of which has kept pace with social technological change.

We have no clear solutions to these economic sociological problems and we do not yet understand the political implications of the cultural change. Some of these will be discussed in later chapters.

Where does all this leave us?

No two "free" nations will have the same blend of freedom and of limitation in their laws and institutions. No "free nation" will have a static blend of freedom and limitation in its laws and institutions. These will always be changing, some slowly, some quickly. These changes will be perceived by some groups as affecting them favorably and "fairly"; by other groups as affecting them unfavorably and "unfairly." The degree of conflict generated by these changes will vary in accordance with the ability of individuals and groups to adapt to these changes and by the ability of the government and other institutions to correct the gross errors that are inevitable in any changing society.

What is true within a "free nation" is also generally true among nations. Furthermore, many groups and perceptions are trans-

national. giving rise to the forms of conflict that tend to defy precise definition or clear assignment of responsibility.

This is the normal, the expected state of affairs. The problem is how do we control the violence and destruction of this inevitable conflict to the degree that the concepts and institutions of a free society, a free civilization can survive?

Regardless of how we label the conflict, a system of organized power and force at the disposal of the national government is required. Furthermore, the fundamental principles governing its organization and employment and the requirements for intellect and character in its leaders will be the same regardless of whether or not it is labeled a military system.

The basic characteristics of the free society will greatly influence the control and effective employment of this power and force as the military system and the society interact.

In all human society there is a continuing struggle between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration. This is a natural process carried on largely inadvertently, often at the subconscious level.

A man will advocate a cause because he thinks it will benefit a segment of society in which he has a special interest or because to him it represents an abstract ideal of justice, morality or compassion. For this cause to succeed, it must acquire and use power in a variety of aspects. It also creates and uses symbols and symbolic language that, in turn, identify and unify the adherents to that cause. But in most cases, except in major epidemics and natural disasters, these symbols often arouse the overt opposition of those who have differing concepts and perceptions.

There is a slow swirling dance as various interest groups form and reform. They associate and dissociate within the society as the perceptions and ambitions of the leaders change as the changes in the society, *which they have induced*, take place.

The anarchists think that there should be no attempt at governmental control; the totalitarians believe in the maximum possible control. In the past anarchy has been transient, lasting until power was seized by either an authoritarian left or an authoritarian right. Somewhere between those two recognizable areas, the free society exists, moving about a center position with its edges on both radical political left and radical political right.

Constitutional guarantees do not by themselves create or assure a free society. Some of the most dictatorial and oppressive regimes operate by suspending or ignoring liberal constitutions. Experience has shown that successful free representative government requires

not only competence and discipline, but also a high degree of respect for the intangible values of personal political integrity.

The concept of "The Loyal Opposition" is a fundamental element of stable free representative government. The degree to which this broad concept is actually practiced is a significant indication of where in the political spectrum a particular government can be placed.

The constitutional checks and balances, a loyal opposition and a free news media all are necessary if the corrupting influence of power is to be controlled.

Because the free society is generally assumed to promote fairness and equity among its citizens, the charge of unfairness or inequity is one of the most serious that can be brought against any law or administration. The professed values of the society are violated by overt inequity—be it social, political, or economic. The contradictions and imbalances that are inherent in the working of a free enterprise system at once become clear targets for the citizens and critics in a free society; it takes little skill or ability to point out the defects in the operation of the society. Such attacks have a great emotional weight. As a consequence it is much easier to bring down the government of a free society than that of an authoritarian society.

In the authoritarian society, on the other hand, and particularly in the Communist state, the welfare of the state as perceived by the ruling political group is overtly the highest value to which all individual rights and values are properly subordinated.

Those who speak about the "illegal actions" of the allied socialist countries in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is not, and there cannot be, law that is independent of class. Laws and legal standards are subject to the laws of the class struggle, to the laws of social development. These laws are clearly formulated in Marxist-Leninist teaching and in documents jointly adopted by the Communist and Workers' parties.¹

Of course, it is extremely difficult to create and operate any government, Communist or free, with equity and fairness. Those who find it relatively easy to destroy a government—a negative action—very seldom have the ability to organize and operate an effective and equitable government—a positive action.

The Struggle for Power. In either free or authoritarian society, there is a continuing struggle for political prestige and power. It takes many forms and is evidenced in many ways.

Regardless of whether the government is free or totalitarian, it can function only by means of a bureaucracy. This, in turn, introduces the further complication of bureaucratic politics, about which Allison and Halperin observed:

... the "maker" of government policy is not one calculating decision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decision and the actions of their government.²

In the totalitarian society this struggle is not often reported by the news media whereas in the free society it is frequently mentioned, with many speculations as to the nature, the participants, and the probable outcome.

Because the struggle tends to interfere with the orderly conduct of justice, legislation, and administrative matters, even in the best of times with the best of men and the best of organization and laws, there is always a significant amount of disorder, and chronic dissatisfaction with the government is normal.

There are legitimate conflicts of interests among the various groups within society. The necessary compromises are achieved by debate, adversary procedures, mediation and conciliation. These processes sometimes serve as lubricants in reducing the heat, the intensity, and damage of this vital "political" function of change. In many cases, they actually "solve a problem." In other instances, they retard or prevent beneficial change. But it is seldom possible to resolve the conflicts of interest with perfect justice and equity.

The authoritarian society, on the other hand, uses more arbitrary methods that in this century produced some spectacular results. For instance, the Fascists made many great improvements in the economy, transportation, public health, and public order in Italy; the Nazis made even more striking changes in Germany. In spite of the fact that the Fascist and Nazi regimes, by their cruelty and unrestrained aggrandizement, destroyed themselves and millions of others in World War II, the memory of their successes still elicits nostalgic or naive admiration among some people.

The U.S.S.R. has become a great military and economic power under a highly authoritarian regime that has adapted to changing

conditions, moving from Stalinist dictatorship to the more flexible collective government of the last 20 years. And, finally, the Maoist regime in China has eliminated mass starvation, stimulated production and popular education, and vastly enhanced national prestige.

In such authoritarian societies the apparatus of ruthless political repression is strong and ready for immediate use should the regime be threatened.

The maneuverings that go on within a state have their counterparts in the maneuverings among the transnational groups. The spread and diversification of conflict, particularly the manner in which many states either encourage or acquiesce in the various forms of terrorism, both national and transnational, the manner in which both the seizure of hostages and the payment of ransom have gained respectability, seems to be a reversion to the medieval and feudal periods of European history.

All of these actions represent the use of power and force to attain political objectives. A major difference, however, between this and the use of the legally constituted armed forces of a nation-state lies in the matters of responsibility and accountability.

A great philosophic gulf separates these societies. The idealistic totalitarian believes that the end justifies the means whereas the idealistic proponent of the free society believes that the end does not justify the means (this reemphasizes the importance of the concept that strategy is ultimately based on values).

The degree to which moral principles can be applied in a confusedly changing world is an intuitive judgment rather than a matter of dogma. This adds another paradox to the always puzzling human condition.

Weighing values is one of the "political" aspects of high-level decision. It is a severe test of one's intellectual ability and moral sense. It is further and conclusive proof of the importance of military discipline and the integrity of command. The usual standards of civilian life are totally inadequate for this rigorous test. If we cannot find men who can measure up to such high standards, then we must understand and accept the inevitable compromises and, perhaps, ultimate consequences.

It is easier to destroy a corrupt, inefficient and oppressive national government than it is to create a viable efficient honest and humane regime in its place.

The intellectual romanticists seem to ignore this problem, but such pragmatic idealists as Lenin and Mao recognized its

importance and difficulty and paid as much attention to the apparatus of power retention as to the process of good government. Freedom, in the sense of the aspirations of the free society, is then postponed so far into the future as to be almost wholly irrelevant.

Throughout history, demagogues have exploited the common human propensity for self-deception. In recent years, this has been illustrated by their semantic distortion of Lincoln's inspiring Gettysburg Address. His plea that "Government of the people, by the people, for the people, should not perish" was converted to the slogan "Power to the People."

The "people" require a mechanism to exercise power, and this mechanism frequently requires highly authoritative direction to act effectively. The control of the mechanism becomes subject to seizure by a corrupt individual or group, thus defeating the idea behind the slogan.

The struggle for political power through recorded history provides innumerable illustrations of the various means by which individuals and small groups have seized and manipulated power. Ancient Greece, the fall of the Roman Republic and the consolidation of imperial power, the development of the temporal power of the Vatican, the power struggles in the French Monarchy, the consolidation of power of the British Crown under Henry VIII, and the French Revolution, all provide fascinating areas of study.

In the early days of the United States, an elite group of transplanted Englishmen pondered the long history of classic power, its usurpation and corruption, and drew up a constitution of checks and balances.

In the early 20th century, a small group of dedicated exiles led by Lenin evolved not only an economic-political philosophy based on Marx, but what is equally important, they developed a doctrine for the seizure and subsequent retention of power that has shown remarkable strength. Iron discipline, unquestioned obedience among a small thoroughly indoctrinated and dedicated inner group form the heart of this doctrine that, in turn, uses a well-known variety of techniques of incitement, disruption and confrontation to gain power. A process of purgative purification based on a strict adherence to the party line is depended on to retain power.

In such authoritarian societies the use of assassination or prejudged public mass trials for political deviationists is an accepted form of party purification. The purges of the Stalin era in Russia, the Communist takeover in China, the Russian takeover

in Poland in 1945 and Czechoslovakia in 1948, the consolidation of Castro's power in Cuba, as well as the methods of Hitler and Mussolini, all show that most of these purifications were represented as the "will of the people."

The theoretical debates associated with the purity of the party concepts are sometimes relatively open, sometimes behind the scenes. Usually, they are incomprehensible to the average citizen of the non-Communist state. Because the party apparatus claims to represent the will of the people, power to the people means power to the ruling group. Similarly in a nonauthoritarian society, power resides in the persons who control the mechanisms of power.

It is here we come to a major contrast. Free societies creak along with obvious inefficiencies and much wasted motion. In any free society with a large population, the ballot is usually in the form of a yes or no vote. The electorate can choose among candidates for office, they can say yes or no to a referendum, be it a bond issue or approval of a constitutional amendment; they can seldom discriminate among fine points. They cannot make operational decisions, for few of these matters can be phrased in a yes or no manner nor can electoral action be taken fast enough or frequently enough to guide decisions. Insofar as public opinion affects policy or plans, it does so by influencing appraisal of the individuals controlling the mechanisms of power.

A public opinion poll, of course, furnishes valuable if not conclusive evidence about how people feel at the time the poll is taken. The more complex the issue, the less clear the result. Thus, the processes by which the people of a free society exercise power and guide the actions of government in what they perceive to be their interest, are complex and at times very slow and very uncertain.

This situation is further complicated by the fact that most people, even in highly developed nations, do not take a continuing active interest in the political and economic activities of their local and national governments. Very understandably they are preoccupied with their day-to-day work and personal affairs. As a consequence, the general public is slow to grasp the importance of events and future implications of the decisions taken by officials and legislatures. Predictably, the preventive measures necessary to avoid serious social and economic problems are seldom popular. Therefore, problems accumulate and intensify before the necessity for action is generally recognized.

When catastrophe seems imminent, the public becomes indignant and frequently, amidst cries of "why were we not told of this

situation?" demands crash programs and the naming and punishment of scapegoats. The concern with the starving millions of Africa and Asia, worldwide inflation, and the question of availability of energy to continue the industrial development of nations illustrate this situation.

These factors and the complexity and contradiction inherent in most socioeconomic problems, the failure to recognize the difference between the "puzzle" and the "difficulty" combine with the pressure tactics of vested interests to keep the free societies in a state of ferment and frequently on the brink of catastrophe.

Thus, the free society is by nature a blundering society; that is, it is free *and is expected to make mistakes*. Many of these will be very grave mistakes. Depending on the degree of centralization of authority, the nature of the problem and situation, and the alertness and freedom of the news media, these mistakes will be known and in many instances corrected before doing serious damage. We live, however, in the faith that in the long run these admittedly imperfect processes are not only the most humane but also the most efficient and effective.

Nevertheless, the large number of military and one-party dictatorships in the world shows that representative, free government thrives only under special conditions. Many of these authoritarian governments have been justified by the lack of competence and personal integrity of elected leaders. In particular, there is a frequent tendency for the fiscal decisions made by elected officials and representative legislatures to be irresponsibly inflationary. Inflation is probably the most common and dangerous enemy of the free society. It has often been a major factor in the imposition of military dictatorships.

For instance, C.L. Sulzberger, commenting on Latin American politics, pointed out that five out of six countries he recently visited were under military rule and asked, "Why should the military play such an intrusive role in political affairs?"

The global answer to this question is that, throughout the world, it is a symptom of the times. Officers have seized power in a vast number of developing nations simply because these countries haven't been able to produce civilian leaders of sufficient acumen, experience and honesty to deal with the problems of our era.³

In 1972 Freedom House, a national organization dedicated to strengthening democratic institutions, inaugurated a Comparative

Study of Freedom based on the analysis of civil and political liberties among the nations and territories of the world. In this study nations were rated as "Free," "Not Free," and "Partly Free" and the trends toward or away from freedom noted.⁴ As the criteria of freedom are not absolute and the evidence frequently is uncertain, the statistics merely give general appraisals of situations and trends. In the 1977 survey, 71 nations were classed as "Not Free," 80 as "Partly Free," and 61 as "Free."⁵

Another report described how in 40 non-Communist countries men of military background are exercising top leadership and ascribes this to a combination of: fear of anarchy, need for political stability and to prevent civil war, and the failure of civilian institutions "... One thing is certain. When civilian governments are in deep trouble, the military especially in underdeveloped countries, will always be tempted to take over."⁶

Thus, the free society can never be taken for granted. As will be discussed later, the qualities of man that make him seek freedom also create forces that tend to destroy freedom.

Theoretically, as a sociocultural system, the chief strength of a free society lies in its supposed ability to adapt to change. Such adaptation is accomplished by a process whereby information on the consequence of a change is fed back to the authority that initiated the change in order that necessary further adjustments may be made.

In the free society the authority making the change is very complex, a combination of government legislators, executives, bureaucracies, private enterprises, and individual actors. The channels of information are similarly complex with each of the authorities having its own sources and channels, but with a group of private enterprises known as the media playing a major role.

As presented in Chapter I, the primary mode of communication is language, both verbal and mathematical. The overall information systems that gradually developed in society for thousands of years have been in the last generation enormously expanded by electronic sensing, storage, retrieval, transmission, and evaluation of information. Judgment of whether the change is good or bad is based on a sense of values as related to the objective of the change: *the effect desired*. In political and social affairs this is usually an intuitive judgment.

In any large system in which a major change is made in accordance with a coherent plan, such cybernetic action is difficult. In a sociopolitical system, however, many of the most significant changes take place, not in accordance with any plan but

rather as unexpected consequences or side effects of other planned changes or events.

Because the world is in the midst of major cultural, economic, and political change caused by the growth of world population and the urgent requirements for energy, food, and environmental protection, the pressures on free societies are greater than before. The political effects of this change are not predictable. Generally, however, they seem likely to enhance the appeal of authoritarian measures.

Free societies today confront another change that is especially pertinent to the topic of this book: the development, particularly in the Western World, of what is known as a libertarian youth culture. This development has been evident in dress, hairstyle, music, the theater, moral values, and behavior throughout society. It has also been associated with the great wealth and extraordinary popularity of the leaders of the new musical style of loud rhythmic, overtly sexual, partly political rock music:

Rock and the record industry it has spawned are both big business today. Last year rock aficionados, largely the affluent between ages 12 and 32, spent over \$2 billion for records and tapes plus another \$150 million to see their favorites in concert. That's twice the amount spent on network television and equal to the combined gross revenues of Broadway, professional sports and movies. . . . Over 50 U.S. rock artists annually earn from \$2 million to \$6 million.⁷

The cultural values associated with this evolution are often characterized by overt distrust of government in general and large business and industrial organizations in particular. In the vernacular, these are known as "the establishment" or "the system." Concurrently, in the society as a whole, there has been a pronounced trend toward the politics of the left, toward greater emphasis on civil rights and liberty; hence the term "libertarian."

The degree of permanence and the full economic-political consequences of these changes are still unknown. In particular, we do not know how our society will eventually adapt. We do know, though, that such changes in traditional lifestyles and values pose especially difficult problems for a free society.

Cultural Change and Libertarianism. Cultural change takes place unevenly, being slow in some areas and periods and rapid in other

areas and periods. It usually is so complex that it is difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. Throughout the process, there runs the uncertainty of side effects of any deliberate or inadvertent change. For convenience, we speak of human activity in terms of economics, politics and sociology, etc., categories of study that are so interwoven that we must always remember the basic artificiality of discussing them as separate entities.

However, from the perspective of 1978 and for the purposes of this work, certain elements of the cultural change of the last three of four decades seem especially significant for they have been associated with a great decrease in the stability of society and of international and domestic politics.

Throughout the world, and particularly in the United States, there has been a decrease in the sense of authority, in national and local governments, in the system of education, in the family and the church. As part of this loss of authority there has been a very great increase in violent⁸ crime.

Specifically there has been: a great increase in violent crime by children and by women;⁹ in crimes against old people and priests; in arson (with churches being a frequent target); in child abuse; in prison riots; and particularly and most dangerously there has been an enormous increase in violent crime and vandalism in the public schools of the United States.¹⁰

This last situation probably is the most damaging aspect of cultural change, for it represents a decay in the roots of the concept of a free society and thus constitutes a regenerative evil in which each element of decay and destruction increases the forces of decay throughout the society.

It is a social-economic-political chain reaction in which the lack of discipline hampers the education of the disadvantaged who depend on public education for self-improvement. It requires the diversion of professional time from teaching, increases the expenditure of monetary and professional resources for physical security, increases the load on the policy system, the judicial system and the penal-correctional system, and effectively prevents the achievement of such humane goals as equal education, equal economic opportunity, and racial harmony on which so much economic, political, and social effort has been expended.

As a consequence, millions of children grow up not only with bad formal education but with no sense of moral or community responsibility. This, in turn, overloads the judicial, penal-correctional, and welfare-relief systems.

Because this school problem is worst in the large cities, it encourages the migration from the cities of the very people who can contribute most to the political and economic health of the cities. It is indeed a destructive vicious circle which makes a mockery of real freedom.

Thus, in retrospect,¹¹ we can see how the nationwide move from agricultural areas to urban industrial areas has resulted in the disintegration of urban civility.

The Legal and Administrative Snowball. This cultural ferment brings the legal and administrative snowball into play in a manner that illustrates some of the major points in the initial chapters of this work.

As the defects in our society evolve, e.g., corporate and official corruption, urban deterioration, increased crime, overloaded prisons, excessive legal delays, bad education, and large welfare and unemployment relief roles, various special interest groups are formed and begin to exercise power. State and national legislators and officials, motivated both by humane feelings and reelection ambitions, respond to these problems and the urging of the special interest groups by passing more laws creating new programs, and expanding government regulations—all supposed to correct or at least alleviate the privation or the injustice and economic inequity at issue.

Each special interest creates an opposing interest with which it vies for power in the legislative lobbies. Some of the laws and special agency regulations are excellent, well-thought-out and clear. Some are hastily drafted and, while well-intentioned, may be directly harmful; in others, good ideas are so changed or weakened by deliberate amendment, sabotage or partisan compromise that they are useless. But this mass of new law and regulation has cumulative side effects that have snowballed into a budgetary and management monstrosity that is threatening bankruptcy to our cities and encouraging growth of national and local bureaucracy.

The cumulative side effects of the successful efforts of the special interest groups serve to slow down and complicate the whole process of government and, in particular, increase the mass of paperwork and litigation. There is a swelling flood of detailed, increasingly complex forms to be filled out by businesses and individuals. They use up time and money and require more government employees, offices, and equipment to handle. Their multiplicity and complexity induce honest mistakes and invite fraud. All this creates excessive dispute and litigation¹² that, in

turn, decreases popular confidence in the quality of government, combining too often to defeat the major purpose of equity and justice that the legislation was supposed to achieve.

It is well to note the Principle of Centralization proposed by Irving Katz:

Centralization is justifiable when, and to the degree that, the information and the decision rules available to the central point are known to be, or with a large degree of confidence are expected to be complete, accurate and optimum.^{1 3}

The very volume of such interest-induced regulations explains why this optimum is so seldom possible of achievement. As the law of diminishing returns operates, there comes a point in major programs where the further allocation of money and effort is absorbed by the snowball and less and less useful work is done.

Finally, this practice also results in a large number of unenforceable laws and regulations. These are unenforceable because (a) they may be basically silly; (b) no one wishes to provide the funds or the force to enforce them properly; and (c) they frequently contain errors, contradictions or inadvertent conflicts with other well-intended laws or regulations.

Regardless of what is cause and what is effect in the foregoing complex interaction, the net result is to make the selection, the discipline, and the training and education of military officers and enlisted personnel more important, more difficult, and increasingly more expensive.

The course of this cultural change cannot be positively controlled on a worldwide basis. Nor can it be controlled on a national basis except by authoritarian measures that, in turn, set up forces that alter the effect of these measures in an unpredictable manner.

The cultural change affects the concepts and perceptions of people—more among the young than among the adults. Consequently, there is a continuing change in the values of those coming into power, generation after generation. This is why there is such emphasis on strong political indoctrination in the elementary schools of such nations as Russia and the People's Republic of China. But despite such early indoctrination, as these nations become more associated with the science and technology of other nations, even the most thoroughly indoctrinated change in many ways.

As previously noted, the free society has great resilience. When people are well informed and given freedom to innovate and adapt

at their own initiative and risk, they frequently confound the prophets of doom. For instance, in the United States in the late 1970s, we can see significant changes in the attitudes of college students as contrasted to those of the late 1960s. Nevertheless, we should not expect a return to a state of social-political-economic stability and prosperity that allegedly was characteristic of previous periods—ferment and change will continue.

In recent years, the significance of “peer groups” and the implied pressure among the members of such groups to conform to group style and behavior has increased substantially. The moral concepts of youth or ghetto “peer groups” have tended to dominate the libertarian youth culture.

The semantic distortion that called wanton destruction “trashing” and theft a “rip-off” and justified both as a legitimate aspect of political protest, greatly reduced an important moral sanction that with other sanctions has hitherto served as a kind of cement to bind together the disparate elements of society. Thus, within these “peer groups” there is no special stigma attached to criminal conduct in general. Furthermore, the popular sociological theory that ascribes such conduct to social and environmental factors over which the criminal supposedly has no control has gained great popularity. That the theory denies the age-old concept that a man is responsible for his own actions and behavior has gone largely unnoticed.

Very significantly, Judge Macklin Fleming has pointed out in *The Price of Perfect Justice* that there has been in American criminal law a “. . . shift in emphasis in a criminal proceeding from the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused to the determination of the correctness of the procedure used in his prosecution. In this latter determination guilt becomes irrelevant.”¹⁴

It could be argued that such a “cultural” change will eventually produce a more humane society, but the great increase in violent crime in the United States in the last 20 years is strong evidence to the contrary. A clear-cut case of concern over this trend is in the problem a free society confronts in using military power to protect its freedom and defend its interests. Once such mores are transferred to the military forces of a nation, the effect is clearly disastrous. No military system or institution that does not place stringent demands for responsibility on its members can be expected to stand up and operate effectively under the severe stress of combat.

An even more fundamental cause for alarm in the spreading of a sense of irresponsibility is the moral decay it sets in train. Irving Kristol's comment applies:

... Edmund Burke pushed this thesis a little further when he declared that it was part of the people's rights to *have* obligations—that an absence of obligation means a diminution of humanity, because it signifies a condition of permanent immaturity. But I would say we can extend this line of thought even further and declare with some confidence, based on our own more recent experience, that obligation is not only a right but a *need*—people upon whom no obligations are imposed will experience an acute sense of deprivation. It is our striking failure to recognize this phenomenon of *moral deprivation* for what it is which explains our fumbling and even cynical response to the dissatisfaction that Americans are expressing toward their institutions.

The main point which, it seems to me, emerges from the American experience of late is that people do not have confidence in institutions that do not have confidence in themselves—that people do not have respect for institutions which, instead of making demands upon the people, are completely subservient to their whims. . . .¹⁵

The breakdown of the sense of community, particularly in large cities, is a significant aspect of cultural change.

In the United States the urbanization caused by the industrial technological revolution brought to the cities great numbers of people who by cultural background or poverty were unable to participate fully in the process of government or to organize effectively in their own interests. In many instances they overwhelmed the institutions of the public community. Joseph P. Lyford in discussing this further states:

A city in the midst of a financial and administrative breakdown is peculiarly handicapped by its own bureaucracy which is insensitive to public complaints. This unresponsiveness in the face of the public's rising anger accelerates the dissolution of order. As the city, approaching insolvency, attempts to cut back the size of its bureaucracy, members of the bureaucratic establishment organize to protect their jobs

at the expense of the public. They enforce their demands by withholding essential services. That technique, as practiced by New York City's firemen, policemen, sanitation and transit workers, further disorganizes the city and adds to the isolation and anger of the individual citizen. To call such an arena a "community" requires an enormous stretch of the imagination. . . .

. . . Even in those enclaves which have all the physical appearance of neighborhoods, the stresses of disorder have set neighbor against neighbor and are driving out people whose roots have been a stabilizing influence. Marginally solvent areas have become wastelands. Tens of thousands of people in our largest cities are trying to survive in these blighted areas outside the protection of the law. What authority exists is largely that of the gangs who have an affinity for systematized murder, arson, and rape. The gangs terrorizing Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and New York City are far more vicious than those of the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties, most of which were rooted in the neighborhood and often protected people who lived on their turf.¹⁶

Social-Political Discipline. These conditions challenge us to come to grips with the fundamental question of social-political discipline and its relationship to military power in a free society. The violence and turmoil in American society in the last 20 years suggests a widespread assumption that freedom and discipline are incompatible. This is nonsense. In fact, the precise opposite is true: freedom cannot survive without discipline.

Now that the U.S. astronauts have repeatedly visited the moon, the situation seems particularly poignant, for this spectacular illustration of the fulfillment of human aspiration would have been impossible without strict discipline throughout a huge human technological system.

Discipline is self-control and in its deepest sense involves: a sense of values; the knowledge of cause and effect; the willingness to make decisions; and very importantly, the willingness to accept personal responsibility for the results of such decisions.

In this sense discipline is a fundamental safeguard of political freedom and of reasonable social stability. It is the foundation of national security in its military, economic, and political aspects. The understanding of discipline ultimately includes an

appreciation of the whole interacting complex of abstract terms: justice, law, order, power, and force. It is essential to control humanity's tendency to use violence for foolish or selfish purposes. Such discipline is relative, never absolute. It implies enlightened self-interest, and unselfishness simultaneously.

Its absence now is the tragedy both of our ghettos and of our educational system. In 1975-1976 the fiscal difficulties of the City of New York caused a sharp reduction in funds for education with a further effect of reducing by 1,000 the number of school safety officers. In March 1976 the principal of the Jefferson High School in Brooklyn stated to Senator B. Roy Goodman, a member of the State Senate Committee on Education that "... she tries to hide her fear as she walks the corridors of her school and she seldom walks alone." Senator Goodman stated that the dismissal of the security officers "... have turned the schools into battlefields in which teachers and students are terrorized daily."¹⁷

Because an educated citizenry is considered to be a prerequisite for the maintenance of free representative government, a large-scale degeneration of public education is a threat to the free society. When this is associated with a widespread contempt for the concept of authority, the threat to freedom increases.

It is a major cause of our transportation crisis, our pollution crisis, and the troubles of urban sprawl. It is the fundamental factor in our huge highway death toll as well as being the most intractable element of monetary inflation. Major inflation is bound to disrupt any system of representative government. This was evident in the fall of the Weimar Republic in Germany and is still seen in one-party authoritarian governments in Latin America and elsewhere.

The law of diminishing returns combines with the habit of semantic distortion in matters of freedom and authority in our highly technical modern society in a manner which undermines freedom.

If schoolteachers and parents do not themselves have the intellectual capability and the legal right to speak with authority, how will we deal effectively with drugs? If our judicial system is so cluttered with legal technicalities that it is slowed to a snail's pace, how can justice prevail? If our penal institutions and systems are based on archaic concepts of penology, how can they serve the cause of justice and rehabilitate wrongdoers? How can they serve decent social ends? If construction unions exercise monopoly power over homebuilding, how can decent housing be provided for low-income families?

In all of these problems, the assumptions have implicitly been made that there is no limit to the extent that one can pursue a demonstrably good cause; there is no limit to the semantic distortion permissible in such worthy pursuit. This is not new; it bothered Socrates and it will bother our descendants.

The ideas of disciplined thought and the ideals of objective truth as expressed by Plato and Aristotle are still basically valid. These great men knew that concepts of truth, accuracy, and precision are essential elements in human progress and are the foundation of civilization. The concepts of accuracy and precision apply to language as well as to mathematics. Both are part of the foundations of law and government as well as of science and technology. Hence those who tend to sneer at the emphasis on semantic accuracy do so from ignorance. The concept that vulgar usage justifies any kind of language is bound to degrade our ability to discipline our thoughts and hence our actions.

This does not mean that language must never change. It does mean that the change should be disciplined and that concepts of truth, accuracy, and precision be retained even though new meanings and new colors to old meanings develop. Nevertheless, we should recognize that deliberate semantic distortion for purposes of gaining favorable emotional response is a significant cause of violent human conflict.

With the increasing recognition of the importance of strict political control of military posture, deployment and action, the question of ambiguity requires examination. We should discuss ambiguity in nonambiguous language!

Ambiguity seems to be an important element in policy statements, contests for power, international, national and bureaucratic affairs. Generally, it serves four purposes: to provide for freedom of action (i.e., fallback position); to conceal or distort real intentions; to confuse an adversary; and to provide the image but not the substance of agreement in a difficult controversy.

A classic example of ambiguity is the continuing problem of capabilities versus intentions in determining the military posture and force deployment of the United States. Another is the arguments about the meaning and usefulness of *détente*.

In a somewhat different context, the term is used in many problems of intelligence, particularly electronic intelligence, and the resolution or avoidance of ambiguity is a continuing challenge to research and interpretation. Ambiguity should be intentional, not inadvertent. While ambiguity may contribute to flexibility, the

Ambiguity may mislead one's supporters as much as or more than it misleads one's adversaries. *Military directives must be unambiguous to be effective.* A person trained to use ambiguity in bureaucratic power struggles may become so habituated that he does not or cannot write or issue clear military directives.

Certainly no one should deny the vital importance of emotion in the conduct of human affairs. It is an integral essential element in human nature and is the driving force behind much human accomplishment. But uncontrolled, unlimited emotional response is eventually fatal to the individual and to the group or society it dominates. On the other hand, controlled emotion is the essence of responsible leadership and logical analysis is essential to the control of emotion.

In considering the cause and effect relationships of our society, we should remember that a major modern business, the advertising business, spends a great part of its effort inculcating false values, fictitious glamour, and habits of semantic distortion upon our people. Among other things, advertising has two effects: It decreases the ability of many people to think clearly and it creates in others a sense of contempt for organized business and a system of free enterprise. Thus, to a significant degree our free enterprise, and free speech, tend to defeat their own purposes and to diminish the strength of the system they purport to support.

The operation of the law of diminishing returns is further illustrated by the harmful side effects of the political and commercial exploitation of excitement and glamour. The details extend throughout our entire system.

Political charisma, so admitted by many commentators, is often followed by dangerous demagoguery. Exaggerated newspaper headlines spread distorted versions of events and statements, thus stimulating conflict. Excessive showing of violence in television and movies leads to subsequent public violence. Excessive size and horsepower of American automobiles increase air pollution, traffic congestion, and traffic deaths, and coupled with excessive style consciousness, increase the costs of maintenance and repair.

Disciplined thought acknowledges the fact and importance of mystery even though we try to dispel it by research. For example, our knowledge of electronics is improving our knowledge of the way the human brain and nervous system operate. But even so, we have only a slight understanding of the operation of intuition, insight, or instinct, qualities absolutely vital to human culture and progress.

Regardless of the fact that modern science and technology have produced many difficulties for humanity through adverse side effects and maladjustments, we know that their elimination would cause mankind to revert to a sordid primitive struggle for a short nasty brutish life. Therefore, we must make a special effort to use them skillfully with respect for those intangibles that determine the human values by which technology must ultimately be judged.

The law of diminishing returns applies directly to the search for freedom in modern industrial society. As the world grows in technological development, the various peoples become more and more interdependent and interactive. This in turn means that each group in society must more and more consider the effect of its actions on other groups. Only if they act with such consideration can they maximize their own freedom.

In all of this it is necessary to recognize the distinctions between the reality and the fiction of freedom, the distinction between liberty and license, and to recognize such truisms as: Personal freedom can never and should never be absolute; Justice is essential to the maintenance of law and order. The penalties for neglecting these matters are inexorable. An excessive exercise of freedom will inevitably bring repression, violence and tyranny.

If we wish to reduce this violence, we must strengthen the sense of discipline. Therefore, we must understand both the sources of discipline and those elements of attitude and behavior that weaken it. We will never fully achieve ideal discipline, and to do so might possibly mean the descent of man into a mass of total mediocrity. Nevertheless, to ignore or to disparage discipline, *while at the same time pleading for massive efforts to allay human conflict and misery*, is the height of hypocrisy and foolishness.

We began this chapter with a distinction: that there are two broad categories of freedom. One is internal or domestic freedom: the exercise of liberty within the state. The other is external freedom: the exercise of liberty by the state, the freedom of the state from domination by an outside power.

In any state, authoritarian or "free," the nature and degree of involvement in world affairs is a critical factor in determining the nature and employment of its military power. If a state expects to take an active and responsible role in world affairs, it needs a larger and more diverse military system than does a state that takes a passive role. Thus military power and freedom can be regarded as a kind of equation with the variables being the nature and degree of internal freedom, the nature and degree of external freedom, and the nature and degree of activity in world affairs.

These are the political determinants of the nature, size, and employment of the military forces of a state.

This raises the related question: What conditions govern or limit the ability of a government to choose the nature and degree of the state activity in world affairs? There are three obvious fundamentals: geography, economics, and cultural-philosophic. All of these are interrelated: Geography does not change, but the others are changing and the changes will greatly affect all questions related to military power and freedom.

Regardless of the unpredictable nature of these changes, the ability of the society successfully to play an active role and to control and use military power effectively in support of that role will depend on understanding not only the nature of human conflict but also the fundamentals of authority, sovereignty, and power.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY POWER

Authority, Sovereignty and Power. For 2,500 years the main themes of classical literature have concerned authority, sovereignty and power. These matters form much of the substantive content of humanism and are the special province of political science, sociology and international law. They are the essence of a liberal education. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the subject of military power in a free society is inextricably bound up in them, for they include the fundamentals on which the use of military power should be based.

Two major points are pertinent to what follows: first, there is a great difference between authority as such and authoritarianism or the authoritarian state and second, sovereignty in international relations is not absolute, but must be limited by law. These limitations can be expected to change as law itself develops as a continuing process of cultural change.

Authority and the Authoritarian State. Bertrand de Jouvenal speaks of authority as being both the faculty of gaining man's assent and the force that makes a voluntary organization work. He states that authoritarian government is one which "... has large recourse to violence both in act and threat, to get itself obeyed ..." because its authority is inadequate to the fulfillment of its plans—it must use intimidation:

... Power, however, is something very different from authority. The distinguishing mark of the latter is that it is exercised only over those who voluntarily accept it Of all states that is the worst whose rulers no longer enjoy an authority sufficiently extensive for everyone to obey them with good grace, but in which their authority over a part of their subjects is sufficiently large to enable them to constrain others ... [p]ower over all by means of authority over a part—is the mark of the authoritarian state.¹

Then, writing in 1956, he makes the following devastating comment on what subsequently occurred during the last 2 years of the Johnson administration and the Presidency of Richard Nixon:

The decline of authority in a state is a great misfortune. It may happen either through the inadequacy of the rulers or through their excessive pretenses, but also for a third possible reason—the destruction of the halo which upholds authority. Instinctively and unwittingly, men everywhere find new prestiges which add to the stature of their rulers. When scepticism attacks these prestiges and denounces them as bogus, it undermines in the citizens their willingness to obey and in that way weakens voluntary co-operation. One of two things then follows: either friction and anarchy grow in the nation's functioning, or else constraint must play a larger part in it. It was the provision of these twentieth-century evils which inspired Royer-Collard his great lament: "Authority is shattered."

Since the dissolution of human aggregates is the worst of all evils, police regimes come in when prestiges go out.²

Sovereignty. War is the overt armed clash of sovereignties. Questions of national sovereignty permeate all discussions, agreements, development and working of alliances, arms limitation and control, and operations of military forces outside one's own border. In particular, they are vital to all international discussions of nuclear weapons. As will be discussed later in Chapter V, we seem to have a situation in which sovereignty and national security cannot both be maximized. Instead they resemble the two buckets of an old-fashioned well: when one goes up, the other goes down.

The concept of the sovereignty of the nation or state is relatively new, having evolved as an inherent part of international law in the 15th and 16th centuries. Wilfred Jenks writes: "Only with Bodin, in 1576, do we encounter the theory of the sovereignty of the State and Bodin recognized that the absolute power of the State is subject to the authority of the divine law, of the natural law and of the law of nations"³

Jenks then traces the development of various aspects of the concept of sovereignty through Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Treitscke, Neitzsche, etc. He concludes his historical perspective with three salient points:

... over the ages the weight of opinion clearly upholds the sovereignty of the law rather than the sovereignty of the State ... the issue [etc.] ... have been dominated by successive challenges of unbridled sovereignty to the rule of law Thirdly, the sovereignty of the State is not an expression of anything universal ... : it is a reflection of a particular phase of European history in which society escaped from an age of warring barons at the price of entering upon an age of warring States.⁴

In the context of international law and relations, sovereignty is the freedom of a state from external control.⁵

Sovereignty is a concept with a logical function, "... a theory to integrate a number of distinct concepts, such as power, authority, legitimacy, obligation, community, thus providing the foundation for a type of discourse without which political theorizing must come to an end."⁶

The State—political sovereignty is "... the possession of coercive power sufficient to enforce obedience internally and to maintain independence in external relations."⁷

"The basic rules of international law can be summarized in the following fundamental principles: Sovereignty, recognition, consent, good faith, freedom of the seas, international responsibility, and self-defense."⁸

The Attributes of Statehood—"First, there must be a considerable measure of stability and continuity in respect of defined borders and consequently of population."⁹

"... The primary function of a state, maintaining order and security by means of law backed by force, naturally entails a number of permanent institutions."¹⁰

Conceptually, "sovereignty" in its original sense of "supreme power" is not merely an absurdity, but an impossibility in a world of states that pride themselves upon their independence from each other and concede to each other a status of equality before the law, and equal capacity for rights and obligations though not necessarily an equality of existing rights and obligations.¹¹

The concept of sovereignty as a power beyond the law paralyzes and inhibits the growth of law The concept of

sovereignty as a residuum of authority conferred and determined by law and varying in its content as the needs of society change, interposes no such barrier to growth and development.^{1 2}

Because the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are so important to the control of conflict, we should realize that the U.S.S.R. makes its own interpretation of the nature of sovereignty.

In the Soviet Union, "Law remains a tool of the state, to be manipulated in the interests of the state, which at this moment in history [1965] are said to call for humanism, for protection of the individual, but which might tomorrow call for a return of the terror if expediency so required."^{1 3}

... The events surrounding the declaration of the 81 Communist Parties in December 1960, may suggest that new restraints were then in the making.... It does not yet suggest that there will be a relaxation of attitudes toward the impregnable position the USSR has sought to establish for itself within the family of nations. On this front Soviet policy makers still want Soviet sovereignty to be unchallengeable.^{1 4}

Some Economic Factors. Economic factors and considerations pervade the subjects of nationhood, sovereignty, politics, and military power. They lie at the heart of the contest between the free and the authoritarian societies. Throughout human history they have been a principal cause of human conflict and war. As a consequence the economic aspects of national sovereignty are critically important. This brings up some very difficult questions.

To what extent does the degree of freedom of enterprise in a nation influence the state of freedom in that nation? In other words, does the nationalization of resources and industry with consequent high degree of government control inevitably if not immediately lead to authoritarian government?

Is a nation fully sovereign if it does not command the resources sufficient to support its population?

To what degree and when does the lack of natural resources and arable land cause or justify political and military aggression?

To what degree does the acceptance of a program of economic and/or military aid reduce the sovereignty of a nation?

To what degree and in what circumstances do the operations of large multinational corporations facilitate international

cooperation or produce friction and international conflict? To what degree do these operations affect national sovereignty?

Such questions as these already form a large part of the scholarly discussion in the journals and other literature of economics and political science. Opinions differ greatly for obvious reasons. I mention them primarily because they involve the basic causes for the use of violent force and overt military aggression.

These questions and the assumptions that are implicit in them form an important part of the psychological atmosphere in which critical military political decisions are made, particularly the decision to use military force to achieve an economic objective. To further emphasize their importance, we should bear in mind that once large-scale combat begins, economic factors in the form of military logistics will tend to dominate strategy and grand tactics. Some historical illustrations clarify the point.

The Napoleonic wars were largely based on economic rivalries and Napoleon, after great initial success, was driven to excessive adventures by his inability to organize a grandiose economic system. Hitler came to power largely because of the economic consequences of World War I. Japan attacked the United States in 1941 because of the opposition of the United States to the Japanese military regime's "Co-Prosperity Sphere" doctrine of Asia and the Asians. The organized economic industrial power of the United States was the decisive factor in World War II.

In 1974 there was an extraordinary interlocking of these economic and political factors in the United States efforts to work with the Soviet Union in decreasing world tension and reducing the prospect of nuclear war. For example, there were the SALT nuclear weapon negotiations; the negotiation of a trade agreement with the U.S.S.R.; the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union; the maintenance of the cease-fire in the Israeli-Syrian front; the United States resupply of war munitions to Israel, and the similar Soviet resupply to Syria and Egypt; the maintenance of Israeli sovereignty in Palestine.

This situation was further complicated by the speculation in the American press that the United States might attempt a military conquest and occupation of Arab oilfields to overcome the economic leverage of the high price of crude oil. For instance, *The New York Times* reported that Kissinger said he "could not rule out completely the use of military force against oil-producing nations, but that such action would be considered only in the gravest emergency."^{1 5} Numerous similar articles appeared in other publications.^{1 6}

Thus, while economic action and terrorism are the forms of power most frequently used to attain political objectives, the use of overt military force with possible resort to nuclear weapons is always a continuing threat as nations pursue their interests and guard their sovereignty.

The Nature and Use of Power. The understanding of military power requires disciplined thought. The effective use of military power requires disciplined behavior as well. Military power can be understood only if it is related to the other elements of power at the disposal of the nation, and as it is related to the other elements of military theory and substantive knowledge. In particular, it must always be related to strategy.

These elements are so intertwined that there is no single best sequence in their discussion. In time of crisis all must be intuitively evaluated in the light of the situation as it actually unfolds rather than as some hypothesis may have assumed.

Because many people seem to feel that any use of power and force is inherently evil, I quote a concept of the theologian, Paul Ramsay:

Therefore, I say, the use of power, and possibly the use of armed force, is of the "esse" of politics and inseparably connected with those higher human goods which are the "bene esse" of politics in all the historical ages of mankind.¹⁷

Because Herbert Rosinski's concept of strategy is such an important part of my thinking, some of his comments on power are pertinent.

As he thus develops himself and little by little conquers a living space from surrounding nature, man unavoidably involves himself in the dialectic of power. For it is by bringing power into being that man develops Man's quest for freedom and his quest for power have been but the two faces of a single coin Power is nothing less than an objective quality of all reality, a quality inherent in all that exists by virtue of the mere fact that it does exist. Power is an inescapable aspect of reality itself.¹⁸

Power is essential to human existence. It always tends to accumulate about centers that, to varying degrees, cooperate and

compete with each other in an uncertain manner. The only way to prevent this process of accumulation and competition is to eliminate communication.

Power is never completely dispersed. As soon as a major power structure is destroyed, there is either the accession of another power structure or a period of uncertainty while various competing power structures struggle to gain ascendancy. Thus, any major dispersion of power tends to be incomplete and temporary.

The competition between power centers is conflict. The problem is to keep this conflict under control. But the control of conflict always, to a greater or lesser degree, requires the actual or implied use of force, either the force of law which must ultimately have the backing of police force or some other kind of force. The objective is not to have peace *per se* but instead to keep the violence and destructiveness of continuing human conflict within the degree that will permit the continuation of civilization and, one hopes, a reasonable degree of human freedom. In the context of the power struggles and conflicts of the 20th century, the words "war" and "peace" are so ill-defined that they have little value. The semantic implications are important for the control of human conflict depends upon our understanding the nature of conflict and the legitimate uses of power and force.

Everything written about power and particularly the use of military power and force must be simplified. Whitehead remarked "one must omit much to get on with something," and Napoleon is alleged to have commented, "the art of war is the giant among the branches of knowledge for it embraces them all."

Without some measure of theory and set of relationships, it is impossible to distinguish among the essential, the important, the desirable and the trivial in this vast area of knowledge. I am trying to present here a group of coherent ideas that apply to civilian executives and military leaders alike. While each idea herein can be expanded manyfold without exhausting its content, certain themes, certain analogies recur frequently. How best should we express them? What is their significance? What can we learn from them?

I cite a few: The classic dilemma of power is that of ends and means. When do the ends justify the means? This question in its various forms has been asked for thousands of years without there being any final answers. The fact that men have been unable to agree is one more reason to expect that human conflict will persist, and the need to be able to use military power will continue.

We can agree with Lord Acton that: "All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely."

And we know that international affairs are so complex and pose so many conflicting values that the actions of a nation or state should not be judged by the same moral standards as the actions of an individual. Nevertheless, in spite of the many dilemmas that confront our leaders, we know that the end does not justify the means when the end, or an intended by-product of the end, is personal power or personal aggrandizement.

The great and common tragedy of power, the real corruption of power, occurs when a man exercising great power confuses his personal interests with the interests of the state. This kind of corruption pervades all walks of life. It is particularly dangerous in a politician who controls great military power or in a high-ranking military commander.

Again and again we come to three central principles.

The use of military force without a clear political purpose is futile and ultimately self-defeating.

Strategic realism requires the challenge of assumption, the analysis of objectives, and the appraisal of expectations.

The law of diminishing returns operates inexorably in all areas of human activity.

World Wars I and II, Korea, Suez 1956, Bay of Pigs, Vietnam—all contain instances of the consequences of the violations of these principles. They will occur in future conflicts.

The reaction of the architects of disaster is one of the great ironies of this continuing violation of sound principles; when caught up with the consequences of their behavior, they seldom seem to understand how they failed.

If we are unwilling to bring coherent continuing disciplined thought to the study of our past and the lessons thereof, we can expect only a dreary repetition of the contemptuous violation of the eternal verities. Even so the outcome is uncertain. The end is never in sight, the solutions are never final, but at least we would be giving ourselves a better chance.

Diplomacy is the art of adjustment and accommodation in the relations among nations. It is an essential element of national power. Normally it uses persuasion and recognition of common interests. If these do not succeed, various other elements of

national power are brought into play to exert pressure. This, in turn, can develop into coercion. Thereafter the use of the elements of power will shift toward first the threat and then the actual use of force and violence. Initially, however, it may develop into the overt use of formal military force and bring it into play with extreme violence—war.

But in some minds war has been “outlawed.” Many euphemisms will be used to avoid the onus of declaring war. Therefore, the use of clandestine operations—military, paramilitary and nonmilitary may dominate the action. Many controversies will ensue regarding the initiation and continuation of the use of armed force in conflict.

But even after large-scale overt combat starts, diplomacy, though it may move into the background, must continue. Otherwise the political purpose that must dominate strategy may be obscured by the passions aroused by overt conflict.

Again we come back to the intellectual discipline needed to analyze the objectives as influenced by the course of events and to avoid the traps of specious slogans, and to the social-political discipline required to maintain the control of the sources of military power. Only with such discipline can the diplomatic negotiations necessary to bring hostilities to an end be timed and carried out effectively. Good timing is an essential element of successful negotiations.

All of the foregoing is a matter of good political-military intuition. Among other matters it involves a continuing accurate appraisal of the effectiveness of the military force being used. This, in turn, brings us to the integrity of command. Slanted intelligence, slanted staff studies, false or inaccurate readiness and combat reports (which played such a large part in our Vietnam war) have a cumulative effect leading inevitably to massive self-deception and defeat. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the influence of these factors will be different in an authoritarian society from that in a free society.

Power is used, be it wisely or unwisely, in accordance with the concepts and percepts of the possessors of power and not in accordance with those of those against whom power is being directed.

In 1974 the Arabs and the Third World nations used power in the General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance with their perception, both of power and of national and group interests. They began to use their newly recognized economic

power, the control of raw materials needed to sustain the economies of the developed nations, in order to advance their own interests. As the tone of many of the speeches in the General Assembly indicated, they used this power with a significant degree of special satisfaction, a newly found pride and assurance and with a sense of repaying some of the arrogance and exploitation the great nations had applied to them from the 18th century to the 1970s. Turnabout is fair play.

In the Arab-Israeli debates, the Arab sense of power was augmented by a bitter sense of the injustice at the manner in which some of their interests and rights had been disregarded by the action of the majority of the United Nations in the 1947 creation of the state of Israel.

In other words, in the last few years we have seen all of the tools of conflict brought into use—political, economic, psychological, terroristic, clandestine, and overt military force.

No one questions the sovereign right of self-defense against aggression. The difficulty comes, however, when one attempts to define "aggression."

After 24 years of consideration, the Committee on the Definition of Aggression of the United Nations agreed on a hazy definition of aggression on 12 April 1974.¹⁹ The General Assembly approved the Committee draft on 14 December 1974.²⁰ In its comment on this agreement, *The Economist* noted: "... The fine print in this long text will give specialists in international law plenty of scope for further contention So as far as the UN is concerned, aggression will have been committed when the Council says it has" In other words, there is no significant change since the San Francisco Conference of 1945.²¹

It is clear why it is so difficult to create and operate a world government that can effectively exercise authority and power over and above the competition of sovereign states. Each national government tends to pursue its own concept of national and world interest; each is conscious of its need to maintain its own authority and prestige with its own people.

Today, the nations of the world face many difficult problems: each can be a cause of major conflict with unpredictable destructive consequences. Each involves power, authority, and sovereignty. For the politician each also raises the difficult distinction between "morality" and "moralism."

The great world population growth has produced shortages but primarily inadequate distribution of raw materials, food, and energy with resulting starvation in Asia and Africa, together with

economic and political disturbance in both the developed and the undeveloped nations. A growing concern with environmental pollution is a further problem.

The slow progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), together with the explosion of a nuclear device by India and the increasing prospect of other nations building nuclear weapons, are further disturbing political-military factors.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Sino-Soviet border disputes, the continued conflict in Southeast Asia, the tension between Turkey and Greece, the bloody suppression of minorities in Africa all create dangerous political situations with far-reaching economic and military implications.

Thus the growth of world law continues to be very slow and very uncertain. In one way or another all of these matters are related. Each major problem requires agreement on its broad nature and the points of national interest. In some instances broad conceptual agreement is necessary before proceeding to details. In other cases agreement on principle is so difficult that the opposite route must be taken—that is, to start by resolving a few minor issues and gradually build a pragmatic larger structure of agreement.

But in every case eventually the agreement must be put into such language that the various bureaucratic administrative agencies can work in effective harmony. This takes both time and talent but overall there is the continuing shadow of resort to force.

Power and force are not synonymous. Military power is only one of the forms of power available to the nation/state, the chief others being political, ideological, and economic. Nevertheless, as military power is the subject of this book, we should consider how and in what forms and specific associations we can expect it to be used.

We can expect that the people of each nation/state will demand protection for the rights of the nation and the rights of its citizens. This will be translated into a demand for national security; and while there may be many arguments about its precise nature or definition, it will require organized protection or defense. If the formally constituted armed forces are not adequate or sufficient to provide this protection, other forms of defense or protection will be created and used. These will vary greatly in size, efficiency, nature, and legitimacy. They will vary from loosely coordinated individual activists or terrorists to large-scale paramilitary forces under private sponsorship. Generally speaking, these forces will

recognize no law or restriction, national or international, but will develop and perhaps legitimize their own codes.

While this type of irregular activity now appears to be used most often by underdeveloped or militarily weak nations, we should also expect all nations, small or large, weak or strong, to continue to be concerned with *their own* definition of security and to reserve to themselves the right to determine just what kind of forces they will organize and employ. If overt military forces are ineffective, then they will organize covert forces and use clandestine operations to a greater extent than they do now. *They will continue to pursue their interests, as they perceive them.*

If the governments of these large and potentially powerful nations fail to protect their citizens and their interests, either the government will be changed or increasingly strong groups will organize and act regardless of their government. This will come about because the proliferation of independent groups today represents both a breakdown in the effectiveness of national and international law and/or breakdown in respect for the concept of authority.

There is an important linkage between the authority, rights, and obligations of sovereignty, and it is only the respect for the concept of authority that makes the continued existence of a sovereign nation/state possible. One cannot expect people to have respect for the laws and authority of a world government if they have been conditioned to be contemptuous of the laws and authority of a sovereign nation/state.

The conclusions are inevitable. If the organized armed forces of a large nation disintegrate or become corrupt, domestic order will be damaged and international order will be reduced because there will be an increase in the numbers of private groups and organizations that will use violence and terrorism to advance what they conceive to be their nation's or peoples' interests.

If, on the other hand, the government of that state remains strong in spite of the weakening of its overt armed forces, such government can be expected to defend its own and the nation's security by an increase in the size, power, and operations of clandestine forces equipped with an increasing amount of sophistication of the weapons of modern conflict. The effect of this shift from overt to covert forces will not increase the freedom of that society.

Military Power—Some Specific Factors. With this background in mind, we can move to some of the specific factors that govern its effective use.

I use the term "military power" as does Innis Claude: "... the elements which contribute directly or indirectly to the capacity to coerce, kill, and destroy."^{2 2}

The essence of military power and military strategy lies in the ability and ultimate willingness to resort to destructive killing force.

The essence of command lies in the control of that killing and destructive force.

The essence of this control of destructive killing force lies in understanding that: it is not to be used for its own sake; there must always be a political purpose. It is not to be used for a trivial or unworthy purpose nor is it to be used to satisfy hatred or for revenge. In other words, the essence of this control is discipline: a discipline that must extend to the people—not just to the military.

There is a distinction between military power and a military system and this distinction is directly related to the concept of military command.

Military power is based on organized combat forces. The principal responsibilities of military command are to create combat forces, to support combat forces, and to employ combat forces.

The whole rationale for the establishment of a military system is to be able to employ combat forces effectively to attain a political purpose. In the United States the military system has several purposes: to employ combat forces, to satisfy national socioeconomic needs, to satisfy partisan political needs. Frequently, therefore, these needs as perceived by high authority and the public become confused with consequent ineffectiveness and waste in the primary effort.

Military power is a vital but not the only component of national power. Military forces are of no value unless they can be tactically employed. The effective tactical employment of military forces depends on a group of related factors. These are: strategic purpose, logistic support, sound tactical concepts, tactical training, appropriate choice of weapons and equipment, and, above all, discipline, morale, and leadership. For the purposes of this discussion, concepts, training, morale, and leadership can be roughly grouped under the broad title of "professionalism." They are primary responsibilities of "command."

"Command" implies a much greater personal involvement and commitment than does "management." Management, which is an essential tool of command, involves technical competence that is placed at the service of first one organization and then, perhaps, to its competitor. Military command in its best sense involves a

lifelong commitment and loyalty; and it must be so, for command has life and death power over men.

When we consider "modern conflict" in its fullest sense, we can see that one of the major problems of "command" is to be able to use military force effectively in any level of conflict and at any time directed by political authority, regardless of whether or not a formal state of war exists. Therefore, several fundamental aspects of modern political-military relations have both immediate and ultimate implications of great importance.

To a greater degree than ever before, political and strategic considerations will limit and perhaps govern the weapons and the tactics employed by the combat commander. In the past it frequently seemed possible to define or accurately to describe the nature of "military victory." Military victory itself could be the primary and at times sole purpose of command. There was an apparent separation between the civilian factor of politics and the military factors of strategy and tactics. While this separation was more apparent than real, it nevertheless gave the field commander more freedom of action than he now has. It also made it much easier to define and to recognize "victory."

Today, clear definitions of "victory" do not seem possible; the concept of "winning a war" is not the clear simple concept it used to be. Instead, the officer in tactical command of an operation must accept political restraint and at times even tactical defeat for a higher strategic or political purpose. Nevertheless, even while operating under such restraints, the commander has the task of maintaining the morale, the discipline, and the combat effectiveness of his forces.

This constitutes a far greater challenge to his intellect, wisdom, spirit, and leadership than the old situation where one could define victory and simply fight to win without thought of further consequence. As for the troops—this situation requires a very high degree of professionalism.

The tactical restraint now necessary and the inability to define victory in simple terms do not reduce the need for combat effectiveness. Indeed the opposite is true; we need to know more about the nature and sources of readiness and effectiveness and how their attainment creates special problems in the already complex matter of civil-military relations. In particular, they require the civilian to understand the military problem as well as for the military to understand the civilian. The French Army revolt of 1961 is a striking illustration of how a prolonged period of frustration under modern political restraint can break down the discipline of combat personnel.

A further implication of “professionalism” is in its relation to control of the logistic snowball: that is the natural tendency of all logistics activities to grow to indeterminate size. A small, highly motivated, highly trained, and expertly led force will have much greater combat effectiveness than will a much larger, less professional force. Thus, by stressing the quality, morale, and leadership of our forces, we attack the snowball at its source.

And, finally, in the development of high-level military thinking, we must seek the wise mean between two extremes, each of which has a limited view.

One is found in the professional who may have become so imbued with the immediate aspects and ends of tactics or of technical affairs that he is unresponsive to the political and strategic aspects of high command.

The other extreme is found in the scholar or scientist who, without operating or command experience or responsibilities, may become lost in technology or the niceties of an esoteric military theory, and remain unaware of the importance, the nature, and the sources of strategic flexibility and combat effectiveness in the real world of modern human conflict.

The decision to use military force to achieve a political objective is a political decision and is the gravest decision that the political authority can make.

The Decision to Use Force. One of the most important elements in this decision is to ask: “Is this use of force intended to be decisive?” At first glance this may appear to be silly. Nevertheless, it is clear that in recent years either it was not asked or, if asked, its implications were gravely misjudged.

For instance, the British and French in the 1956 Suez Crisis; the United States in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs; the United States in 1964-65 in South Vietnam; Egypt in the 1967 Israeli war; Pakistan in East Pakistan in 1971.

An accurate evaluation of the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of the armed forces is an essential element of the decision to use overt military force. The integrity and reliability of the operational readiness reporting and evaluating system is an essential part of the larger absolute—*The Integrity of Command*.

A reconnaissance in force is a time-honored military action designed to test the determination and combat power and disposition of the enemy. The commander is prepared to accept a *limited* loss to gain important information. Its usefulness is entirely a matter of discipline and control. The force can be

withdrawn after the information is obtained or if opposition is unexpectedly great. The route and method of withdrawal are essential elements of the reconnaissance plan. While it may be a prelude, the reconnaissance should never be confused with the decision to take decisive action.

There is no more expensive form of self-delusion and economic and human waste than to employ combat forces ineffectively; it is not only foolish, it is positively wicked. The consequences build for generations.

This situation points up the importance of the interweaving of the substantive elements of military knowledge within a structure of coherent military theory.

What kinds of military power and force can be used effectively to achieve a political purpose? What kinds of power and force cannot be used effectively to achieve a political purpose? What changes in the political-military situation and environment can change a particular kind of military force from one category of usability to the other?

I do not think that these questions can be categorically answered in advance of events. They do show, however, what must be considered by command in the process of reaching a decision to use force. Once the decision is made to use military force, the military commanders have the responsibility to use it effectively.

In all this decision process, there is and must be an interaction of various elements of authority, advice, information, responsibility, and decision. This involves both civilians and military professionals; political, economic, and military factors and considerations. The manner in which the formal routines of advice, information, analysis and final decision are formalized will vary in each government in accordance with its particular constitutional and legislative requirements and with the personal concepts and preferences of the head of government. The final decision to use force will emerge from his intuitive evaluation of the situation and the factual analysis presented.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to steer a steady course—undeterred by slogans or expedience—and not let themselves be driven by fluctuations of mood, because experience and history teach that people will not forgive their leaders for doing even those things that were temporarily popular if what is temporarily popular leads to consequences which they do not like.^{2 3}

What are the questions raised?

I have known people who said that if we thought thoroughly about these things before deciding to use force, we would never formally decide to use force and would thereafter be blackmailed into national destruction. Others may say that there are some issues and situations in which we should use force regardless of consequences.

Regardless of the techniques and procedures actually used, the essence of the exercise of high command today lies in the ability not only to decide such matters, but also to analyze them thoroughly before deciding them. This is *The Commander's Estimate of the Situation*.

It is not just a matter of listening to the advice of so-called experts, it is not just a matter of obtaining a consensus among the leaders of power groups and vested interests, it is not just a matter of listening to the presentation of facts and proposed options as developed by a staff. It is, and always will be, a creative personal analysis which weighs and intuitively evaluates the various facts provided by staff assistants and all other sources of information which the commander has, all being related to his concept of *the effect desired* that is the foundation of all strategy.

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGY

Strategic realism requires the challenge of assumptions, the analysis of objectives, and the appraisal of expectations.

Introduction. One can examine how well a strategy achieves or is even designed to achieve a desired effect from two points of view: that of the student, and that of the practitioner. The judgment of the student is unhampered by deadlines and free from adherence to any particular formulation or authority other than that imposed by intellectual rigor. And his decisions are free of costs in blood. But the executive authorities who are formulating specific national and military strategic policies and plans, by contrast, are operating within a specified time. What they choose to do must always be both responsible and authoritative. The difference between the two points of view is basically the difference between pure strategy and applied strategy.

Attempts to impose discipline upon the discussion of strategy frequently are doomed to failure for, almost inevitably, the discussion begins to include both points of view and shifts from the nature of strategy itself across to methods for reaching strategic decisions, and again over to a critique of specific strategies—all without realizing that the subject has imperceptibly changed focus. Yet, unless there is some sense of semantic and structural discipline, the discussion tends to dissolve into lamentations and confusing speculative arguments rather than constructive analysis.

Bear in mind that when one has executive responsibility for the formulation of an operative strategy, little time or energy can be devoted to speculation. The decision must be based on one's basic assumptions, one's view of current facts, and on the fundamental concepts one has already developed. Assumptions and current facts, of course, vary greatly according to circumstances. Concepts, if well thought out, have greater endurance.

The fundamentals of strategy are relatively few and relatively simple.

What Strategy Is. In his book, *Strategy*, Liddell Hart devoted the last 40 pages to the theory of strategy and to grand strategy. Here, in developing “a new dwelling-house for strategic thought,” he discussed the ideas of Clausewitz and Moltke and then wrote:

We can now arrive at a shorter definition of strategy as—“the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.” For strategy is concerned not merely with the movement of forces—as its role is often defined—but with the effect. When the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the disposition for and control of such direct action are “tactics.” The two categories, although convenient for discussion can never be truly divided into separate compartments because each not only influences but merges into the other. . . .

As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of “grand strategy.” While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should govern its object, the term “grand strategy” serves to bring out the sense of policy in execution. For the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the political objective of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.¹

This places strategy, grand strategy, tactics, policy, and objectives in a clear perspective. The element of policy stressed by Liddell Hart here and elsewhere was clearly brought out in the Naval War College publication, *Sound Military Decision*:

Understanding between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to enforce it. While military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure of military strategy. Therefore, it behooves policy to ensure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of strategy be allotted adequate power, and be undertaken under the most favorable conditions.²

These thoughts, together with Rosinski's concept of strategy being the art of control, provide the foundation for the conceptual unity and coherence essential to military theory. Rosinski wrote:

For the past 150 years there has been a continuous effort to arrive at satisfactory and illuminating definitions of strategy and tactics. This effort has so far been greatly hampered by the fact that the definitions have been verbal enumerations rather than analytical definitions. The situation is further complicated by the widely differing meanings of the terms as used in the German and Russian as opposed to the French, British, and American schools of military thought.

As a result of the work done on a paper on the Evolution of Warfare and Strategy, the following definition is hereby suggested as a formulation which bridges the gap between these two schools of thought and brings into better perspective and focus the ideas of the military thinkers of the past 150 years. *Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power; Tactics is its immediate application.*

This definition requires the recognition that there is much more to strategy than mere direction of action. It is a type of direction which takes into account the multitude of possible enemy counteractions and thus it becomes a means of control. *It is this element of control which is the essence of strategy: Control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a haphazard series of improvisations.*

Thus, strategy in contrast to haphazard action is that direction of action which aims at the control of a field of activity be it military, social, or, even intellectual. It must be comprehensive in order to control every possible counter-action or factor.

Therefore, except where there is absolutely overwhelming superiority, strategy must be selective in order to achieve economy of force. Comprehensive control of a field of action means a concentration upon those minimum key lines of action or key positions from which the entire field can be positively controlled. This is well illustrated by the concept of control or command of a sea area.

This concept of strategy as a comprehensive control has the advantage that it applies equally to the offensive and to the defensive. On the offensive, the aim of strategy is to break down the enemy's control while simultaneously preventing him from interfering with our attack. On the defensive, strategy similarly seeks to constrain the enemy attack to such a form and degree that, while the defense may be forced back, it still maintains control of its actions and avoids collapse. As long as it can manage to do so, as long as it can continue to parry all decisive thrusts of the enemy, it may suffer a series of defeats but it will still be a coherent strategy and avoid wholesale catastrophe.

In this sense a discussion of the strategy of the three services can best be analyzed in terms of control. Control is easiest in land warfare, has always been more difficult in naval strategy, is still more difficult in the field of air warfare, and is most difficult in the combined strategy of all three forces.

This definition has the advantage that it can be transposed from the military field in which it originated to any of the other fields to which, in the course of the years, it has been increasingly applied by analogy, such as, for instance, the strategy and tactics of science.

This definition has the further advantage that tactics very simply is defined as the immediate action beyond which comprehensive control of the entire field is not necessary.³

The Fundamental Relations. Just as military power can be understood only when it is related to the other elements of power, so too strategy can be understood only when it is related to the other elements of military knowledge and activity, and to the fundamental responsibility of command, to create, to support, and to employ combat forces, all in order to achieve a political purpose.

From the perspective of command these relationships are shown by Figure 1 that summarizes the most important factors of the fundamentals of military affairs:

Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas to attain broad objectives. *Tactics* is the immediate employment of specific weapons and forces to attain




Fig. 1—The Fundamental Relations from the Perspective of Command

strategic objectives. *Logistics* is the creation and sustained support of weapons and forces to be tactically employed to attain strategic objectives.

The actual employment of weapons and combat forces is tactics regardless of their size or destructiveness. The *effect* of such *tactical employment* is *strategic*. To label a weapon as being tactical or strategic in accordance with its range of destructiveness tends to inhibit the understanding of strategy.

A strategic concept is a statement of:

- What to Control
- Why to Control
- When to initiate Control
- To what degree Control
- How long to Control
- And, in general, how to Control

The practical application of a strategic concept consists of specific tactical actions that must be preceded by logistic actions. In other words, operations is a blend of tactical and logistical action to accomplish a strategic purpose. Logistics provides the physical base for both operational readiness and combat effectiveness.

The elements of time and timing are two of the most important factors in strategy and in the general conduct of war. What is a good course of action at one time may be impossible or even fatal at another time. Additionally, the time available for a decision is frequently a critical factor that is closely related to both the sense of responsibility and the intuition of the commander. In all forms of modern conflict, the scope and timing of both strategic plans and tactical action will be dominated by logistics considerations, producer logistics dominating strategic timing and consumer logistics dominating tactical timing.

Just as historians such as Liddell Hart and Rosinski clarified the subject of strategy, so also did another historian, Duncan Ballantine, illuminate the hitherto obscure but vital matter of logistics:

The logistic process is at once the military element in the nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations. And upon the coherence that exists within the process itself depends the successful articulation of the productive and military efforts of a nation at war.⁴

Thus, logistics can be considered as military economics. Having this in mind, and recognizing that the word "logistics" induces strong semantic reactions, we can state that "logistics" is analogous to military economics and that in general it deals with the provision and control of "the means of war."

The word "logistics" can disappear from all organizational titles and directives, from all curricula and, in fact, from the military vocabulary itself without in any way influencing the nature of war, the nature of the problem of war, or the problems of command and command decision. The forces of "military economics" will continue to work regardless of the words and titles used to describe them. The understanding of these forces and the provision of special measures to use and control them will still be major factors in military management regardless of what they are called or how they are grouped.

This can also be expressed by the concept that logistics is the bridge between the national economy and the tactical employ-

ment of combat forces. A further corollary is that the logistic system must be in harmony both with the economic system of the nation and with the tactical concepts and environment of the combat forces.

In moving from its base in the national economy to its payoff in the tactical operations of combat, logistics changes its nature. This change affects both organization for control and criteria of effectiveness. In spite of this duality, logistics must be seen as a coherent process.

This inherent duality in logistics produces tension and differences of opinion as to terminology, organization, and policies. This duality is found in seven related areas:

The Producer vs. The Consumer

Civilian Control vs. Military Control

Centralization vs. Decentralization

Regional Command vs. Functional Command

Logistics Command vs. Systems Command

Logistics Manager vs. Project Manager

Standardization vs. "Better Mousetrap"

Some other aspects of this duality that involve the producer phase and the consumer phase of logistics are shown in Figure 2.

From the foregoing several corollaries are clear: Economic factors limit the forces that one can create, whereas logistic factors limit the forces one can employ.

The producer phase of logistics, involving procurement in all its aspects and including the allocation of major resources, can be considered as the strategic aspect of logistics.

The consumer phase, while it must overlap with the producer phase, can be considered as the operational aspect of logistics. Both phases involve the management of resources. However, when we consider that military commanders' resources include both tactical and logistical resources, their blended employment being "operations," we see how important this whole discussion is to the attainment of operational readiness and combat effectiveness.

In other words, command transforms war potential into combat power by its control and use of the logistics process. In so doing it uses the techniques of management as applied to the various functional categories and systems within the overall logistic process. Therefore, military executives, both civilian and uniformed, have a special obligation to understand the management techniques used by command in controlling the logistics process and systems. These techniques are so numerous and are developing so rapidly that their study must be disciplined and oriented




Fig. 2—The Phases of Logistics

primarily toward military effectiveness. Such study should start early and be continually refreshed throughout an officer's career.

Knowledge of logistics tells why to act and what to do in order to create and support combat forces in combat. Knowledge of management tells us how best to do these things. Thus, logistics and management are intertwined. The understanding of these basic principles is the first step in attaining the mental discipline necessary to sort out the amazingly intricate details of modern military technology and planning and place them in an orderly structure best suited to effective combat operations. Without this intuitive understanding there can be no thorough knowledge of strategy.

Strategy and Objectives—The Effect Desired. The essence of strategy lies in the analysis of objectives and how they relate to the interests and policies of the state.

Figure 3, "The Analysis of Objectives," with its accompanying definition of terms, is at best only a rough approximation of a complex and demanding intellectual process that provides the foundation both for strategy and the supporting operational planning. It also shows how the various aspects of strategy and tactics merge, one overlapping the other.

The ideas of Clausewitz and the previously cited remarks of Liddell Hart are harmonious and set the stage for further important development. Clausewitz wrote:

We see, therefore, in the first place that in all circumstances we have to think of war not as an independent thing but as a political instrument. . . .

Now this unity is the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself. . . .

. . . Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse and if, in the consideration of this matter, this occurs anywhere, all the threads of the different relations are, in a certain sense, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an objective.⁵

Strategy is comprehensive. It directs all the elements of power that are at the disposal of the authority formulating the strategy. It aims at control, not destruction. It destroys only when there is

no better means of attaining control. Always strategy is concerned with objectives, with purposes, with the effect desired. The use of military force without a clear political objective is futile and ultimately self-defeating. Therefore political purpose must dominate strategy.

But merely to state a purpose or an objective is not enough for such a statement can easily degenerate into a rigid or dangerous slogan. The analysis should not only clarify the purposes for which action is to be taken, it should also show what constitutes their satisfactory attainment.

When a nation undertakes overt military action, it immediately causes many reactions. Obviously, the enemy reaction must be carefully evaluated. But also there is the reaction among one's own people, among the governments and peoples of allied nations and in other important nations.

Here we encounter one of the chief problems of strategic thinking. How are the objectives influenced by the course of events and these various reactions? How does one distinguish steadfast adherence to a firm purpose from dogmatic pursuit of an outworn or irrelevant objective? Objectives are multiple in modern conflict, there being a hierarchy of major and minor, primary and secondary, immediate and ultimate.

Because plans, once prepared, always have a great and frequently dangerous momentum, the running estimate of the situation must involve an alertness to changes and particularly to the reactions of the opponent that influence one's own major objectives and the nature and relative importance of the individual elements of this complex hierarchy. The figure, "The Analysis of Objectives," is a grossly simplified picture of an extremely complex and important analytical process that ultimately provides the necessary linkage between national policy and combat action.

Strategy and Control. Both political objectives and political control are essential elements of all strategy, emphasizing Liddell Hart's words:

. . . For the role of grand strategy . . . is to coordinate and direct *all the resources* of a nation or a band of nations toward the *political objective* of the war—the goal defined by *fundamental policy*.⁶ [Italics supplied]

The foregoing shows how in reality there are three aspects to the concept of strategy as control:




Fig. 3—The Analysis of Objectives

The analysis of the political interests and the evaluation of the available national power in the light of the world situation provides the foundation for the harmonious development of policies and objectives, political, military and economic. This diagram indicates how the further analysis of military objectives is related to strategic and tactical planning.

<i>The National Interest</i>	=	The General and continuing ends for which a state acts.
<i>The National Interests</i>	=	The particular interpretation of the National Interest for particular conditions or situations.
<i>Principles</i>	=	The enduring modes of behavior or relatively established guides to action that characterize nations.
<i>Objectives</i>	=	Derived from both Interests and Principles and are a specification of previous generalizations for particular circumstances.
<i>Policies</i>	=	Specific courses of action designed to achieve objectives.
The distinction between policies and objectives is that between means and ends.		

For a detailed discussion of these matters see Appendix A of the Brookings Institution study, "United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955." Also quoted in Appendix A of Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

The aim of strategy is to attain control vis-à-vis an opponent—control of the external field of action.

The exercise of the power used to attain control must itself be controlled—command control of military force.

The “commander” exercising this power must maintain control over the sources of the power that he is using—control of the internal field of action.

National strategy is the comprehensive direction of all the elements of national power to achieve the national objectives.

Military strategy is the comprehensive direction of all the elements of power that are at the disposal of military authority.

The political authority decides which elements of national government will exercise control over the various elements of national power.

Because these various elements of power cannot be precisely defined, compartmented, or divided, it is normal to expect areas of ambiguity, overlap, and contention about authority among the various elements and members of any government.

In some instances, such ambiguity is deliberate and is intended to preserve the freedom of action of the head of government and to protect his personal power from the encroachment of an overly ambitious subordinate, as for example, President Franklin Roosevelt prior to and during World War II.

This is all part of the internal political process of any government, be it authoritarian or free. It is an inherent part of the struggle for power that characterizes normal human activity and behavior. These factors are part of the element of control—control both of the application of power and the sources of power.

In modern grand strategy the attempt to take a strictly quantified systemic approach is doomed to failure because the most important elements in the complex relations between usable military power, economics, and international and domestic political factors cannot be measured at any one time with the degree of accuracy necessary to make estimates of relative power in other than very general terms.

While such estimates are certainly highly desirable, they always must be intuitively evaluated by a very few responsible individuals whose own sense of personal values will greatly influence their perception and evaluation of these factors. In politics this evaluation also includes the political leader’s subconscious evaluation of his own personal power, particularly his ability to

influence the perception and value judgments of both his supporters and his opponents, both foreign and domestic.

Here we must face up to a major factor in the use of military power by a free society. This is particularly important because a strategy that is contrary to the sense of values of the people of the nation should not be expected to succeed. This was clear in the 1967-68 collapse of U.S. strategy in Vietnam. Consequently, the strategy that is suitable for an authoritarian government that has control over the news media and the expression of public opinion is not necessarily suitable for the government of a free society that has no control over the media and expression of opinion.

Strategy, Interwoven with Tactics and Logistics. Edward Lasker, the chess grandmaster, made the following perceptive comment:

... Strategy sets down the whole of the problems which must be solved in war, in order to attain the ultimate result aimed at; tactics solve such problems in various ways, and according to the conditions prevailing in the particular case. Sound strategy, when setting the task, must never lose sight of tactical practicability, and only a thorough knowledge of tactical resources makes correct strategy possible.⁷

This last description explains why the term "strategic doctrine" is so frequently a dangerous misnomer. Doctrine arises from repeated experience and is useful in dealing with recurring situations. Its purpose is to provide a good solution to the repeating problem and to be applied almost automatically when a recognized situation occurs. It saves time and achieves instant understanding between unit commanders without the necessity for consultation or elaborate communications. It simplifies decision and facilitates coordination in action. It is an essential element of tactics, logistics, and communications, but has little, if any, application to strategy.

Bear in mind that most strategic problems seldom recur in such a manner that the tactical resources are so disposed as to make a doctrine applicable. There is, however, room for doctrine in the area of grand tactics.

Sound Military Decision again is useful in explaining fundamental relations:

... Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. But

strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord with the strategic aim. Strategy and tactics are inseparable.

It is thus the duty of tactics to ensure that its results are appropriate to the strategic aim, and the duty of strategy to place at the disposal of tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded. The latter consideration imposes upon strategy the requirement that the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can be made available.

Consequently, while the attainment of the aims of strategy generally depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy is initially responsible for the success of tactics. It is therefore in the province of strategy to ensure that the attainment of tactical objectives furthers, exclusively, the aims of strategy, and also that the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for the attainment of the designated objectives.⁸

In military strategy the interweaving of logistical, tactical and strategic considerations in the mind of a single responsible individual will always be an intuitive process based on professional experience and judgment. Both the logistical and tactical factors contain many quantitative aspects whose evaluation is subject to many modern analytical technical techniques.

In moving from purely military strategy to the level of national strategy or to grand strategy, we have an increasing emphasis on economic and political considerations.

Recalling Duncan Ballantine's comment on logistics as: "The military element in the nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations," we must understand the interweaving of strategy, economics, and logistics and how the two phases of logistics, producer and consumer, affect the situation.

At the levels of national or grand strategy, political factors, both international and domestic, are important. At this level, strategy, economics, and logistics tend to coalesce; with national and international economics, i.e., producer logistics, limiting the forces one can create, and operational logistics, i.e., consumer logistics, limiting the forces one can tactically employ. Strategic deployments involve both producer and consumer logistics.

Weapons, force structure, and force deployments do not determine the strategy to be employed; they merely determine the

maximum operational capabilities at the disposal of the commander and thus they limit or constrain the strategy he may employ. To believe otherwise is to fall into the trap of the weapons strategy discussed in the next section. This kind of trap can best be avoided by following the classic principle of military decision found in *Sound Military Decision*, which emphasizes this interweaving of integrated thought by testing each proposed course of action for:

Suitability—Will it accomplish the mission? Attain the objective? Achieve the effect desired? This involves both strategy and politics.

Feasibility—Can it be accomplished with the means available? This involves tactics, logistics and economics.

Acceptability—Are the consequences acceptable? This involves politics, economics, and logistics. More importantly, however, it involves the more fundamental matters of human lives and moral values.

Implications of the Concept of Strategy. Many discussions of strategy suffer from the semantic confusion arising from the two commonly used meanings of the word “strategic.” The first meaning evolves from defining strategy as the art and science of using political, economic, psychological and military forces of a nation to support national policy. Thus, in this sense, “strategic” refers to the plan or scheme for such use.

The second meaning defines “strategic” action as the physical destruction of an enemy’s warmaking capacity. This second meaning refers primarily to industrial, agricultural and military targets.

The fallacy that strategy and destruction are synonymous and the consequent development of a “weapons strategy,” both stem from the careless use of the second meaning of “strategic.”

Rosinski’s concept of “comprehensive control” has certain specific implications of tremendous importance. In particular, it establishes the primacy of strategy in the conduct of national affairs as opposed to the emphasis on destruction that is implicit in any “weapon strategy.” The idea that the weapon should determine the strategy to be used is based on the implied assumption that strategy and destruction are synonymous. This simply is not true. Naturally, strategy will be influenced by the availability of weapons, but strategy should use destruction only when this is the best way of gaining or exercising control. The

concentration of thought on control naturally leads to a reexamination and better understanding of the objectives whose attainment is the purpose of the attempt to exercise control.

The concept of continuing control prepares the mind for shifting the emphasis from weapon to weapon or from tool to tool in accordance with changing situations or with the changing capabilities or application of the weapon or weapon systems involved. Thus, the intellectual concept of strategy as "comprehensive control" naturally leads to the intellectual concept of flexibility. But "flexibility" itself must be understood lest it degenerate into mere hesitancy, uncertainty, and vacillation. The essence of true flexibility lies in the continuing clear appreciation of the aim, the purposes, the objectives and of how the actual course of events has influenced the relative importance of their component parts.

This is illustrated in the manner in which various types of government exercise control over the sources of national and military power in times of hostilities. The fundamentals apply to the initiation of hostilities, the conduct of hostilities, and, not least, to bringing hostilities to an end.

The executive has the primary responsibility for attaining and maintaining the conceptual unity that is absolutely essential for successful strategy. He has the further task of judging how the degree of conceptual units he has been able to maintain will influence the outcome of his strategic plans and operations and he has the task of initiating changes in these plans appropriate to changes in his position of power relative to that of his opponent. Conceptual unity is the heart of control of the sources of power.

In this process we again illustrate the sequence of assumptions, objectives, expectations and the overriding importance of intuition based on a sense of military realities. This sequence can be summed up by the simple statement: strategic realism requires the challenge of assumptions, the analysis of objectives, and the appraisal of expectations.

The vital importance of these factors is a major lesson of the U.S.-Vietnam experience. Their stark simplicity has been obscured by the mass of accusations, specious rationalization and wishful speculation that flowed following publication of the *Pentagon Papers*.

The foregoing theoretical discussion of the nature and structure of strategy and its relation to the other elements of military theory and substantive knowledge has been relatively simple and

brief. The practical application of these fundamentals is subtle, complex, and variable. In its broadest sense strategy includes:

—Formulation of national strategic policy and plans and the development of military force levels and of procurement plans to support them.

—Broad public statements by senior government executives in order to guide and inform one's own people; guide and inform one's allies; inform and signal one's opponents.

In all of this, the understanding of the fundamentals of strategy and of the conduct of large-scale combat operations is necessary in order to appreciate the significance of the inevitable discrepancy between the desired military force levels and those actually provided by the planning, budgeting, and procurement processes.

Only a man with a personal sense of responsibility for the outcome of a plan is qualified to make an operational plan, and to do this he must have an intuitive sense of how these fundamental factors operate in the actual situation he is dealing with.

While the scholar can break down and analyze the various elements of this complex transitional process into individual specialties, the commander must see them as a whole and exercise control of detail both in planning and execution by delegating his authority. This basic principle applies at all levels of command authority. This delegation is effective in accomplishing the strategic objective only when the commander establishes conceptual unity.

Finally, the clear concept of the objective is the single most important element of a high-level political-military decision. The objective must be analyzed, not merely stated, if such a clear concept is to be attained.

With these matters in mind, what does the record show?

Illustration of the Importance of Conceptual Unity and the Objective.

Great Britain and United States

1939-1945

Strong differences as to detail were successfully reconciled because of agreement on basic strategic-political issues and recognition of common national interests.

Germany and Italy

1940-1944

There was continual distrust and disagreement and final dissolution and defeat. There was no real conceptual unity. The alliance was based on opportunism, not common interests.

Germany 1941-1942

Germany failed to appreciate the importance of Malta and concentrate on its capture. Even though Malta was seriously damaged and intermittently isolated, it nevertheless still played a critical part in the defense of the British position in the Mediterranean before the full weight of U.S. power could be brought to bear.

Germany and Japan World War II 1941-1945

There was no conceptual unity. Both neglected many opportunities for real strategic collaboration. Opportunism rather than common interests governed their relations.

Japan World War II 1941-1945

All through the Pacific War, the Japanese submarine campaign was directed toward the U.S. naval combat forces rather than against their logistic support.

United States World War II 1944-1945

The United States had a wholly incorrect understanding of the Russian political objectives in 1945 and therefore U.S. military operations in Europe were not directed toward a clear political objective but only toward a limited military objective. Hence the anomaly of Berlin and the extension westward of Russian power.

France, Indochina, and North Africa World War II 1945-1960

There was no conceptual unity in France itself as to long-range interests and objectives.

United States Korea 1950-1951

The basic concepts of President Truman and General MacArthur were far apart, and because of inadequate personal communication neither seemed to appreciate the situation and danger.

Great Britain, France, and the United States Suez 1956

This was a disaster because neither the British nor the French had a clear attainable objective, and the uncertain objectives they had were contrary to the objectives and interests of the United States. Thus, there was no conceptual unity. There were, of course, other factors that I have discussed elsewhere.⁹

United States Bay of Pigs 1961

Because of supposed great secrecy and neglect of fundamental command responsibility there was no conceptual unity among

those exercising authority and major influence; specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Cuban Exile Leaders all had different concepts of the operation, while President Kennedy seemed wholly unaware that such differences existed or of their significance.

United States

Cuban Missile Crisis 1961

Applying lessons of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy made sure of unity and positive political control.

The implications of this record are clear. The understanding of basic military theory and an analysis of the interests and objectives will show the presence or the absence of conceptual unity. Sometimes, however, a commander in the field must take action in spite of having an inadequate concept of his own or his superiors' objectives, but if this happens his expectations of success should be very modest. At the highest as well as the field level, the major command responsibility is to insure that throughout the chain of command there is conceptual unity regarding the objective—the effect desired.

So much for major examples of conceptual unity and disunity.

Some Strategic-Logistic-Tactical Relations. No single incident of the U.S. Pacific campaigns from December 1941 through 1945 better illustrates fundamental principles and the inseparable relationship of strategy, logistics, tactics, and command than the emergency repair of the carrier *Yorktown* after the battle of the Coral Sea. Samuel Eliot Morison wrote:

... Although the picture was not complete the composition, approximate routes and timetable of the enemy forces that immediately threatened Midway were so accurately deduced that on 23 May Rear Admiral Bellinger, the Naval air commander at Pearl, was able to predict the Japanese plan of attack on the Atoll. But for this early and abundant information and (what was equally important) the prompt and intelligent use of it, the Pacific Fleet would have had only a slim chance of winning. As it was, the three weeks preceding Midway were the most tense and anxious experienced by Nimitz's staff during the entire war.

Anxiety was never more justified. The carrier situation was critical. *Saratoga*, her repairs completed, was training her air group at San Diego. *Lexington* had been sunk and *Yorktown*

damaged at Coral Sea. After that battle Admiral Fitch estimated it would take about ninety days to repair *Yorktown*, but the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard did it in less than two. She limped into port at 1430 May 27 with her bowels in disorder from a bomb explosion and leaking from near-misses. The big dry dock took her in that afternoon. Over 1400 men—shipfitters, shipwrights, machinists, welders, electricians—poured in, over and under the ship; they and the yard shopmen worked in shifts the rest of that day and the next and during the whole of two nights, making the bulkhead stanchions and deck plates necessary to restore the ship's structural strength, and replacing the wiring, instruments and fixtures damaged in the blast. There was no time to make blueprints or to draft plans; templates of parts that needed replacement were fashioned in wood and hustled ashore to the appropriate shop, where the replacements were made in record time, carried on board "on the double" and installed. At 1100 May 29 the dock was flooded, *Yorktown* moved into the stream with hundreds of men still working on her, fueled that afternoon, took on replacement planes and sortied at 0900 on the last day of May. Her new air group, a composite from three different carriers first operated as a unit in the forthcoming battle.^{1 0}

The battle of Midway is considered one of the decisive battles of World War II. *Yorktown* made a vital contribution to this victory at Midway. Many important principles are clear for example:

The critical importance of logistic improvisation and of imaginative leadership and dedication transcend all routine management techniques and cost effectiveness analyses.

At no time during this critical period did the availability of money have any influence on the decisions or on the outcome. The limitations were wholly a matter of materials, facilities, skilled workers, leadership, physical endurance, and time; all efforts being enhanced by high morale and decentralized authority.

There was unquestioned command control of all the logistic resources available.

Logistic factors limit the combat forces one can employ.

The nature and importance of operational readiness and combat effectiveness are apparent.

A logistic system responsive to needs of tactical command is necessary.

The vital importance of conceptual unity and of the evaluation of intelligence data is critical.

Carrying basic principles further, we can see that the South Pacific offensive campaign of 1942-43 was a strategic exploitation of the tactical successes of the battle of Midway. Furthermore, the Guadalcanal and the other South Pacific operations were combinations of tactical actions and logistic actions. Their success constituted the strategic effect desired, the attainment of the successive objectives of the campaign, by securing the line of communications to Australia and providing bases for further offensive action of the Southwest and Central Pacific campaigns.

B.H. Liddell Hart, writing in the *Military Review* of November 1968, brings out a point of major importance:

The most critical stroke in the six-day war of 1967 was the first, the air stroke—or, in modern parlance, the “air-strike.” . . .

Besides the combined calculation and subtlety of a plan that paralyzed the whole of the numerically superior Egyptian Air Force at the outset, the staggering ground turnaround time of the Israelis, barely seven and a half minutes, was itself a great contribution to surprise. It enabled many of the Israeli pilots to start on a second sortie within an hour, and make eight sorties in the day compared with the Egyptian reckoning that they might manage to do two. . . .

A general point of more significance was brought out in an operational analysis of the campaign in a Voice of Israel broadcast on 15 July 1967 by Colonel J.L. Wallach . . . :

“The first point I would like to make is the prime importance of the Israeli Air Force’s [IAF’s] actions in destroying the hostile air forces and gaining air superiority over the battlefields. . . . But what was really outstanding on 5th June, 1967, was the fact that IAF had accomplished the

main part of its mission in less than three hours... The key to this phenomenon may be found in the high technical level of the force, which enables the maximal utilization of its planes, in the high standard of its pilots and in their courage, but also in the fact that in the IAF there is no gulf, so characteristic in most air forces throughout the world, between ground staff on the one hand and flying personnel on the other. IAF has succeeded in welding together both branches of the service into one family, in which one respects the functions of the other... ”¹¹

This illustrates the complete integration of strategy, logistics and tactics; that operations is a blend of tactical and logistical action to attain a strategic objective.

I use the Yom Kippur War of 1973 as the final illustration of fundamentals. Here, in addition to the inseparable relations of strategy, tactics, and logistics, we see how national policy is intertwined with international law and conceptual unity among the members of an alliance.

Arab-Israeli War—1973: A Study in Interrelations. In October 1973 Egyptians were unable to make a full strategic exploitation of their initial tactical success because of:

Israeli skill and timing in the commitment of tactical reserves in Sinai-Suez area. This employment was made possible by a responsive logistic system.

Rapid replacement of Israeli weapons and equipment lost in initial successful Egyptian attack. This was made possible by rapid response of U.S. logistic system, using large Galaxy (C5A) aircraft refueling in the Azores.

U.S. policy had been that of friendship and support of Portugal in spite of opposition in the United States to Portuguese-African policy or “colonialism.” The NATO nations did not support U.S. Mideast policy of strong support for Israel. Therefore, (except for West Germany) they did not permit use of their bases for replenishment and they did not permit U.S. resupply overflights of Europe. Therefore, flights from Germany had to go down the English Channel to the Atlantic then around through the Mediterranean to Israel.

This underscores elements of policy, national sovereignty, international law, international organizations and treaties—all as

they are viewed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Armed Forces.

There was a near confrontation with the U.S.S.R. as a result of intelligence about Soviet moves, and this led to the U.S. command control alert.

Simultaneously, the Arab oil embargo started a chain reaction throughout the Western World as resonant logistics systems reverberated under stress. Logistic leadtime became a matter that all economists had to consider, and government and industrial officials had to change oil distillation and transportation programs to adapt national economies to new conditions.

The cease-fire negotiations and the long discussion of peace terms brought out the complex interrelations inherent in this dangerous conflict. One issue alone, the opening of the Suez Canal, posed problems in economics, politics, military and international law affairs, with special consideration being needed for the strategy and logistics of the Indian Ocean area and its effects on existing treaties and informal accommodations.

While the degree of detail that any individual must understand will vary with his professional specialty and specific assignment, the President of the United States must intuitively evaluate them, recognizing how they influence each other and how various decisions support the national interests. In this, he depends on his intelligence and information service for the vital information concerning the capabilities and attitudes of allies and adversaries alike.

The following issues were and still are at stake (again, no order of relative importance):

Israeli security and boundaries versus the expansionist spirit of Israel.

Redress of Arab grievances and the control of international terrorism.

Energy, oil; economics of all nations. The Suez Canal.

Détente between the Soviet Union and the United States.

SALT Agreements, and control of nuclear proliferation.

Domestic politics in the United States.

Solidarity of NATO nations.

Solidarity of Arab nations.

The organization, support, and effectiveness of peacekeeping forces.

The need to avoid a nuclear war was the overriding issue—it transcended all others. This in turn made the question of political economic blackmail a dangerous factor.

When we add to this the further complications of negotiating a general Arab-Israeli settlement in an atmosphere in which there is little prospect of impartial action by the United Nations, we can appreciate the true scope of strategy.

With these historical examples in mind, we can now sum up the essentials of strategy both from a theoretical and an operational standpoint. The perspective of command was dominant as the President of the United States had to consider economics, policy, intelligence, command control, strategy, logistics, tactics, operations, international law, treaties, and international organizations simultaneously and evaluate them intuitively. This interrelation of political, economic, and military affairs and factors must be understood by top executives and their senior advisors, regardless of whether they are civilians or military professionals.

The realization that strategy is indivisible does not change the fact that under some circumstances one element of power, such as landpower or airpower or seapower, may be of paramount importance for that time and situation. Furthermore, in most protracted conflicts, strategy is cumulative. What may bring success or failure is seldom one great stroke. Usually it comes as the culmination of a series of events and operations, no single one of which would have brought the end result. However, taken in the aggregate, they are decisive.

Just as national economics is a vital factor in national strategy, so too military economics, that is, logistics, is a vital factor in military strategy. The understanding of logistics, therefore, is essential to understanding strategy. This principle applies through all levels of discussion with only minor modification of adjectives as one shifts the level of consideration. So one can talk of international strategy, grand strategy, national strategy, or maritime strategy, as long as one realizes that one is dealing with a coherent combination of:

Objectives—the effect desired;

Scheme;

Physical means—economics or logistics.

There should be no confusion or difficulty in grasping the essentials of a strategic discussion or practical strategic problem. Recognizing the essentials does not of itself solve the problem but it is the first vital step. The purpose may be offensive or defensive, its subsidiary elements may change with the passage of time and the course of events: it may be worthy or unworthy, wise or foolish.

Finally, returning to the Rosinski concept, the very use of the word strategy implies rationality which, in essence, is the ability to translate a strategic concept into practical operations in order to accomplish a known purpose. It may be difficult to discern the purpose of an opponent's actions, or to understand his supposed line of reasoning. Nevertheless, all of this is part of understanding what Clausewitz meant when he wrote:

Now the first, the greatest and the most decisive act of the judgment which a statesman and commander perform is that of correctly recognizing in this respect the kind of war he is undertaking, of not taking it for, or wishing to make it, something which by the nature of the circumstances it cannot be. This is, therefore, the first and most comprehensive of all strategic questions...^{1 2}

CHAPTER V

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGY

Background. The questions of nuclear weapons, nuclear warfare, and nuclear strategy involve the very existence of the state. They are inevitably bound up with the broader subjects of power, sovereignty, policy, strategy, economics, logistics and ideology. While the theory thus involved may appear complex, it is relatively simple in comparison to the problems, paradoxes and complexities of its practical application to the affairs of statecraft. As is also true with other political and military matters, the theory does not solve the problems—at best it can help to explain them, put them into focus, show the relationship between the component parts and perhaps help to estimate probabilities. While each such part has its specialists, when a critical decision must be made or a dangerous international crisis arises the generalist must bear the burden of responsible action.

From the perspective of international relations, the problems of nuclear strategy, arms control (SALT), mutual and balanced force reduction, and nuclear proliferation are intertwined. Their most difficult aspects are apparent in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States and their allied nations. The People's Republic of China, however, as it grows in economic strength and political influence, has an increasing interest in these matters. Furthermore, the so-called Third World of developing nations, with its insistent demand for political recognition and technical aid presents not only a source and field of conflict, but also a potential area for constructive cooperation.

For the foreseeable future, however, the central problems will be U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. and the resultant twin concepts of *détente* and deterrence. Ironically, *détente* or "peaceful coexistence" in its broadest sense means that "deterrence," to an important degree, has been successful, for there is now a tacit agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—each with overwhelming nuclear weapon capability—not to allow the exasperations and conflicts of ideological difference, economic political rivalry and regional competition, to induce a major and nuclear war. Therefore, in the practical application of

nuclear theory, the concepts and issues of détente become important.

Détente. The fundamental element of détente is the tacit mutual recognition that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States intends to take aggressive military action against the other. The subsidiary elements are:

Avoidance of confrontation in areas where one power or the other perceives its own interests to be vital;

Expanded cultural and scientific cooperation and exchange;

Expanded economic relations, particularly as related to food, energy, and technology;

Cooperation in the conservation of natural resources and environmental health;

Control and limitation of arms, both nuclear and conventional.

These elements have many difficult domestic and international political implications and areas where various vested interests compete for special benefits: one striking illustration is the controversial sale of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union.

While the mutual and worldwide benefits of détente seem to be obvious, the question of the long-range intentions of the Soviet Union troubles many people. For instance, the Brezhnev doctrine affirms the right and the obligation of the Soviet Union to intervene with military force to preserve socialism in the satellite states. At the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow on 24 February 1976, the General Secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, stated:

Our party supports and will continue to support the peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination or exact military bases. We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience, our Communist convictions... We make no secret of the fact that we see détente as the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist construction.¹

The uncertainty of intentions is increased by the great size and continuing buildup of Soviet conventional land and naval forces and weapons in the face of simultaneous reductions by the United States. These factors add a disturbing element to the negotiations on arms control and limitation and, in particular, raise serious and honest doubts in the United States about the wisdom of continuing the SALT and other negotiations. Thus, because détente implies a reciprocal relationship and because both sides can be expected to pursue their own interests, the climate of détente will fluctuate, ranging from cooperation to hostility depending on the area of interest and the issues. This situation will test the poise and responsibility of the political leaders, for continuity in policy will be difficult if the semantic distortion common to partisan politics is allowed to dominate the inevitable debate in the free society.

In this connection, is one willing to face up to the full implications of the assumption that in the Soviet view, détente is merely a pause in the continuing struggle of world conflict, a pause accepted in order to prepare for eventual forceful aggression? Whoever makes this assumption should reexamine the whole structure, balance, and quality of the armed forces and not merely call for more funds and resources for their expansion. New concepts will be required that look both at civil defense and at the discipline and standard of living of the entire population. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, this requires an appreciation of the nature and extent of the cultural change taking place throughout the world.

Finally, throughout the discussion of nuclear weapons, one should bear in mind that there is a psychological difference between the strategy of their procurement and deployment and the strategy of their actual use. The leadtime for the former is from 2 to 15 years but for the latter it is from 15 minutes to several months. The employment is limited by but should not be determined by the deployment! The employment must be appropriate to the purposes and circumstances at the time of their actual employment that may or may not coincide with the purposes and circumstances that govern their deployment. Furthermore, there is a great difference between their use against another great nuclear power and their use against a nonnuclear power or one with relatively small capability.

Deterrence. In the late 1950s, a body of nuclear weapon terminology, concepts and hypotheses emerged in the form of a

general theory of "Nuclear Strategy." In its simplest form it "... can be reduced to an analysis of the interaction between alternative targeting options and alternative capabilities for threatening, destroying or protecting those targets."² This sound but deceptively simple statement is based on the implicit assumption that the theory of deterrence is central to all discussions of nuclear weapons and strategy.

Furthermore, deterrence is a matter of the interplay of capabilities and intentions. George and Smoke state it simply:

Deterrence is the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a course of action outweigh its benefits... Effective deterrence requires:

- a. Intent to protect or defend.
- b. Acquisition and deployment of capability to do so.
- c. Communication of this intent to potential aggressor. (credibility)... .

Deterrence is not merely a self-contained strategy but is a broader multi-faceted process to control conflict potential in inter-state relations.³

With the experience of many years as a scholar, U.S. official, and arms control negotiator, Paul Nitze has expressed the range of strategic nuclear concepts available to any nuclear weapons nation as follows:

1. *Minimum Deterrence*. This means a capacity to destroy a few key cities with little if any counterforce capacity to attack a hostile nation's military forces. In essence, it relies on the threat alone to deter... .

2. *Massive Urban/Industrial Retaliation*. As the name implies, this posture is designed to destroy many cities, many millions of people and much productive capacity, and to do so on an assured second strike basis... .

3. *Flexible Response*. In this form of deterrence the United States would have the capability to react to a Soviet counterforce attack without going immediately to a counter-

city attack. It would thus increase the credibility of deterrence...

4. *Denial of a Nuclear-War-Winning Capability to the Other Side.* This means a nuclear posture such that, even if the other side attacked first and sought to destroy one's own strategic striking power, the result of such a counterforce exchange would be sufficiently even and inconclusive that the duel would be extremely unattractive to the other side...

5. *A Nuclear-War Winning Capability.* This would be a position so superior that, whatever the initial forms of nuclear exchange, one's own surviving capacity would be enough to destroy the war-making ability of the other nation without comparable return damage...⁴

He continues later:

... A fundamental aim of nuclear strategy and the military posture to back it up must be deterrence: the failure to deter would be of enormous cost to the United States and to the world.

Once again, two important distinctions should be borne in mind: the distinction between the concept of "deterrence" and the concept of "military strategy," and the accompanying distinction between "declaratory policy" and "action policy." Deterrence is a political concept; it deals with attempts by indications of capability and will to dissuade the potential enemy from taking certain actions. Military strategy deals with the military actions one would, in fact, take if deterrence fails. A responsible objective of military strategy in this event would be to bring the war to an end in circumstances least damaging to the future of our society.⁵

Other scholars have discussed these matters in somewhat different terms. For instance:

The central theoretical problem in the field of national security policy is to clarify and distinguish between the two central issues of *deterrence and defense*... Deterrence works on the enemy's *intentions*; the *deterrent value* of

military forces is their effect in reducing the likelihood of enemy moves. Defense reduces the enemy's *capability* to damage or deprive us; the *defense value* of military forces is their effect in mitigating the adverse consequences of . . . enemy moves. . . .

This is the most striking difference between nuclear and pre-nuclear strategy: the partial separation of the functions of pre-attack deterrence and post-attack defense, and the possibility that deterrence may now be accomplished by weapons which might have no rational use for defense should deterrence fail.

Deterrence, in one sense, is simply the negative aspect of political power; it is the power to dissuade, as opposed to the power to coerce or compel. . . .⁶

This distinction between "deterrence" and "defense" is translated into concepts of "assured destruction" and "damage limiting" capabilities and into such terms as "first strike" and "second strike" capabilities for different weapons systems. All these are related to missiles and bombs, to antimissile defense systems, to "strategic" systems and "tactical" systems. When "scenarios" are written, such concepts as "pledges for no first use," "nuclear bargaining" with "demonstration shots" and "take out of cities," "counterforce strikes" become part of the speculations on "escalation." Such terms as "parity," "strategic sufficiency," "stable and unstable balances of terror," are inherent in the discussion of arms control and limitation as well as in the public and congressional debates concerning national defense policy and legislation. It is important to recognize that these semantic refinements and the esoteric nuclear vocabulary will probably evaporate as a nation crosses the nuclear use threshold.

The complexity of the issues and of the associated semantic distinctions is illustrated by James E. King's comment:

The trouble is that deterrence, no matter how it is conceived otherwise, obviously has both passive (or preventive) and active (or war-fighting) modes. Flexible Response, for example, was clearly a shift away from the almost exclusively passive or war-preventive complexion of Massive Retaliation to a more active (war-fighting) posture. But the intent was still "deterrent" in those situations in which it was

the U.S. purpose to "prevent or hinder" military action by the opponent. Furthermore, in other situations, such as Laos and (for a time) Vietnam, while the "threat" was essentially *political*, Flexible Response was also intended to encompass the positive or affirmative (more candidly *aggressive*) employment of military force, if necessary, to accomplish the containment of Communist expansion. In other words, if by "deterrence" is meant the prevention or control of war, especially nuclear war, then deterrence is indubitably an important part of U.S. strategy since 1945. But it is by no means the whole of it, nor is it the most active manifestation. In essence U.S. strategy, since and before Alamogordo, has been concerned with the use of military force to preserve or promote national interests and the risk of nuclear annihilation as the penalty or cost has quite explicitly *not* been ruled out. So either "deterrence" has to be defined so as to include the war-fighting mode or it has to be recognized that the deterrence of military actions by our enemies is only a part of our national strategic purpose.⁷

Target Selection. With these concepts and purposes in mind, what tactical objectives should be sought, what specific targets should be hit?

Theory of target selection based on these concepts involves two main choices: counterforce targets and countervalue targets.

The counterforce targets are the opponents' weapons and weapons delivery systems. These are attacked in order to reduce his ability to attack. Such defensive attacks are sometimes known as damage limiting, or disarming.

Countervalue targets are the opponents' cities, transportation and industrial systems and people. Destroying or threatening such targets is a form of punishment to be used for retribution, revenge, or destruction of his economic and long-range military capability.

Target attacks are classified by their timing as first strike or second strike. A first-strike capability gives one the ability to preempt enemy action or to prevent him from taking offensive action. In terms of both "nuclear strategy" and arms control and limitation, the possession of such a first-strike capability is considered to be provocative or destabilizing, whereas the possession of a purely second-strike capability is thought to be nonprovocative and thus stabilizing. A second-strike capability is the ability to absorb an enemy attack and still have enough nuclear capability to inflict major damage to him. The second-

strike capability is to be achieved either by dispersal, physical invulnerability, invisibility, or mobility of weapon-launching platforms. When both sides possess the latter, the situation is often described as a stable strategic balance or strategic symmetry, a term which also has other connotations: it can connote a situation in which neither side has or believes it has the capability to disarm the other by a first strike.⁸ The term is also used for the situation in which both nations have approximately the same range of nuclear options.⁹ Furthermore, the Soviets consider geography an essential element in strategic symmetry by directing attention to the different nature of the so-called strike targets (military, industrial, population, etc.), their number, size, density and relative importance. They also include in this the location of bases from which attacks can be made.¹⁰

Some suggest that strategic weapons are used for deterrence and tactical weapons are used for defense. In such cases target selection for tactical weapons of course depends on the tactical situation at the time of the action. In general they are designed to be used as a field commander would use heavy artillery: to check an enemy ground advance or to facilitate the advance of one's own ground forces. The more one examines this, however, the more the uncertainty grows, particularly as the Soviets have consistently held to the principle that strategic weapons, tactical weapons, and conventional weapons must be wholly integrated in accordance with the grand strategic aims.¹¹ They have consistently held to the assumption that a major war will be a nuclear war. Thus, the targeting of "tactical weapons" cannot be considered as wholly apart from the targeting of the "strategic weapons."

Theater Nuclear Weapons. Détente, Deterrence and Target Selection become important when we consider the great variety and number of nuclear weapons now available. The weapons of the United States and the U.S.S.R. vary in explosive power from the Soviet SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile of 18 to 25 megatons with a range of 7,500 miles, down to U.S. artillery shells of 2 kilotons with a range of 10 miles.¹² The number of U.S. tactical weapons in Europe is estimated to be about 7,000.¹³

Planning for the actual use of all nuclear weapons involves complex physical and economic trade-off calculations, the precision of which may exceed or even obscure the knowledge of psychological political factors and the knowledge of the threshold of escalation. One major political matter is: What signal do you wish to send to your opponent by the threat or the actual use of a weapon?

A favorable response to that signal may be considered to be successful deterrence; an unfavorable response is a threat of uncontrolled escalation. The threshold is always uncertain. Escalation is not a chess game; there is no way to be sure of controlling or even predicting the course of events.

The paradox of nuclear power becomes apparent when we consider the problems of alliance. For example, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, reported to the Congress on the concepts and requirements for nuclear weapons in Europe. Among other things he stated:

... The evolution of U.S. doctrine ... which sets as the primary objective for the use of nuclear weapons the termination of war on terms acceptable to the United States and its Allies at the lowest feasible level of conflict.^{1 4}

Schlesinger went on to state that the NATO strategy of flexible response requires the capability to employ nuclear options at various levels of conflict ranging from limited battlefield use to extended theater use or to "general nuclear response." He described the various forms in which a Warsaw Pact attack might be made, the specific responses designed to achieve a shock effect, and the decisiveness that would so change the tactical situation that the Pact political leaders would change their expectation of quick or cheap victory. He stated:

To accomplish the above while trying to avoid escalation to general nuclear war. . . . Efforts would be made to control escalation in such desperate circumstances by a combination of clearly perceivable limits on the NATO nuclear response and the threat of more extensive strikes with theater and strategic forces if the Warsaw Pact chooses to escalate.^{1 5}

In another statement on strategic doctrine, he stated:

Many people believe that in all likelihood it must go all the way, but that there is some possibility that nuclear war could be constrained at a lower level.^{1 6}

The foregoing are merely fragments drawn from a series of statements by one of the most knowledgeable and responsible defense officials in the world. When the full statements are read we see that the real situation is fully and clearly discussed, that the

grave uncertainties are acknowledged, that many important problems and known deficiencies are just beginning to be studied, and that there is much room for differing opinions on fundamentals.

Two of many such differences are here cited—former Professor of War Studies at Kings College, London, Laurence Martin, writes:

The decision to use so-called tactical nuclear weapons is very likely to be the first form in which NATO would confront the fateful step to nuclear war. . . . It is therefore all the more reprehensible that doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons is ill-developed and that the forces required have been carelessly designed and deployed.¹⁷

In the meanwhile, Britain and France have maintained their own independent nuclear forces and plans. Those of France, in particular, have raised many difficult questions. One opinion is that the very nature of nuclear weapons makes any alliance impossible and that European nations must either equip themselves with nuclear weapons, as France and Britain have done, or seek the protection of the United States as West Germany has done by holding American soldiers hostage.¹⁸

The number of qualifications, reservations, and uncertainties expressed by Secretary Schlesinger illustrates the paradox and ambiguity that are inherent in the deployment of large numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons. There is little doubt about United States or Soviet capabilities. There is grave doubt in each nation as to the intentions of the other. No one has any idea as to the probability of the successful containment of escalation once a nuclear weapon is used—all that can be stated is a hope. Consequently, no one can say in advance under what circumstances a weapon will be used or what the response to that first use will be. It cannot be planned in advance with assurance; the paradoxes must be resolved in the mind of command at the time of actual confrontation. Hence, the subject and the climate of Command and Control are vital.

Command and Control. In the case of the employment of nuclear weapons, unless the timing is absolutely precise, the whole strategic purpose may be defeated.

To be effective in time of crisis a weapons system must have *all* of certain specific characteristics:

It must be such that its use will contribute to the accomplishment of a strategic objective.

It must have "security" or invulnerability resulting from great numbers, concealment, mobility, or "hardening."

It must not be fired or launched or otherwise used except through the legitimate authorized chain of command.

It must have such readiness and reliability that when ordered into use it will operate in the numbers and with the accuracy necessary to accomplish its tactical and strategic purpose. The corollary to this is that it must be maintainable and operable by the personnel actually assigned. The maintenance of these advanced systems is very complex and requires the complete harmony and compatibility of the personnel maintaining and operating them.

The nuclear weapons system is much more than a warhead. It must include many warheads carried on either manned or unmanned vehicles that have extremely expensive propulsion, guidance, and control systems. The nuclear weapon is not versatile. It can be created and manned only by the sacrifice of money, resources and trained personnel which otherwise could be applied to more versatile weapons and forces.

Finally, it must be responsive to the command and control system. In the case of nuclear weapons both the "lock" and the "release" must operate with certainty within the time required by the combat situation.

For a major power, the Command and Control System Headquarters is the heart and nerve center of the nuclear weapons system. Here, in time of nuclear crisis, the intellectual and physical forces of politics, morality, and psychology are focused in a personal confrontation with fate. The combination of responsibility and urgency create pressures that in quality and magnitude are unlike anything in previous human experience. For this reason the defense authorities require that anyone associated with the control and operation of nuclear weapons must be carefully screened for emotional stability.

The Command and Control system has its origin in the political concepts of national sovereignty and civilian control of military affairs and in the intellectual concepts of political-military decision and the control and supervision of the planned action. On this conceptual base the United States has built a very expensive

worldwide system made up of a combination of permanent and mobile national command centers connected to combat commanders by a sophisticated electronic system.

The system itself is a physical structure of headquarters, sensors, computers, data banks, display monitors, and communications that provides for three major functional systems and three supporting components.¹⁹ The major functions are:

The processes and methods of acquisition, evaluation, and correlation of such information as political and military intelligence with primary emphasis on "strategic warning"; the location and readiness of our own forces, the state and forecast of weather, targeting information and plans, and damage assessment.

The process of decision and the transmission of orders, together with their authentication and verification.

The connection with other systems of authority and control such as the Congress, allied governments and forces, nonnuclear commands, civil defense and other government agencies, etc.

The supporting structure consists of:

The special logistic support of the headquarters facilities, together with transportation, communication equipment, and personnel.

The special security measures both of the headquarters and of the weapons themselves, these being a combination of mechanical, electronic and personal safeguards.

The special selection and special training of personnel.

I specify these functions because while each has its own special characteristics and problems, they all operate in a very special and extensive electromagnetic environment in which all functions must be tuned and precisely timed to avoid paralysis or catastrophe.

In conventional war the time for consultation and for verification of dubious information is measured in days. In nuclear war there may not be even hours—certain decisions must be made in minutes.

In conventional war, a major mistake frequently can be rectified or overcome by a change in command, by the application of more resources, or by sheer endurance and bravery. This will not be the case in nuclear war.

A system of strategic warning is the intellectual core of nuclear control. It consists of a number of political, military, and other

indicators that have been selected as being, in combination, evidence of the imminence of a major move against a vital national interest of the nation. In particular, it is designed to warn against an impending or actual nuclear attack. It is a synthesis and evaluation of information received from many sources such as the news media, diplomatic reporting, various intelligence agents and sources, and from an elaborate electromagnetic system of observation and calculation.

Channels of communication and the process of verification and authentication are duplicated in order to guard against accident, sabotage, and personal aberration or error. Technical and procedural safeguards are used to guard against unauthorized firing of a weapon and to insure that when so ordered the weapon does fire on time. Both the lock and the release must be positive and reliable.

The matter of filtering the mass of information flowing to the system is a continuing problem. Too much information and "noise" (i.e., irrelevant information) can choke both the intelligence system and the minds of the men who make the decisions. An event which in isolation may appear to be insignificant may really be very important when it is seen in conjunction with other apparently trivial matters. Therefore, the vital element of evaluation will be greatly influenced by the perceptions and cognition of the evaluator. Thus evaluation must always be highly intuitive. Furthermore, many of the indicators are so obvious that an opponent seeking to achieve surprise may seek to establish patterns of behavior that may give false clues or camouflage the ultimate intent.

The understanding, the control, and the use of electromagnetic environment, particularly as it may be employed in cover and deception operations, have placed new demands on technical excellence and intelligence.

As the various significant individual indicators in the warning system begin to show a dangerous pattern, signals are sent to inform the military and civilian leaders to alert the commanders of "quick reaction" forces. For example, in October 1973 the United States placed its armed forces on a formal alert because its strategic warning system indicated that the U.S.S.R. might be contemplating actual intervention in the Arab-Israeli War. Under these conditions psychological pressure begins to build. The existence of the state itself may be the ultimate issue at stake. The so-called threshold of escalation is just a guess. Mistakes are not retrievable. Time for decision is short and if and when nuclear

action is taken, its precise timing is vital. Therefore, within the system, discipline must be absolute.

The cumulative pressures have added a new dimension to the exercise of high command. Matters which may have seemed relatively simple when discussed in a quiet time may now create disturbing doubts. These can best be expressed by a series of questions, the answers to which no one can know before the event.

To what degree will the legislative leaders demand the right to be informed and to influence the decisions? To what degree will it be physically possible to inform and to listen to them? To what degree will it be wise to do so? To what degree does the public have a right to know what is taking place and what to expect? To what degree will the adequacy of the civil defense system and the state of public civil defense training influence the command decision? If the Head of Government goes to a secure command post while the people have no place in which to find refuge, how will this affect public opinion? How will it affect the decisions of the Head of Government? To what degree will it be possible to maintain secrecy about the movements of the Head of Government? In the light of these factors, at the time of crisis will the Head of Government have the same willingness to act and to delegate authority as was assumed by those who made the contingency plans?

In a free society the answers to such questions will probably be quite different from those in an authoritarian society.

Further Considerations. The foregoing constitute the leading principles, always few, around which considerations of detail group themselves.

Beyond this simplified statement of nuclear theory and deterrence, some further considerations, not always discussed in the conventional literature, will influence the practical application of this theory.

In all the discussions of how the control of nuclear weapons can be shared among the members of an alliance, there seems to be an implicit assumption that it is possible to work out a system of command and control that will operate effectively in a time of crisis and retain the sovereignty of the various states in the alliance substantially unimpaired.

The study of the central problem involves consideration of the nature and fundamental factors of sovereignty, politics, conflict, strategy, weapons systems, and command and control systems as

they are intertwined in modern electronic, nuclear and missile technology. For they are intertwined in such a way that the major contradictions inherent in sharing nuclear weapons from a practical point of view are irreconcilable.

The concepts of national sovereignty as taught in the first four decades of this century are in many respects out of date in that nations have become more frankly interdependent. This is particularly apparent in that arbitrary action in one's own self-interest has been greatly restricted. Those who would like to act in accordance with clear concepts are confronted with the paradox of growing interdependence in an atmosphere of increasing nationalistic spirit.

Nevertheless, a sovereign state today insists that it have the right of final decision in any matter that clearly affects its major political, military, or economic interests. True, concepts of military "security" have been modified and serious political and military provocations are accepted with considerably more patience than was the case in "sovereign states" of 50 years ago. But sovereign decisions in vital matters of security are jealously retained even when elaborate patterns of military coordination are established within an alliance.

Modern conflict is an extraordinary continuum of varying factors, pressures, and violence blending the use of both covert and overt force with threats of force. In each situation of crisis, one's own initial actions are followed by the opponent's reactions and these by a further sequence of actions and reactions that seldom follow any previously prepared plan for more than one move or countermove. Except in the simplest situations, the most any formal contingency plan can be expected to accomplish is to acquaint cognizant officials with the chief features of an expected situation and to prepare and deploy forces that are appropriate to the expected developments.

When a specific crisis develops in this continuum of conflict, it usually has some major elements of equivocation and of uncertainty. This can make the problem of command in an alliance very difficult, for seldom do all the members of an alliance see their national interest in the same light. The heads of sovereign states are greatly concerned lest they become militarily involved in situations wherein the national interest is not clear to them as heads of government.

Usually discussions of "nuclear strategy" or the use of nuclear weapons pointedly ignore any consideration of the aim, the end in mind, the effect desired, all of which are the heart of strategy.

Thus the actual plans for such use are chiefly desperate attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable; they are haphazard improvisations not to be dignified by the term strategy, except as they induce accommodation with other great powers.

Because nuclear weapons cannot be "uninvented" and cannot be used to accomplish a desired political purpose, the whole concept of "nuclear strategy" becomes a process of negotiation, accommodation, and conciliation to avoid their use. This is chiefly a political process with very little direct military content. Nevertheless, the military must participate in this process because the control of the nuclear arms race cannot be divorced from the overall problem of arms control and limitation that has important military aspects.

This vital process of accommodation and conciliation illustrates some fundamental differences between the free and the authoritarian societies.

Except for the most elementary facts, only a tiny fraction of either population can understand or remain interested in the abstruse arguments and fine semantic distinctions in the discussions and literature of "nuclear strategy" and arms control. In the authoritarian society, the public does not expect to be informed, it does not pretend to have "a right to know"; major decisions are made in private or secretly as a matter of course. As there are no public or parliamentary discussions and no public hearings, public opinion is not openly manipulated. There is no clamor of inquiring reporters nor speculation of news commentators. The government acts quickly or deliberately delays in accordance with its own perceptions and needs and not on what may take place in the emotional and frequently slanted public adversary arguments of a major electoral campaign.

Because in the authoritarian societies these issues are not publicly debated, policies can be changed, and untenable positions abandoned without public recrimination. This gives the government a high degree of freedom of action. In free societies, frequent press conferences and open legislative and public debate, which are an inherent part of the public's "right to know," in reality restrict freedom of action. Public acclaim gravitates toward the activist who seldom can bring himself to admit failure.

In addition, the difference between authoritarian and free societies becomes especially evident in the matter of civil defense. In the Soviet Union and in China, civil defense is taken very seriously, both by the government and by the people. The people are trained and disciplined. In the United States, the government

pays little attention to it and the people are both ignorant and indifferent. Yet in time of confrontation, this may be a major and perhaps the deciding factor in the course of events.

The most intractable paradox is that the free societies maintain a dangerous weapon primarily as a defense against the encroachment of the authoritarian discipline yet seem unwilling to accept the elements of discipline that would defend their freedom by means other than this dangerous weapon. The liberal apostles of freedom too often decry both the weapon and the concept of discipline.

The nuclear weapons problem is so complex, so inherently contradictory, that it cannot be specifically "solved." It is a "difficulty" that must be endured, not a "puzzle" for which there are one or more solutions. The hazards of living with these weapons must be accepted with the hope that their employment can be avoided until the basic sources of violent human conflict are better understood and the effects adequately controlled. This requires a high degree of social-political discipline.

Finally, the supreme irony of so-called "nuclear strategy" is: While no coherent rational military strategy that involves the use of nuclear weapons can be devised, nevertheless, for the foreseeable future it will be necessary to maintain a strong and invulnerable nuclear missile capability, the exact size and composition of which is a matter of judgment rather than of formula. This must be a highly intuitive judgment based on the best possible military-political intelligence, military knowledge, and above all, a sense of values and a willingness to acknowledge and accept risks. The most important effect of this situation is to force an analysis of the concept of victory among the great powers.

The nuclear balance of terror, the nuclear standoff, or whatever one wishes to call it, has made tactical defeat more acceptable than in the past. This, in turn, has had the following specific results: It has increased the need for high quality in political leadership and military command—particularly in that intangible called integrity; increased the need for discipline and morale throughout the armed forces with consequent increased need to understand their nature and sources; it has increased the power of weak nations; increased the use of covert "tools of conflict," and decreased the usability of overt, military "tools of conflict."

It has accentuated or aggravated the struggle for power and dollars between and within the services. Each service, striving to get a nuclear capability to enhance its prestige and obtain money, neglected its funding of nonnuclear units and its study of strategy!

Thus it has damaged people's ability to understand strategy because nuclear weapons, being given the label "strategic," preempted the use of the word strategy and distracted scholars, politicians and military men from the study of the other aspects of strategy.

If the reader considers the foregoing to be contradictory, I merely say that it is contradictory precisely because every view or discussion of the term "nuclear strategy" is inherently contradictory.

Thus, other than to expose areas of ignorance or of danger and difficulty, the elaborate discussions of deterrence and nuclear strategy give no answers to the question of how nuclear weapons can be employed usefully against an opponent of comparable capability.

The "nuclear calculus" provides quantitative estimates of the physical damage and deaths that would result if various mixes of weapons, in a variety of sequences, were to be employed against various defensive and offensive systems. It also estimates the minimum time of economic recovery from such damage. But because it gives no information on the manner in which such damage would influence the perceptions and political purposes of the peoples concerned, the nuclear strategy ultimately comes down to an intuitive decision on what the risks are, which seem to be the least or most likely, and which are the most dangerous. All of this, of course, is part of an equally intuitive judgment on the nature, rate of change, and relative importance of the world political and economic factors which all are related to an equally intuitive judgment of the President's power in his party, in the Congress, and in the consent of the people of the nation. The result, of course, is a series of compromises with which none of the vested interests are completely satisfied.

The responsible men, as individuals and groups, must make intuitive personal evaluations and decisions, hoping that they are reasonable, wise, and correct. This is the best we can expect.

Conclusions. The ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation. If these values are confused, the strategy will be confused and likely to fail. National strategy is chiefly concerned with the achievement of a complex hierarchy of objectives that in turn derive from the political purposes of the state. Among these, the continuing existence of the state as a sovereign entity and the preservation of the national values are the paramount and enduring objectives.

The use of the term *strategy* implies *rationality*. If we say, and some do, that a certain course of action makes no sense, but, nevertheless, we must adopt it because of forces that we cannot control, we should not dignify such a plan or decision with the name strategy. It is merely a haphazard, desperate improvisation, nothing more, and it should be so labeled. There is no way of predicting or controlling the subsequent course of events.

The term nuclear strategy is a misnomer. Instead, we should think of the nuclear aspects of strategy. The term nuclear strategy, however, seems to be an established part of the political-military vocabulary. Therefore, we can recognize the fundamental inherent paradox of nuclear power by stating that nuclear strategy is the political maneuvering, together with the procurement and deployment of nuclear weapons whose sole purpose is to insure that nuclear weapons are never used.

Nuclear deterrence is a necessary but negative aspect of strategy. Its only purpose is to provide sufficient freedom of action to employ the positive aspects of strategy. As nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and as the results of continuing research are uncertain, the knowledge of nuclear weapons, their effects and their control is essential to the strategist.

The political strategic futility of the actual use of nuclear weapons makes it imperative to control and limit the production and deployment of such weapons. This is the core of *détente*, or peaceful coexistence, between the United States and the Soviet Union. The negotiations for such arms control and limitation have two main but related areas—controlling nuclear weapons and reducing the conventional forces, particularly those of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Alliance.

In both areas there are two purposes: First, to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic confrontation; and, second, to reduce the economic burden.

In each case the United States and the NATO position has been that such limitation and reduction should be symmetrical; that is, neither side should be left with a decisive preponderance of force. Such a preponderance might tempt a government to attempt blackmail or a hostage-making *fait accompli* thrust.

Therefore, the process of negotiation involves a highly sophisticated systems analysis of the entirety of weapons and forces on both sides. This analysis also must include a forecast of research and development as well as the analysis of forces in being. The high command, even though it may reject the concept of the usefulness of the actual employment of nuclear weapons, must

still be prepared to direct and control such use. Research and development in the use of laser weapons for defense, in the disturbance of the electromagnetic environment, in the attainment of greater weapon accuracy, and in the detection of submarines, may have results that will greatly affect the situation. This, in turn, creates a need for rigorous intelligence, that must also include electronic and other surveillance to verify the adherence to the agreements that have been achieved.

Finally, the major ironic paradox is that the level of tactical defeat that is acceptable in order to attain a higher strategic or political purpose has been raised. This demands greater quality of command, morale, and discipline in the armed forces in order to retain combat effectiveness in spite of such defeat.

The opponent's awareness of this paradox may be an inducement to the very adventure that you are trying to prevent. At the same time, the political commander, when faced with the decision to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to save an army division or a whole army from destruction or capture, will know that if this nuclear weapon is used, it may start an escalation that he cannot control: an escalation that may kill 20 to 40 million of his own people within a 2-day period: the first use of tactical weapons followed by the first tactical nuclear response to that use; followed either by a series of larger tactical weapons until the tactical-strategic threshold is reached or an immediate resort to either small-scale or large-scale use of strategic weapons by either side.

In discussing this process the so-called nuclear strategists generally use the terms "may" or "might" for each of these "either/or" transitions. They seldom pause to assess the psychological political effects of the increase in the order of magnitude of the casualties, both civilian and military, that inevitably accompany each state.

The rational mind recoils from the task of appraising the shock of casualties such as one million casualties in a 48-hour period or 20 to 40 million casualties in a 72 to 96-hour period. The elaborate academic and bureaucratic terminology and semantic refinements become inane in the context of this brutal reality.

To what degree will the head of government of any state delegate to any subordinate or any committee the authority to make the decisions that will start the sequence?

Yet nuclear deterrence is based on two assumptions: that the first use of a strategic weapon will cause a strategic weapon response; no first strike can be so complete as to prevent a

devastating response. The only real delegation by the head of state will be to insure this response should a nation actually be struck by nuclear weapons.

This is the essence of both the French *Force de Frappe* and the Presidential delegation of power in the U.S. Command and Control system. This is the balance of terror. This is the essence of symmetry. This element of deterrence is the major element of rationality in "Nuclear Strategy!"

This is the risk with which we must live until the slow processes of diplomacy and arduous negotiation gradually reduce its worst aspects.

For an indefinite period we must live with nuclear weapons and all the risks this entails. In doing so we should appreciate the implications of their power and the problems of their control.

The nuclear "balance of terror" or "stalemate" between the great powers provides an opportunity, and perhaps even an incentive, for small nations and nonstate groups or actors to pursue their ends by means of overt formal violence, by blackmail, and by terrorism. The degree to which the great powers use these nonnuclear groups as surrogates in pursuit of their ends is uncertain. Thus, violent human conflict continues in the form of "limited" war and clandestine and irregular operations.

CHAPTER VI

LIMITED WAR AND CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

The 1939 undeclared war between Japan and the combined forces of Mongolia and the Soviet Union lasted from May until September, when an official armistice was achieved after the Soviet Forces under Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov drove the Japanese back behind their own frontiers.

This heavy fighting that, in addition to Mongolian troops, involved some 498 Soviet tanks, 346 armored cars, 500 aircraft, heavy artillery, 35 rifle battalions, and 20 cavalry squadrons, against Japanese Forces of roughly comparable strength, was the climax of serious conflict along the Mongol-Manchurian borders in which battles had been fought in 1937 and 1938.¹

In more recent years, with relatively little public discussion of the forces involved, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have clashed repeatedly in "incidents" along their 4,000-mile common border. There has been some discussion of the possibility of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear and missile centers. There have been frequent charges and countercharges, some highly theoretical, some very specific. Thus, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have had long practical experience in the conduct of undeclared limited war.

Since 1948 there has been continuous limited war in the Middle East, not only between Arabs and Israelis, but among and within the Arab states.

Against this background it seems curious that some frustrated Americans, including, sadly enough, some supposedly educated military professionals, have drawn the false conclusion that the experience in Southeast Asia demonstrates that the United States should never again fight a limited war. No one knows when such a necessity will arise. Therefore, we need to understand what is involved and what is implied.

The standoff in "strategic" nuclear weapons and the likelihood that the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons will rapidly escalate beyond control make it clear that the statement "there is no

substitute for victory" has little application to national strategy. The consequences of this situation extend through all aspects of the use of power and force by a free society.

All military actions must be so controlled that they do not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, except for the ultimate catastrophe of massive thermonuclear war, all wars now are limited wars. It is pointless to say that the United States should never again fight a limited war unless at the same time one says that the United States should never again employ organized military forces in combat. The question becomes: what are the limitations that govern any particular war or any specific use of force? Thereafter, we can ask how these limitations influence the conduct of the war and the conclusion of a peace.

War, the organized use of violent force, is limited by: the scope—that is the number of the participants; the geographic areas of combat; the nature of the weapons employed; the targets that are attacked; the degree of effort exerted; and above all, by the objectives sought.

Sometimes these limitations are imposed deliberately in order to assure control of the action, sometimes by lack of resources, sometimes by lack of accessibility, sometimes by unanticipated circumstances. There is no reason to suppose that the opposing parties will achieve a symmetric limitation. The nature and consequences of this asymmetry, the manner in which its various elements may affect the perceptions of the contestants have been thoroughly explored in the extensive literature on limited war. There is, however, an important difference in the limited war discussions in the free society and in the authoritarian society.

In the former, the discussion is chiefly in the open, with the nature of the relatively few classified discussions being generally well known to those who write the published material. For example, a public meeting such as "Pacem in Terris IV" held in Washington in December 1975 would be impossible in any authoritarian society.

This meeting, sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and the Fund for Peace brought together more than 50 speakers, including several Senators, the former representative to the United Nations, former Secretary of Defense, and the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. They discussed such topics as Ideological Conflict, Arms Control, Covert Operations, and Deterrence. The speeches and most significant comments by informed Congressmen, officials and scholars were later published.²

There are differences of opinion within the authoritarian societies, but because of security and limited distribution of translations, these differences and their significance have not been fully understood.

Within the authoritarian societies, the newspapers and magazines publish articles critical of government policy only when the government so wishes. Policy is formulated within the inner circles of the government and the ruling party and confirmed by the legislature or membership as a matter of course. Major differences of opinion are publicized only after the decision and then usually to disparage or punish the advocates of a losing cause.

Scholars from other nations usually get some idea of such differences only by drawing inferences from published papers rather than merely translating them.

It is well, however, to note two further aspects of the authoritarian position. Their representatives at international scholarly conferences are selected by their own governments and conform to the official or party position. The discussions in their available military literature will stress that all wars between major powers will be nuclear with the certain ultimate victory of the Socialist peoples, even though more cautious ideas may be held by the governing political elite.

When man is thwarted in one path toward his objectives, he seeks another path. In the continuum of human conflict, when political objectives cannot be attained by the use of formally organized overt military forces and by attaining a "military victory," the pressure, the incentive for the use of other means, other forces, builds up.

Political and economic pressure, political warfare, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism are all used and in many instances revolution or large-scale insurrection takes place. In all of these and in their control or defeat, clandestine operations may play an important part.

Political and economic pressure are generally accepted as legitimate means of attaining objectives. Political "warfare," however, carries one into another area entirely—an area which while covert and considered by some to be unscrupulous has, nevertheless, been widely practiced. Lyman Kirkpatrick describes it:

I differentiate between "political and economic pressure" and "political warfare." The former is usually overt, and generally obvious, while the latter is covert, or should

be. . . . "political warfare" [includes such] techniques as buying or subsidizing politicians or political parties to such a degree that they become dependent on the subsidy for existence and therefore accept dictation of actions and politics; buying or subsidizing editors or newspapers for the same reason; injecting a controlled individual into a top advisory role; use of fabrication and deception, etc.³

Since its founding in 1917 the Soviet Union has carried on an extensive worldwide political operation that has included all the activities described above. This has been done through a series of such agencies as the *Cheka*, the GPU, the Comintern and, in recent years, the KGB. Furthermore, the KGB also acts as a major international and domestic intelligence and counterintelligence agency. It is particularly significant that the KGB also exercises political control over the Soviet population itself. The manner in which the Soviet Government openly rewards and commemorates the successful founders and leaders of these agencies, such as Felix Dzerzhinsky and Uri Andropor, shows that they consider this kind of extensive coherent and highly coordinated operation to be a normal function of government.

The fact that since the death of Stalin domestic repression and control has been less brutal than in his regime in no way diminishes the importance of understanding the basic philosophy and the nature both of this control and the worldwide operation of the apparatus. Only then can the danger posed to the free societies be appreciated. We can hope that, in time, the spread of education in the U.S.S.R. and greater association with other nations will diminish this threat. But until there is more positive evidence to this effect, all other nations, particularly the United States, must maintain strong, reliable intelligence and counter-intelligence systems.

While the importance and difficulties of these matters have been recognized for many years, the efforts to bring them under the practical jurisdiction of international law have hitherto been futile.

For example, on 21 December 1965, after months of debate in the First Committee, the General Assembly of the United Nations by a vote of 109 to 0, with the abstention of the United Kingdom, adopted a Resolution that among other things said:

1. No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. . . .

2. No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state . . . or secure from it advantages of any kind . . . also no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime or another state or interfere in civil strife in another state.

In the discussions of the draft several states including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom expressed reservations on the ground that the declaration was vague and imprecise . . . that it was more political than legal in content. . . .⁴

In spite of the attempts to define and control such things as intervention, aggression, and terrorism, international violence and particularly terrorism are widely regarded as legitimate aspects of wars of national liberation. For instance, in late 1974 while the General Assembly of the United Nations was overwhelmingly voting to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the debate on "The Question of Palestine," Paul Hoffman wrote from the United Nations about the prevailing confusion concerning terrorism and the liberation struggle. He pointed out that the President of the General Assembly, the Algerian Foreign Minister, came from a movement that 15 years before was considered by the French to be terrorist. After discussing Israeli charges of terrorism by the Palestine Liberation Organization, he quoted Arab charges of "criminal acts and acts of sabotage committed by the Zionist gangs since 1936." He concluded his article by quoting a Dutch law expert: "It sometimes looks as if there were an international premium on terrorism—instead of being punished it is rewarded . . . I am afraid we have to get used to a new international level of disorder and crime."⁵

These matters are all so woven into the fabric of human conflict that it is difficult to imagine worldwide agreement on when and under what circumstances the various forms of force and violence are legitimate or illegitimate, justified or unjustified. Because no nation can be expected to ignore such operations taking place on its territory, every state must operate a defensive system. Furthermore, just as the tools of political warfare are both overt and covert, so too the defense against such warfare must be both overt and covert. The targets of political warfare are both civilian and military. Consequently, no nation can make a sharp and

permanent dividing line between its civilian and military activities, between military and police action, or between its foreign and domestic intelligence operations. Coherent defense is just as essential as coherent offense; therefore, overlap is essential.

Probably more than any other areas of human conflict, intelligence, counterintelligence, clandestine, and guerrilla operations bring out the distinction between morality and moralism—particularly that morality carries with it the vital element of responsibility.

Restating and rephrasing some previous comments: Strategic realism requires the explicit statement of critical assumptions, the analysis of objectives, the appraisal of expectations, plus the willingness to accept moral responsibility for the consequences of the course of action one recommends.

Perhaps one should not expect human beings to be able and willing to follow such a rigorous process. But is it not the essence of morality to try to do so?

The history of political-military disaster is the history of military intelligence and staff studies that have been slanted to conform to the conclusion previously reached by the commander or the political leader. This is not intellectual discipline, it is sheer charlatanry. And yet for many people, it is their idea of normal behavior; hence, tragedy in the classic sense. Moralism and self-deception go hand in hand.

Irregular and clandestine operations pose many continuing problems for which there are no final solutions. The very concept of their employment by a free society is repugnant to many political romantics and moralists. Nevertheless, they are an essential element of modern political-military power. Hence, we must understand their fundamental nature both to defend against them and to be able to employ them effectively. Therefore, a few general observations may help to put these matters in the perspective of military power in a free society.

In the midst of the continuing arguments about the nature and size of nuclear weapons it is easy to forget that since human society evolved what we now call guerrilla warfare was the most common form of violent human conflict.

In his excellent discussion of the Vietnam disaster in historical terms of guerrilla warfare, Robert Asprey describes the progression of guerrilla warfare from the time of Darius in 512 B.C. to its present state as the major instrument in revolutionary wars. He shows how it has evolved into an instrument to achieve political purposes and how the failure to understand its essential nature has

time and again been disastrous. All too often the attempts to combat guerrilla forces with conventional forces have failed because conventional forces have used conventional military concepts and methods.⁶

Pirates, bandits, terrorists, partisans, guerrillas—all these are terms used to describe groups of varying numbers who use force and violence against states or against the police, the armed forces or against rival groups to achieve their personal or political purposes.

While their own nature and their activities blend and overlap as circumstances change, their strength and effectiveness is proportional to the degree to which their political purpose represents or strikes a responsive chord in the people of the state.

Guerrilla or partisan warfare is used for two basic reasons: first, to prevent an invading force from consolidating its tactical gains and establishing strategic political control of the conquered territory. This was the case in World War II when the Germans were seriously hampered by partisans in Russia, Yugoslavia, and France and in Italy in 1944. The directive to General Eisenhower in 1944 is illustrative.⁷ Second, to overthrow an already established political regime. This is illustrated by Castro in Cuba in 1958. In each case it represented a struggle for control—the essence of strategy.

Irregular operations are offensive or defensive. In the former, the major objective of a guerrilla or terrorist organization is to break down the organization of the state. It aims at the economy, the social structure, the political coherence and authority, and, in particular, it aims at the morale or discipline of the police and the armed forces. This can be called revolutionary war or insurgency.

In the latter, in times of invasion, guerrilla or partisan forces direct their operations against the armies and organization of the invaders. This is one defensive mode of irregular warfare.

The other defensive mode of irregular warfare is counterrevolution or counterinsurgency. With the great growth of radio communication and rapid air travel and with the social upheavals of our times, organized terrorism has become transnational and irregular warfare now may involve more than two nations. Therefore, the defensive actions of counterinsurgency and the suppression of terrorism have also become transnational.

The accumulation and evaluation of information are at the heart of every decision process in every field of human activity. Lyman Kirkpatrick describes intelligence as “a compilation and distillation of the total knowledge on any given area or subject.”

Irregular or clandestine operations are inextricably bound up with intelligence. Their conduct must be based on intelligence. Frequently their purpose is to gain intelligence, to prevent an adversary from gaining intelligence, or to protect the sources of one's intelligence.

Just as irregular operations are a part of the continuum of human conflict, so also they form a continuum of their own with the most rudimentary and simple tasks of intelligence gathering, merging with counterintelligence, overt and covert reconnaissance, extending on to large-scale guerrilla and partisan warfare aiming at the destruction of enemy lines of communication and to the destruction of the government itself. As terrorism and revolution have become transnational, they have impeded if not wholly prevented the growth of enforceable international law. The so-called "laws of war" established by the Geneva Conventions have little application in irregular warfare.

The world community has generally accepted the pragmatic view that a political terrorist becomes respectable if he succeeds in achieving and maintaining control of the government. The community has also accepted, even if reluctantly, the concept that a nation can harbor a guerrilla or clandestine force, can conduct overt discussions as to policy with its leadership, and still not accept responsibility for its actions. This situation is a far cry from the concepts of sovereignty that were prevalent in the early 20th century.

As of 1977, there seems to be little prospect of reaching any international consensus on the definitions and legality of the various forms of covert warfare that now take place all over the world, a situation sometimes described as "no war, no peace."

In authoritarian societies, no moral issues seem to be perceived, and clandestine operations are taken for granted both by the government and by the people. In the free societies, while the governments recognize the need for such operations, there is a different popular perception.

Many people are wholly disinterested—but take them for granted just as they take "politics" and political and business corruption for granted without any sense of moral interest or involvement. Others understand the necessity for and general nature of such operations and look on them as a regrettable but necessary feature of modern society and conflict. A third group, however, which seems to have a highly romantic concept of such affairs, considers them to be not only immoral and disreputable but also unnecessary.

There is an element in the media that either sincerely agrees with the romantics or else exploits their attitude, exciting it by ceaseless probing and semantic distortion, labeling every such activity with the pejorative title of spy or spying.

There is little likelihood that clandestine operations will ever cease to be used. They are an inherent part of the normal life of any nation-state that seeks to achieve political ends in a world of nation-states. In this harsh world of continuing human conflict, the free society cannot survive without them. Therefore, it is futile to decry them as immoral and unfit for free men to employ. Therefore, the question is: How can their use be controlled so that they are not used unwisely or for unworthy ends?

Because of the wide range of activities, many agencies of government are involved either directly or indirectly. For example, in his book, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr.⁸ lists 13 U.S. Government agencies engaged in intelligence work. Some of these are strictly military, some are semimilitary, and some are civilian. Part of this work is domestic, part of it is in other countries. This situation poses very special problems of control and security. The need for common-purpose, for a common understanding of the immediate and ultimate effects desired, is so great that their work must be carefully coordinated even though their lines of authority are separate. Otherwise, they may work at cross-purposes or even in dangerous rivalry. The basis for such coordination is in information. Yet in modern irregular warfare and clandestine operations, the total mass of information is so huge that the exchange of information must be highly selective.

Gresham's law applies to the question of "military security." This is particularly true of the government agencies that deal with clandestine operations with one of their subordinate branches. Because of the importance attached to maintaining a "favorable image," it is common practice for government officials to invoke the plea of "national security" to cover up their own mistakes, ulterior actions, and ineptitude. The net result of the prevailing habit of gross overclassification of information is to decrease the security of legitimate clandestine operations and to damage the credibility of officials. Clandestine operations are a form of power and such power should not be used lightly.

One of the attributes of power is poise, that is, the ability to do nothing, to say nothing, when such inactivity is suitable to the occasion. The poised powerful man does not make threats. Public threats make headlines, temporarily satisfy egos, excite the public,

exacerbate conflict, and seldom accomplish any useful purpose. Quiet and poise are not sensational news, they do not provide glamour nor impart charisma. This is particularly important in a free society in which activism is considered to be a political virtue and the media representatives maintain continual pressure for statements and news.

Security is vital to the control and the success of a clandestine operation. If successful it should not be published. If unsuccessful it can be ignored or disowned. Perpetrators of clandestine blunders can even be punished. Elaborate cover plans protect the sponsors.

Yet all these safeguards require highly skilled dedicated people and sophisticated techniques. In an authoritarian society this security is generally taken for granted. In a free society the opposite is true and when a blunder or a failure becomes known, the consequences are harmful.

Thus the manner in which the society reacts to protect its own freedom restrains the government from acting in what it perceives to be the best interests of the society. For this reason clandestine operations should be kept to a minimum and must have a high intellectual and functional discipline.

Clandestine operations require not only strict discipline but also a thorough understanding of strategy. The two go together—the discipline applies both to the planning as well as to the operation itself, i.e., the supervision of the planned action. Rosinski's statement: "Comprehensive control of a field of action means a concentration upon those minimum key lines of action of key positions from which the entire field can be positively controlled . . ." applies specifically to clandestine operations and irregular warfare. The proposed courses of action must be tested for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. In the latter, the cost consequences are vitally important and difficult to calculate.

The regular military forces of the state must be prepared both to conduct and to defend against a great variety of clandestine and irregular operations whose great variety and unique hazards make special demands on the morale and discipline of the forces and the wisdom of their leaders. The elements of cruelty and brutality that characterize all forms of armed conflict are accentuated in both the conduct and the suppression of irregular warfare.

Terrorists use kidnapping and murder of hostages, assassination of public officials, frequently with torture and mutilation, as routine measures for destroying the administrative structure of government. Lenin's remark that the purpose of terror is to terrorize is literally true!

The tremendous importance of gaining vital information places a special burden on the wisdom and moral conscience of those interrogating prisoners and suspected persons. Thus, the dilemma of counterinsurgency forces is that if they are lenient in the work of suppression, the guerrillas are free to act. If they are overly harsh, they alienate the population.

When combating an insurrection the incumbent government must be poised, disciplined, and wise in the restrictions it imposes on its own people and in the manner it handles its police. In Cuba in 1958-59 the extreme brutality of the Batista regime was a major factor in the success of the Castro revolt.

Sometimes in large-scale operations guerrillas are, as in the case of the Chinese Communists of 1945-49, scrupulous in their dealings with the indigenous population providing they cooperate, but ruthless in their treatment of those who oppose them. Both the good conduct and the ruthless suppression were purposeful and disciplined.

The conduct of irregular warfare usually creates serious problems in command relations between those operating irregular forces and those commanding overt operations. This sometimes leads to a decided and dangerous rivalry.

There is a mixture of ideology and nationalism in every revolutionary movement. Almost inevitably there is a struggle for power among its leaders—there also may be a similar struggle for power among the leaders of those countering this movement. The element of secrecy keeps this struggle concealed from the normal self-correcting mechanisms of a free society.

An intelligence service that also has police power will constitute a threat to the government of any state. Control of the secret police has always been considered essential to the control of an authoritarian government and may be the path to absolute power. Any such police or service seeks to grow in prestige and power. Secrecy provides a useful cover for unauthorized activities, for inordinate growth, and for bureaucratic incompetence.

In the beginning of this chapter, I raised the question of how the limitations of modern war influence the conduct of the war and the conclusion of a peace.

While both civil-military and military-media relations will be discussed in subsequent chapters, several related matters are now appropriate.

All wars, whether declared or undeclared, overt or covert, should be conducted for a political purpose that can be fully and finally achieved only through the conclusion of a peace. This

peace can be imposed by the use of overwhelming power or achieved by negotiation; in any case the conduct of the war and the negotiation should be governed by the political effect desired.

In most cases, except where the power is overwhelming, it is necessary to end the overt hostilities before the negotiations to resolve the issues can begin. Negotiations that bring real and lasting peace are rare. In recent years the usual practice has been to try to resolve some of the most critical issues in an armistice, postponing the more intractable until various uncertain economic-political developments can favorably influence the perceptions of the adversaries. There is no way of quantifying these perceptions. Semantic reactions and semantic differences related to cultural background have a profound effect on each party's perception of events and of the adversary's intentions. The complications are almost infinite.

Various forms of political, economic, and military leverage are used during these negotiations. For example, in recent years hostages frequently have been exploited. Here, perceptions of the value of military prisoners and other hostages are based on the cultural background of the adversaries. In Korea and Vietnam, the welfare of U.S. prisoners appeared to be more important to the U.S. people than the welfare of Asian prisoners was to the Asian people. The U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in late 1972 is an illustration of such leverage of military persuasion causing much public concern and controversy as to its value.

Peacekeeping forces that are considered essential to the control of hostilities during a cease-fire become an area of conflict among opposing national interests. Their value depends largely on the objectivity and integrity with which they perform their tasks. The Communist powers make little claim for such objectivity. International neutrality is a rare and uncertain quality. Therefore the organization, funding, and operation of peacekeeping all are part of a special kind of continuing irregular warfare.

In negotiations and in the implementation of a cease-fire, an armistice, or a peace treaty, the amount and nature of the haggling, the charges and countercharges of atrocities, the obstruction and the overt violation of agreed terms are functions of each party's perception of its own available power in relation to that of its adversary, all as related to the immediate and long-range issues and national interests.

In the absence of unconditional surrender or the possession of overwhelming power and the willingness to use it, a cease-fire, or armistice, is not likely to bring an end to clandestine operations or

the need to protect against them. The need for intelligence does not decrease; in fact, it may even increase. Nations pursue their own interests regardless of agreements as long as the issues are unresolved.

The contradictions inherent in the matter of nuclear deterrence and strategy and in the use of irregular warfare and clandestine operations place a special burden on civil-military and military-media relations in a free society, both in the conduct of the war and in the negotiations to end the hostilities. For example, cover and deception have always been recognized as important and legitimate elements of military planning and operations in time of war. They do not suddenly take place with a formal declaration of war. They are frequently the essential elements in the initiation of agreement or hostile actions. They permeate the whole area of irregular warfare and actually are defined by the word "clandestine." The fact that they sometimes are legitimately applied against one's own people creates particularly difficult problems that can be better understood by restating several fundamentals.

A national strategy is the comprehensive direction of all elements of national power to control situations and areas to attain national objectives. Comprehensive direction requires intuitive integration of major factors of all forms of power—economic, political, and military—in the mind of one chief executive who consults, works with, and delegates authority to individual members of a small inner group of his choosing as well as consulting with the key members of the legislature.

The actions derived from this comprehensive direction, to be effective, must be timed so that they support each other. Correct timing is essential to sound strategy, for an ill-timed action can be worse than useless. The basic criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of costs apply just as much to irregular operations as to formal overt military operation. They must be directed toward the same overall effect desired (i.e., objective) as the diplomatic discussions and negotiations.

In irregular operations, security needs vary according to circumstances. In clandestine operations, security must be continuous at all times. In diplomacy it also varies greatly according to circumstances, at times being total. The success of any negotiation depends on two related essentials: good faith and recognition of common interests. Good faith between the individual adversary negotiators is essential to the exploration and exploitation of common interests and this requires secret negotiations.

Thus, we must recognize that "the public's right to know" must be limited and that the democratic process cannot work in these areas in the manner that accords with the idea of full "participatory democracy."

The executive is, however, influenced by his evaluation of the degree of support among legislative leaders. It is the executive's task to establish conceptual unity within his own subordinates and among his legislative supporters to insure this essential support. Public opinion affects this vital feature, and thus indirectly does have a profound effect on both policy and operations.

But this effect is indirect and long-term rather than direct and short-term. Part of the critical art of timing lies in the executive's judgment on the degree of such acceptance and support he can gain at any particular time.

The democratic process works effectively to support the values, purposes, and integrity of a free society only when there is a sense of mutual understanding, trust, and responsibility among the elected leaders and representatives who themselves organize and work within the limitations of their own sphere of government and action.

Inevitably this is an imperfect process. Inevitably there are risks that must be accepted. Through the elected legislators the democratic process places limits on the authority of the executives and limits to the resources available to them, and it must hold them responsible for their actions.

Matters of policy must be determined by a process of consultation and accommodation between the executive and the legislature. Operations are the province of the executive.

A national policy or operational plan that attempts to adjust to every fluctuation of public opinion will be confused, ineffective, and perhaps disastrous.

Semantic reactions are an important part of both perception and cognition. The language of diplomacy traditionally has been courteous and objective so as to keep the climate of negotiation as calm and objective as possible. When, in the course of negotiations or discussions in international organizations, open anger and personal denunciation takes place, the process of international accommodation is made more difficult.

The kind of quiet diplomacy that prevents the occurrence of harmful events does not make the kind of news that attracts public attention. It does not create the excitement that bad news provides. The public becomes bored, commentators are apt to comment on the lack of "color" that so frequently is associated with quiet competence.

Revolutionary guerrilla warfare emerges from a society that has a built-in indifference to human life.¹⁰ This is equally the kind of a society that is susceptible to the indoctrination of an ideology that can be pursued by this form of violence with great effect because there is no sense of the value of life to act as a constraint. As a consequence, after overthrowing the incumbent government, leaders of revolutionary guerrilla warfare have seldom, if ever, established and maintained a free representative government.

This does not necessarily mean that successful revolt always produces authoritarianism. It does, however, seem to mean that the conduct of revolutionary guerrilla warfare with calculated terrorism requires special qualities of mind and character, arbitrary methods, and uncompromising attitudes, and it creates attitudes and deep-seated antagonisms that are all antithetical to the processes of a free society.

As we examine clandestine operations, the continuing importance of intuition and the law of diminishing returns is evident. They truly are double-edged swords, dangerous to the user as well as the victim. Like any powerful medicine, their use must be kept to a minimum for they are addictive and their side effects can be both unpredictable and dangerous. They should not be used when open operations will accomplish the same effect. They should not be used for trivial purposes.

This confused and confusing situation poses the question: what constitutes the most dangerous threat to a free society? Is it the force of external aggression or is it the constriction of freedom created by measures the government must take to defend against this aggression?

It also poses other questions: to what degree does the libertarian movement, the desire for greater civil liberties and greater freedom of the individual, greater social welfare expenditures by government, greater protection of the rights of defendants in the courts and prisoners in the jails, etc., represent a spontaneous rejection of the concept of authority?

Is it a cause of increased violent crime? Is it a reaction to the violence of international conflict? Is it a reaction to the concept of large bureaucracy in government and business? Is it an example of mindless entropic disorganization of human society?

Finally, an almost absurdly contradictory question: To what extent does this libertarian movement coincide with, advance, or obstruct the wars of national liberation that, in the opinion of many governments and peoples, justify domestic and international terrorism?

Not even time can be expected to give us final answers to such questions. They represent continuing human "difficulties."

Military Aid. Military aid is a form of military power that has been used throughout recorded history both in alliances and in situations in which immediate overt direct military participation is not deemed appropriate. It is a form of limited action with a special affinity for clandestine operations and guerrilla warfare. Thus every stage in the continuum of human conflict has a practical counterpart in the continuum of military aid. Its extensive roots and many ramifications permeate the military, economic and political systems of nearly all the world's nations, for they (especially those who take an active role in world affairs) participate in military aid programs either as providers or recipients. Because it is so pervasive and wears so many costumes, it is easy for the illegitimate to masquerade as legitimate. A few examples illustrate:

In ancient warfare it was common practice for states or cities to assist friends with grants of gold for the purchase of supplies or to provide ships and troops. Such aid was also an essential part of all alliances or coalitions. The struggles among the cities and principalities of renaissance Europe were financed by grants of money for the hiring of mercenaries.

The French Government secretly supplied money and supplies to the United States of America for 2 years before signing Treaties of Commerce and Alliance with the United States on 6 February 1778.

The British aid to the Confederacy was a major factor in the prolongation of the American Civil War and the controversies over violations of neutrality nearly brought Great Britain into that war.

Throughout the 19th century, filibusters operating in Latin America fomented insurrection and provided clandestine forces and supplies for the insurrectors.

In World War I, U.S. military and economic assistance to Great Britain and France, initially organized and financed by the banking firm of J.P. Morgan, sustained the effort of the Triple Entente for several years before the United States entered the war, in spite of the officially neutral position of the American Government. This in turn created the problems of war debts, complicating worldwide political economic affairs for a generation.

On an even larger scale, in World War II, the U.S. Lend-Lease for Britain and the Soviet Union enabled their military effort to

continue. Again, the problems of repayment in political and economic terms continued for years.

In the postwar period, the nonmilitary Marshall Plan was followed by the Truman Doctrine military aid and advice to Greece and Turkey.

The military economic aid to the Government of China, starting in the late 1930s, and later to Korea and Vietnam, had profound political, economic and cultural consequences in the United States and Asia.

In different areas and form, private and frequently clandestine U.S. aid made the State of Israel possible, and, when supplemented by official U.S. military and economic assistance, enabled it to survive.

The terrorist action of the Irish Republican Army has been supported by gifts from individuals in the United States.

Both the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Mid-East terrorists have been sustained by overt and covert support of friendly governments.

In 1954, after the Geneva Conference, when the United States started to provide military advice and assistance to the newly formed government of South Vietnam, no one dreamed how this initially small commitment would develop into a massive overt U.S. strategic defeat. One of the early ironies of this disaster was the manner in which the Vietcong forces, to a significant degree, armed themselves by the capture or purchase of weapons provided to the South Vietnam Government by the U.S. aid program.

A major industrial nation may use military aid as well as encourage commercial sales of military arms and equipment both as a general economic stimulus and as a guarantee of its own industrial production base for war. Such continuing production serves two other purposes—one to reduce unit costs of similar equipment for its own use, the other to provide a supply of spare parts for equipment previously purchased. This serves as another illustration of the previously mentioned linkage of the military logistic system with the national and international economic systems, and of the development of continuing growth of the logistic snowball.

It is difficult for the legislature to regulate a major military program without specifying the details to a degree that hampers its administration. However, in attempting to do this, proponents of a program frequently use legalistic and unreal distinctions as a form of subterfuge. For example, the distinction between what is military and what is nonmilitary or purely economic, what is

lethal and what is nonlethal, and such questions as in what category should one place spare parts for engines or electronic components used in aircraft or motor vehicles or power generators?

As a consequence of this ambiguity, military programs provide areas of contention within the administration and the legislature as various vested interests attempt to manipulate the programs to support their special perceptions of the national interest which supposedly justifies the program. Specious euphemisms and semantic distortion are frequently employed to conceal or justify various actions.

Similarly, once having delivered military material to the custody of another nation, it is very difficult for the granting nation to regulate how or against whom this material will be used.

This problem was strikingly illustrated when the Turkish Government took decisive action against the Greek residents of Cyprus in 1975 supported by U.S.-supplied equipment. The resulting argument with the United States and the consequent interruption of U.S. military aid to Turkey added to the longstanding Turko-Greek antagonism and disrupted the Southern Command of the NATO Alliance.

Military aid becomes an element in the rivalry or competition of power centers. Undeveloped nations use their acceptance of military aid as a bargaining point in the competition for their support in the great power's rivalry. Although obtained to provide for security from external threats, military aid can be a major factor in domestic political rivalry and repression.

Because of its economic importance and normal bureaucratic program dominance, military aid tends to have a life of its own in the granting nation. It acquires economic and political momentum that eventually may get out of control. In this connection it is important to note that in 1954 when the United States decided to provide military aid to South Vietnam, the chances of such aid being successful in preserving the newly formed state were considered to be no better than 50-50.

Finally, military aid is a continuing and essential element of military power that illustrates many of the factors and principles discussed in previous chapters. For instance, the linkage between politics, policy, strategy, economics, and logistics; the matter of morality and moralism; contradiction and paradox inherent in modern conflict; the difficulty of decisive limitation and control of arms.

Summary. Except for a major uncontrolled and uncontrollable nuclear holocaust, all wars are now limited wars. The tools of modern conflict are both overt and covert. As long as the causes of conflict remain strong, formal or tacit agreements limiting the use of the overt tools of conflict will increase the use of the covert or clandestine tools of conflict.

For various reasons modern states seldom declare war formally. Instead, armed conflict, with major and prolonged violence, destruction, and bloodshed, occurs under various euphemisms, all used to avoid the onus, real or imagined, of fighting for anything other than self-defense. Formally declared war is considered to be outlawed and immoral.

The legal and semantic complications arising from this modern attitude are endless, ranging from arguments over peacekeeping forces in the United Nations to the constitutional debates about the differences between the Executive and the Congress in the initiation and conduct of "war."

The whole situation is full of confusion, contradiction, and paradox.

Again, we must ask the questions:

- What kind of power and force can be used effectively to attain a political purpose?
- What kinds of power and force cannot be used effectively to attain a political purpose?
- What changes in the political situation can shift a particular kind of power and force from one category of usability to the other?
- How do we judge the effectiveness of a particular kind of force?

The larger our national bureaucracy becomes, the larger our armed forces, the larger our organization for intelligence and clandestine operation, the lower will be the efficiency of our operations, the more mediocrity will govern decisions and actions, the more foolish and unnecessary clandestine operations will be undertaken and the less effective they will be.

Our society tends to demand and exalt activism, glamour, and charisma. In the public mind and in the media, these qualities are frequently associated with secrecy and clandestine affairs; a strange paradox exists, for, at the same time, there is a demand that the public be fully informed on all secret affairs.

The semantic reactions, the semantic distortion, the intellectual sogginess usually associated with the public discussion of clandestine operations is a compelling reason for them to be kept to a

minimum. The direction of clandestine operations, either those of terrorists and revolutionaries or of counterterrorism or counter-revolution, requires a very high degree of political sophistication.

And again we should realize that the strategy that is suitable for an authoritarian society with control of the news media will not necessarily be suitable for a nonauthoritarian society that does not control the news media and public opinion.

CHAPTER VII

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Each society develops a system or tradition of civil-military relations which reflects its basic social, economic, and political characteristics, and the principal functions of its military institution.¹

Civil-military relations can be seen as the interaction of a group of related systems and subsystems—social, economic, political, military, and information. Each has its functional structure and organization. Each has its own formal and informal mode of operation with the informal frequently being as important as the formal. The relations within these systems are dynamic: each system strives always to maintain its equilibrium and to control its own destiny as it adapts to the actions and changes of the associated systems.²

To some degree, civil-military relations can be seen as a vast kaleidoscope in which the concepts and perceptions of men individually and in organized groups, all pursuing their special interests, form cognitive patterns that change as each development shifts the point of view.

Understanding of civil-military relations is made difficult because:

Most of the issues revolve around the central question: What is the meaning, the nature, and the importance of the phrase “civilian control of the military”?

The subject involves every aspect of the ability of a free society to use military power in defense of its freedom.

Every aspect of civil-military relations interacts with every other aspect in a manner that defies complete or precise analysis.

The special “political sensitivity” of many problems in this field have resulted in inadequate research and understanding of the manner in which decisions on civil-military relations influence the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

Because of the political power of various vested interests involved and the economic, political and social implications of "civil-military" decisions, objective analysis is not common. Semantic distortion and specious rationalizations frequently obscure the issues.

The concept of a free news media as an essential element of the free society creates special problems for media-military relations that are intertwined with civilian-military relations. Finally, there always will be major elements of uncertainty and controversy, as various ideas clash and as policies, laws, and schemes of organization are debated, effected, and later changed.

Thus, when we discuss the broad subject of civil-military relations, we are probing into the very heart of the free society whose essentials lie in the basic concepts, perceptions, and intuitive reactions created by the education and the environment in which individuals grow to power. In particular, they involve concepts of military professionalism and one's perceptions of the institutions of government and the functions of the armed forces of the state.

The United States of America was founded by men who believed devoutly in civilian control of the military. For example, Gen. George Washington as Commander in Chief was meticulous in his deference toward the Continental Congress despite his anger with its ineptitude. Furthermore, in the mid-19th century there was a great influx of vigorous able people fleeing from the militaristic repressions of Europe.

The essence of military professionalism has been well expressed by Sir John Hackett who wrote:

The function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem. . . . It has also become a profession . . . in the narrower sense of an occupation with a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its own needs, a career structure of its own, and a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth. . . .

The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the man who embraces this life

somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian.³

As for the functions of the armed forces, some important questions are involved:

To what degree do the armed forces exist to defend the *state* against foreign enemies; against domestic enemies? To what degree do they exist to defend the *government* against its enemies, foreign and domestic? To what degree and in what areas are the military armed forces a police arm of the government? In what way are they related to the various police forces in the state? To what degree does a national defense system serve the economic and social purposes of the state and the personal political interests of politicians?

The answers to these questions will vary greatly among states, even among those that consider themselves free societies. I raise them and comment briefly, not with the intent of answering, but rather to point out that they are pertinent to all discussions of the specifics of civil-military affairs, for they are implicit parts of the environment of political-military decisions.

Furthermore, some of these questions may at times require the military professional to make a political decision of which man or group has the legitimate right to exercise the powers of head of state or head of government and thus they may become constitutional issues. Difficult problems in civil-military relations are the normal state of affairs in all societies, particularly in time of war. The literature is enormous and almost every issue evokes strong emotional bias.⁴

After World War II the U.S. Armed Forces were reorganized by the National Security Act of 1947 which, among other things, established the Department of Defense under a Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Air Force, various unified and specified area and functional military commands, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.

The major purposes of this reorganization and of several subsequent modifications as stated and implied in the congressional hearings were to: Establish firmly the principles, institutions, and channels of civilian control of military affairs; provide for centralization, coordination of military research, development and procurement; provide unified strategic planning and direction of military effort through formal institutional channels from the

military and other departments to the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

Both the congressional hearings and the attendant public debates were characterized by the great bitterness of a major struggle for power as the Army and its Air Corps attacked the future use of naval aviation and the Marine Corps, and sought to reduce both. This "unification controversy" started openly in 1945 and carried on for years, being renewed and accentuated by the B-36 controversy of 1949⁵ which involved both the concepts and most effective means of "strategic bombing."

The associated disputes were severe, deep-seated, and extended to nearly all areas of military activity and resulted in civilian authority resolving many matters that normally would be routinely handled by the military professionals. In this way, many minor military decisions were "kicked upstairs" and civilianized.⁶ Concurrently, the institution of the Uniform Code of Military Justice increased civilian participation and control of military affairs.

Problems in civil-military relations intensified dramatically from 1961 to 1972 during and subsequent to the 6-year regime of Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense. Mr. McNamara's unswerving loyalty to the Presidents he served makes it difficult to determine which actions he took on his own initiative, which he took at the President's specific direction, and which were taken independently by his special assistants. Henry L. Trewhitt's fine book *McNamara* describes many aspects of his personality and reactions.

The full understanding of this period cannot be achieved until the records of the discussions and recommendations of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President are made available. Nevertheless, enough is known to make some limited observations.

Three major political-military blunders occurred during this period: the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, the manner in which the TFX (F-111) aircraft was designed and purchased, and the conduct of the Vietnam war. These matters should be viewed as they relate to each other and also as part of the radical changes in the basic philosophy of defense management.⁷ This relationship is complex.

The 1961 invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was a disaster whose effects will be felt for generations. It laid the foundation for the 1962 Missile Crisis, it led to the large-scale use of hostages for ransom and, most importantly, it provided the psychological

incentive for the initial escalation of the Vietnam conflict in 1963.

During this period new strategic concepts brought major changes in weapons systems and concepts of procurement with great and unpredictable cost increases and other complications. Thus, the TFX affair was more important than was generally realized at the time (1962-67). The basic issue of the TFX controversy was whether or not it was better to build a single design fighter for use by both the Navy and the Air Force, or to allow each service to build its own airplane. The military preferred separate airplanes and were overruled by the Secretary of Defense.

Robert Art's perceptive comment on this program is important:

The TFX controversy is then a classic case of civilian military relations because the issue of civilian control over the military is so starkly presented. . . . A united military elite thus confronted a united civilian elite. . . .

Because the methods that he used to make and enforce decisions were so effective, McNamara directly challenged the *raison d'être* of both military officers and their supporting staffs. In his actions during the TFX controversy, we can see McNamara signalling to the Defense Department that he was going to run that institution in a style unlike any of his predecessors. The TFX controversy is, in effect, a chronicle of how the civilians in the Pentagon gained control over the military.⁸

While Mr. McNamara apparently had formed an opinion on the TFX issue in February 1961 shortly after taking office,⁹ it seems likely that the confusion and recriminations of the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961 strengthened him as well as President Kennedy in the determination to exercise civilian authority.

The Vietnam war was a notable illustration of poor civil-military relations both within the defense system and between the Military Establishment and the U.S. civilian population. Almost all the conceivable errors in the conduct of major military affairs were made, some by military professionals and some by civilians. Among the most important were:

The faulty administration of the draft whereby the burden of compulsory service was borne by the underprivileged poor;

The juggling of funds and military estimates to conceal the true financial cost of the war;

The failure to establish adequate control of shipping and the movement of military supplies;

The excessive luxury and wasteful scale of living in the support areas; and, finally,

The overcontrol of distant tactical operations by civilians in Washington.

Highly sophisticated quantitative analysis techniques that had been developing in all areas of defense management in the previous 20 years came into increasing use. These techniques, which are fundamentally sound when used for limited purposes in appropriate areas, were applied in a ridiculous manner and caused great harm particularly in the evaluation and control of operations. Aggregations of dubious statistical data were used for reporting the readiness of the combat forces and alleged military progress was measured by data that was both unreliable and irrelevant. The arbitrary insistence on these methods produced false or misleading reports and corrupted the military information system and personnel. For example, in some instances combat officers were assigned quotas of "enemy dead" to report: the notorious body count. If the count was not considered adequate, they were told to "go back and do it again."¹⁰

Most important of all was the basic lack of conceptual unity between the civilian and military leaders on the philosophy of "controlled response" as opposed to decisive action, either positive or negative. All too frequently there was a plausible reason for halfway measures and compromise.

Henry Trewhitt sums it up:

The basic reason remained what it had been at the beginning: pressure on Hanoi to desist. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained sorely divided on execution. . . . The wonder is that the differences, though they were understood by some outsiders, failed for so long to burst explosively to the surface.¹¹

The cumulative result of these errors was national disunity and frustration, public distrust of the military, civil violence and, in some instances, mutiny.

Before trying to draw precise conclusions and particularly before ascribing too much blame to individuals, we should remember two points: first, the principal actors were well-educated, loyal, patriotic, and vastly energetic men who differed

greatly in their concepts, perceptions and intuitive reactions to great events. Second, no one knows how the assassination of President John Kennedy affected events: the shock effect was enormous and everyone's perceptions were affected.

It will probably take several generations to make a definitive analysis of this period. In the meantime, I am convinced that some valuable limited conclusions can be drawn.

The Evolution of Command and Management. The manner in which any government organizes to exercise the essential political control of the armed forces will vary greatly with the basic institutions of the government, the national political traditions, the personality and sense of personal power of the head of government, and the availability of competent men. In general, the word political connotes civilian, the word military connotes military professionals. In modern governments, however, military professionals serve in positions that are essentially political and civilians serve in positions of explicit military authority.

The areas of competence now required of leaders of a modern military system are so varied and in many instances so highly technical that it is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for organization and assignment. All too often men of supposedly splendid qualification have failed when given higher responsibility.

While problems in civilian-military relations have long occurred in the control and operation of military systems, they have been extended and intensified by the electronic-nuclear phase of the industrial revolution that produced the following effects: rapid worldwide transportation, rapid worldwide electronic communication and electronic computation and information processing; nuclear missiles with a capacity for devastation of entire nations. These, in turn, created both the need and the capacity for a highly centralized command system to exercise positive control over military action in order to prevent escalation to nuclear warfare.

Beginning in the mid-18th century, the industrial revolution involved the whole nation in any major war. The technological revolution of the mid-20th century enormously increased the complexity, the cost, and the time required to procure military equipment and weapons.

Consequently, the nature of military command changed. It became centralized, institutionalized, and civilianized. In this process the terms "command" and "management" became confused and a new term "command control" entered the military vocabulary. Regardless of how one defines these terms or whether

one is investigating command or investigating management, the important thing is to understand the central functions of command, the basic nature of interrelationship of the constituent elements of military affairs, and how to attain readiness and effectiveness in that combination that is appropriate to the actual situation at hand.

While command and management blend, the U.S. Constitution and the long-established laws and practice of the United States clearly put command as the superior authority. The President is the Commander in Chief, the Congress has established the unified commands and confirms military officers as commanders of various functional and regional commands. This practice is not likely to change. In general, management decisions deal with procurement and other logistic matters, while command decisions deal with the major objectives and the employment, i.e., operations, of the armed forces.

This distinction was underscored by the *U.S. Army Staff Officer's Field Manual*:

Good management is one expression of effective command and leadership. Management is inherent in command, although it does not include the extensive authority and responsibility of command.^{1 2}

The Environment of Decision. In theory, both command and managerial authority use the same basic process of logical analysis in reaching decisions. While there is considerable difference in the terms used in this decision process, the general sequence of thought seems to be the same. However, the environment surrounding the formal thought process is quite different; in particular, it determines the intuitive sense of values that dominates the decision.

The basic difference arises from the fact that in applying military force, command deals in issues of life and death. Consequently, it demands a different kind of personal involvement with the lives of subordinates, a different kind of personal leadership that inspires unhesitating obedience and loyalty to the point of sacrifice of life itself. By contrast, management does not deal in life and death decisions. It does not resort to physical force to accomplish its objectives.

A management decision seldom has to be made in a matter of a few seconds or even a few minutes. In most cases it can be postponed for several hours or even for several years, allowing

time for study and consultation. This is particularly true for matters of major importance. On the other hand, while many command decisions can be made in this deliberate manner, some of the most important command decisions must be made and carried out almost instantaneously. Thus the sense of time and timing is much more important in command than in management. This is exemplified by the current emphasis on elaborate "command and control systems." A commercial airliner is commanded by a captain and not managed by a superintendent. A captain's most vital duties come under the heading of command; his less important may well be classed as management.

These environmental differences are so great and so important that we cannot consider management and command synonymous simply because the techniques and analytical thought processes involved are virtually identical. The most important difference between command and management lies in the intangible elements of honor, integrity, loyalty, and leadership. Here we find the very essence of military professionalism.

Management literature and criteria for successful business or industrial management never seem to approach the heart of successful military command, which is the commander's responsibility to set a high personal standard of fidelity, honor, and patriotism. These, together with professional competence, personal moral and physical courage, and a high sense of loyalty to superiors and subordinates imbue his officers and men with such a sense of faith and devotion to a service and to a cause that they follow him into danger without hesitation or selfish purpose.

To some degree, industrial managers use these elements, but always in industry and increasingly in government there is an adversary relationship between labor and management. This adversary sense can destroy the effectiveness of a military organization. It is thus the commander's responsibility to forestall adversary relationships of any sort.

Most military enlisted men have an instinctive sense of these elements of command and the manner in which the commander's competence, integrity and sense of personal concern for his men is transmitted to the men: Lord St. Vincent, Horatio Nelson, Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway, Chester Nimitz, William Halsey all are conspicuous illustrations of this principle. It is the essence of military professionalism.

People react to the problems of civil-military relations in accordance with the concepts and perceptions created by their education and working environment. In other words, they must

develop that “familiarity with the field of knowledge concerned” which is the core of intuitive judgment.

These distinctions make it important to consider the nature and behavior of logistics systems—because most important military decisions involve major logistic considerations and most military management decisions are implemented by the logistics system. Therefore, such decisions, made without an intuitive understanding of how logistics systems behave, are likely to be poor.

The lack of intuitive understanding was strikingly illustrated by the failure of the senior officials of the U.S. Department of Defense to appreciate how the commitment to combat of the U.S. Forces in Vietnam in 1965 would reverberate throughout the worldwide U.S. logistics system. Among other things, it was clear from well-documented previous experience that without rigorous command control of shipments, together with theater command control of shipping and effective port organization, major port congestion was sure to ensue and ultimately produce a snowball of unnecessary facilities and supplies in Vietnam.

A few preventive measures were recommended by some of the military commanders, but even these were rejected either by higher command or the civilian secretarial and political hierarchy. Thus, the vital lessons of World War I, World War II, and Korea were rejected. The congestion did take place. It took about 2 years of enormously expensive “crash programs” to bring it under control. Logistic support did snowball and combine with other avoidable factors to provide a major impetus to inflation—both in Southeast Asia and the United States—with consequences that even today cannot be finally judged.

Military logistics is a major system composed of functional subsystems. The system has identifiable physical properties such as mass, inertia, momentum, and resonance.

The inherent duality of the logistics process is illustrated by the principle that the logistics system of the armed forces must be in harmony both with the economic system of the nation and with the tactical concepts and tactical environment of the combat forces. Thus, in the producer phase of logistics, procurement is associated with the national economic and political affairs, concepts, and problems which by nature are civilian activities; on the other hand, the consumer phase involves operations in a military combat environment in which the political problems and criteria are quite different. Therefore, civil-military relations and concepts of what constitutes appropriate civilian control are also different.

In the producer phase of logistics, civilian political control is directly exercised through legislative authorization and funding of procurement programs; legislation governing the manner in which military procurement contracts are awarded, negotiated, administered, and accounted for; the appointment by the civilian head of government, or his deputies, of the civilian executives within the defense system who are responsible for developing and administering procurement policies in accordance with this legislation; and various agencies (some responsible to the legislature, some to the executive), that have broad powers of advice, accounting and review.

In the United States, this power lies in the National Security Council, the General Accounting Office, and the Office of Management and Budget, whose direct control of logistics is fortified by the investigative powers of the legislature and by other indirect measures, such as the actual or threatened reduction of essential programs to induce compliance with a committee's or powerful individual's idea on policy.

Thus the creation and home-based support of the combat forces are very much under civilian and strict political control. In fact, the controls are so extensive that it is impossible for any one person to understand all of the tens of thousands of laws, rules, regulations, and policy directives that govern the procurement of military systems and material and supporting services of the military installations.

In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that any inadequacy of civilian control in these areas stems from an unwillingness to exercise authority or an uncertainty as to what measures to adopt, rather than to a lack of institutional authority. Effective control involves perception of where the national interest lies, knowledge of the issue, and understanding of both the process of government and the industrial economic system of the nation:

If military policy is to be subject to civilian control, military force and military capabilities must be adjusted to broader national objectives. But these objectives have meaning only in terms of the specific military (and other) means selected to support them. When those who are politically responsible turn over questions of means to those who are politically irresponsible (whether military or civilian) civilian control is lost. Civilian control involves only two factors: political responsibility and final choice of means. And for a politically responsible official to make a decision "stick"

involves political power and not hierarchical position or administrative centralization.

Centralization may beget uniformity, but it will never of itself produce unity.^{1 3}

Finally, it takes special experience and aptitude for a military professional to act effectively in a position of major responsibility in this highly political atmosphere. He must understand where the political power lies, and how to accommodate to it and at the same time keep foremost his primary professional responsibility to work toward operational readiness and combat effectiveness.

The major troubles of the United States in Vietnam developed from a gradual and initially surreptitious nature of the involvement of the U.S. Forces. Many of these matters, while bitterly argued among and between civilian and military leaders, were seldom clearly and decisively settled. All too often they were compromised, equivocated, and postponed until a tragic entrapment occurred.^{1 4}

Military Industrial Relations. The defense system must compete for available resources with such other major claimants as health, education, welfare, and economic development. The resolution of these conflicts of legitimate interest is a political process of claim, negotiation and compromise that involves the program's sponsors, the executive and the legislators, and professional lobbyists representing vested interests.

In an industrialized state with large armed forces, the question of which industrial companies get what kind of contract for the design and production of military weapons and equipment is politically and economically important. Furthermore, since new weapons and equipment require extensive and expensive research and development, the scientific community and often the universities also become involved.

As alliances grow, military aid, common technical standards for military equipment, and even cooperative design and production of weapons systems for mutual use are necessary for effectiveness and economy. These require intimate association of military, diplomatic and industrial representatives.

As armed forces become larger and more complex, military bases become larger and more expensive. Civilian political power is exerted to determine the location and composition of military bases and installations not only to enhance and balance the civilian

economy, but also to strengthen the political power and prestige of individual legislators. This latter feature brings about a natural and powerful alliance of civilian politicians with the leaders of the major industries in their constituencies.

As a consequence of this seemingly irreversible development, the armed forces now have a multiple role in our society, economy and political system. They are now expected to support and sustain the economy, support the social welfare programs and goals of the government and, to an unacknowledged degree, contribute to the political welfare of politicians in power. In other words, in the United States of America, the armed forces and that entity known as the "Military/Industrial Complex" have become a manipulable element of the executive branch of the government and a source of political strength to many members of the legislature.^{1 5}

The degree to which this situation applies to other nations depends on their degree of industrialization, their power status, and their cultural-political heritage and tradition.

In government bureaucracies, the development of major programs and budgets involves a power struggle among the vested interests wherein military budgets and programs for procurement and support of operations become a matter of persuasion, negotiation and compromise; senior military professionals are always involved. Consequently, the representatives and leaders of the special interest groups can be expected to use a variety of means to gain support for the causes they represent.^{1 6}

Personal relations with legislators, government officials, representatives of industry, and other military professionals including those of competing services are important factors in this political give and take, for they are the lubricant that reduces the friction and heat in the clash of opposing interests.

Public relations are another important factor—here again, personal relations and private discussions form an adjunct to the more formal processes of news releases and speeches to various service and industry-related organizations. The calculated news leak, designed to forestall or embarrass an opponent or to elicit support in a critical area, is frequently used.

There are few rules to this political process; it is highly intuitive. Essentially, it seems to boil down to a few major points. Is the man with whom you are dealing professionally competent? Can he be trusted? Does he have the ability to distinguish between the important and the trivial? Has he the necessary poise and stamina? Can he resist the corrupting effect of the power he gains and uses?

Can he distinguish between his own interests and those of the state? Above all has he the personal perception and integrity to know when to draw the line, and the right time to refuse to compromise?

Military experience *per se* does not guarantee military knowledge or special expertise. In many instances, particularly in logistics, certain types of civilian experience provide a better background than does general military experience. Technical knowledge coupled with an overall perspective and a sense of personal responsibility is essential. So too is the element of commonsense—"the ability to discern a self-evident fact." But, above all, there lies the continuing appreciation of the objective, the effect desired. This kind of sense is not necessarily either a civilian or a military attribute.

The foregoing relationships and processes are generally considered as legitimate parts of normal human political-economic intercourse. It seems likely that they will continue to hold true in the future conduct of government affairs.

These are the essence of civil-military relations. They are the essence of sound relations between the media and the military. They are fundamental to the wise and effective use of military power in a free society and yet they cannot be codified or reduced to an acceptable code of ethics. They are intangible; they require intuitive appreciation.

Given the unspoken and probably unspeakable premises and assumptions of a free pluralistic society, this is the usual state of affairs. People behave this way, and we should not be frustrated or overly irritated when they do so. We should, however, try to have some grasp of the inevitable consequences of such normal behavior.

Long association with the give and take processes of negotiation and compromise and proximity to the sources of political power may dull a man's sense of military essentiality and value or even undermine that special perception and integrity needed for combat command. There is a vital difference between the control of the military procurement process and the control of military operations.

Civilian Control of Operations. When we consider civilian control of operations, we enter a unique area, for here the most dangerous conflicts of opinion take place. The processes of politics, negotiation, adversary debate, and eventual compromise that produce reasonably good results in the general affairs of

government can bring military disaster unless limited and tempered by a sense of military logic and values.

The heart of the concept of civilian control of the military lies in the concept that both the decision to use military force to attain political objectives, and the political objectives themselves, are political decisions and should be made by the civilian arm of government.¹⁷ It is the explicit and primary task of the civilian head of government to establish and maintain conceptual unity of these objectives throughout the entire executive branch of government. Only then can the other elements of national power be combined with military power to form a coherent strategy. Without such conceptual unity, the military commanders will be unable to plan and conduct military operations effectively against any but a trivial opponent. This brings us back to the critical question: What kinds of power and force can be used effectively to attain a political objective?

The issues of war and peace are too complex to be decided purely by any known system of formal logic or analysis or by fixed decision routine. Furthermore, because an accurate appraisal of readiness and effectiveness is necessary in any decision to use military force, the military professionals have important advice to give to their civilian masters in these matters. This includes the understanding of the necessity to be able to fight "limited wars." The advice will, however, have little value unless these civilians have some understanding of military fundamentals. In particular, they must appreciate that the limitations that are to be imposed on the military professionals commanding the forces in combat are vital factors in the effectiveness of the force used. Therefore, the general nature of these limitations must be decided before the final decision to use force is made.

Specifically, there are several legitimate limitations: The degree of effort to be made both by the military forces and the nation, including the tactical and logistical resources to be made available to the military commander and the degree to which the nation will be mobilized; limits on the geographic scope of military action to be undertaken; and limits on the weapons to be employed. However, limitation of the tactics to be employed is a special issue that must be handled with great caution. It is one thing to establish rules of engagement and to enforce them by strict discipline, including removal from command and courts-martial. It is another thing entirely to exercise detailed tactical control during the course of major combat operations.

During most of the Vietnam war, the tactical control of

bombing operations was exercised directly from Washington. In addition to target designation and authorization, the route of attack approach was sometimes prescribed. In some instances, authority to restrike a partially destroyed target was withheld until the reconnaissance photographs could be flown back to Washington for evaluation. As a consequence the shock effect of successive attacks was lost, target destruction was incomplete and the enemy was allowed time to reinforce its antiaircraft defenses before a restrike based on the reconnaissance could be made. One authority has commented:

If ever there was an American war where civilian control over the military was exercised during actual combat operations, the war in Southeast Asia certainly was it. Civilian control was complete, unquestioned, ubiquitous and detailed, not merely at the highest of strategy and political decisions but also—very importantly—at the lower levels of operations and tactics . . . at every level, the military was conscientiously obedient, subservient and responsive to this civilian control.¹⁸

The result of this policy was to decrease the effectiveness of the bombing and greatly increase the losses of attacking planes and pilots. In other words, the policy minimized the effect and maximized the cost!

When the decision to use force is made without a realistic appraisal of the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of the armed forces, and particularly how these will be influenced by the restraints in weapons, resources, and freedom of action imposed by political authority for political reasons, the stage is set for disaster. In recent years, this fundamental mistake was made by Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain in Suez in 1956, by President Kennedy in Cuba in 1961, and by President Johnson in Vietnam in 1965. Some may say that in those cases the head of government was faced by such a special situation that he had no political alternative to the use of force. If that had been the case, then he should have had little expectation that the use of force would accomplish the political purpose he may have had in mind.

When conceptual unity on the objectives of a war or campaign has been established and when the political restraints and limitations of resources have been understood by the operational commanders, the chances for success will be enhanced and the amount of civil-military friction will be reduced if these commanders are given adequate freedom of action.

This underlines a delicate and dangerous aspect of a major military confrontation between nuclear powers. Modern strategists stress the importance of signals between adversaries during a crisis. Preparation for combat is frequently considered a "provocative" signal that offensive action is imminent. Therefore, it is possible that during a crisis the political decision will be made to signal peaceful intentions by not ordering or not even permitting the combat forces to assume a higher state of readiness. Conversely, in other instances the combat forces may be placed in a high state of readiness in order to signal the adversary that he is acting in a provocative or dangerous manner and that further such action will bring combat actions. During the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the military alert by the United States caused great concern among its allies in the North Atlantic Alliance.

In either case, during a major confrontation prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it can be expected that all actions and movements of the combat forces will be strictly controlled directly by the head of government, for these actions may be the equivalent of the decision to go to war—a major political decision. In these cases it is likely that the electronic command control system will be used to the limits of its technical capability and that the normal chain of command will be bypassed.

If major fighting is thus avoided, well and good. But if major combat starts, it is likely that unprepared forces will suffer a major tactical defeat, perhaps to the point of obliteration with consequent major political shock throughout the nation.

Furthermore, a major dilemma must then be resolved. If, on the one hand, the subsequent fighting is not conducted by the military commanders using the military chain of command, it probably will be grossly mishandled. Regardless of what kinds of electronic marvels are at their disposal, no individual head of government or small executive group in the seat of government can possibly handle effectively the details of continuing large-scale combat. Mental indigestion, ignorance, and physical fatigue will dominate. On the other hand, if the course of combat action is not under adequate political control, it may not be possible for the government to bring an end to the hostilities when desired either to prevent intolerable escalation or to achieve a satisfactory objective.

Much of the foregoing has been discussed in recent scholarly literature, particularly the works of Morton Halperin.¹⁹ He has stressed the matter of the military advice given to the chief executive and the interplay of forces in bureaucratic politics. Two major aspects of this continuing process are:

First, military advice cannot be given in a vacuum. The political situation, the objectives and the policies must always be understood by the military advisor. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between forecasting the probable military consequences of a course of action and recommending the course of action to be taken. Because the chiefs of military services are inevitably involved in bureaucratic politics, this distinction between advising and forecasting may at times be very subtle.

Second, there usually is a much greater element of improvisation in the decisions and plans in an actual major crisis than the leaders admit or that the critics deem acceptable. The critics seem to expect consistence while the needs of the situation and the forces of bureaucratic politics produce inconsistency. It is not surprising, therefore, when Halperin writes: "The experience of the last 25 years suggests that the effort to reorganize the Pentagon and then to demand 'unified' military advice has been a failure."²⁰

There are legitimate differences within and among the services. There are also self-serving and parochial differences. When the latter predominate, civilians are apt to exercise control in an arbitrary manner. If the former are suppressed or ignored, foolish and expensive avoidable mistakes will be made. In other words, professional integrity in its full sense enhances both good civil-military relations and effective policy. This brings us to a critical issue in civilian-military relations: To what degree should the personnel of the armed forces and particularly the officers conform to the ethics and standards of conduct of the civilian community to whose defense the military are committed?

In any large industrialized state, particularly one with a representative rather than authoritarian government, the interplay of civil-military and political-economic factors is closely involved with all forms of news media. Each segment of government, each vested interest in the armed forces and in industry, and each legislator consciously uses all available media to advance its image and its interest. Military professionals should understand how their professional standards and integrity are at stake when they deal with the news media.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MILITARY, THE MEDIA, AND PUBLIC OPINION

Communication is the essence of humanity. Ordinarily, it is from person to person concerning the quiet trivia of daily life. Thereafter, with various audio and visual devices, it ranges from the falsehoods of a carnival barker to the precise esoteric reports in scientific monographs and learned journals. The entire subject of communication and public opinion is permeated by the problem of deliberate or inadvertent exaggeration and semantic distortion.

For purposes of this discussion, I will use public opinion as a broad term that represents the judgment or the appraisals formed in the minds of the people as a whole about a particular matter or point of issue. To be useful, the statement of such opinion must identify both the time and the issue. It should be an expression of assent, dissent, or indifference, or a choice or preference among questions, issues or people. Highly sophisticated techniques of observation, sampling, measurement, and evaluation using statistical mathematics and computers can be employed. Nevertheless, except in very simple issues, intuitive judgment is essential to both measurement and interpretation.

The news media are a valuable source of data and a major element in the formation of such opinion. Because experienced newsmen sometimes have a special aptitude for sensing nuances and anticipating shifts in public opinion, they frequently become opinion measurers or public affairs counselors. As such, they are concerned with the battle for control of public affairs through control of public opinion; this battle is waged continuously at every level and in every area of society by manipulation of the media. It ranges from the direct control of all aspects of the press, television, radio, and public meetings practiced by the authoritarian government of China to the manner in which political dissidents in various countries use such attention-getting devices as kidnapping, terrorism, public violence and demonstrations in front of television cameras. In the latter case, the media have an ambiguous role—they must be alert to capture and picture the

violence that is news, while realizing that the presence of their cameras attracts and focuses the violence and in some instances may even incite it. It is not difficult for television to switch from the cavorting of youngsters in front of a camera at a football game to the demand for "political" television time as ransom in a kidnapping. The medium is the message and perhaps even the Frankenstein.

The use of military power in a free society is inextricably meshed in the interrelationship of the government, the military, and the media. Each of these entities has its own special nature and structure. Each has tangible physical aspects and specific financial elements of power. Each has its vested interests, and each thrives or suffers as it satisfies the needs of that vital force and intangible amorphous court of final decision, public opinion. Consequently, each element seeks to form and manipulate opinion to its own advantage. This is a very complex and not necessarily unworthy effort.

It is complex because many vested interests in the society compete for the benefits of favorable public opinion. This competition is legitimate, for public opinion is the heart and soul of the concept of a free society. But the competition is not all worthy; amidst all the legitimate effort to educate, serve, and govern the people and to advance the arts of civilization, there is a sordid counterplay of lust for money, power, and aggrandizement, and the blind thrust of frustrated romantics.

All of the arts—literature, poetry, drama, music, and painting—are used: sometimes intentionally, with careful design, sometimes almost inadvertently as an individual expresses an irrepressible emotion in his art. In ancient days, politicians sought to influence public opinion by public gifts, spectacles, oratory, and marketplace gossip. When the printing press was developed, pamphlets and newspapers were used, but the older devices continued. Gradually, the concepts of free speech and a free press became linked to the concept of a free government.

With the invention of the telegraph and development of steam-powered transportation, magazines and newspapers proliferated and influenced the entire world. One consequence was the extensive use of government propaganda in World War I. A great leap came with the development of radio broadcasting and, in the early 1930s, the oratory of Adolph Hitler combined with the skillful and massive semantic distortion of Joseph Goebbels with disastrous results. After World War II, television, the transistor radio, and cheap fast air transportation vastly multiplied

human communication and Marshall McLuhan announced that "The Medium is the Message."

Thus, throughout history there has been the continuing process of action and reaction. The expression of freedom brought the effort of repression. Repression built up the explosive demand for freedom. Imprisonment, torture, execution, and exile were followed by the counterforces of assassination, sabotage, terrorism and revolution. The violent ferment of freedom is an enduring human characteristic.¹

With the development of the electronic computer and information theory, highly sophisticated statistical techniques were developed to sample and evaluate opinion. This is not a matter of simple statistical sampling, for public opinion is an amorphous aggregate of concepts, and perceptions influenced by and formed into cognitive patterns. As such, it has its own special symbolic logic that is intuitively understood by all great leaders, be they tyrants or apostles of liberty and freedom. It is a major tool for the creation and use of power and thus is an essential element of power itself, both domestic and foreign. Its vital importance in government is evidenced by the fact that in all *coups d'état* the aim is the simultaneous seizure of the person of the chief executive, the telephone exchange, the central television and radio stations followed by the control of newspapers.

Military power and a free press are both essential elements of a free society. As parts of a complex social system, they influence each other not in accordance with any "master plan" but rather as their diverse and sometimes contradictory actions influence the perceptions of the individuals who combine to make up "the military" and "the media." A major part of military, political, and economic intelligence is derived from the study of the media and discussions with reporters. All parts of the media are so studied; your own, your enemy, and the neutral. By definition, a good reporter is a good observer. Furthermore, the study of your own media and discussions with its reporters can give valuable information as to your own situation and that of your friends. It is expected that your enemy will carefully study your media in order to gauge your situation, capabilities, and intentions. This creates problems in two specific areas—censorship and media-military good faith.

Wartime censorship is always a difficult matter. Many experienced newsmen believe that overt formal censorship is better than an informal or partial censorship. The latter always seems to create

a doubtful or equivocal situation that may cause a corruptive antagonism between the media and the military. Furthermore, deception of the enemy has always been a legitimate weapon; sometimes an operational cover plan involves the deception of one's own media. This again is well understood by all experienced reporters and raises the matter of good faith.

Good faith is an intangible, transcendent quality essential to the working of a free society. Some of its elements are recognition of common interests, professional competence, and personal integrity. The American experience in the Vietnam war is a classic illustration of how the decline in these apparently simple and obvious factors can entail widespread harm. Therefore, it is very important for the professional newsmen and the military commanders to understand the problems, attitudes, and reasoning of the other and how their relationship and normal behavior affect the ability of the free society to use military power effectively in defense and support of freedom.

Military Leadership, Symbols, and Images. Military leadership has long involved symbols and symbolic action. In some instances, these are legitimate; in others, fraudulent. The range is enormous:

A young British officer of World War I armed only with a swagger stick, walking in front of his men across the no man's land between the trenches leading an assault: walking to almost certain death, a symbol of loyalty and courage. On the other hand, we may see an officer or politician facing a press conference, carefully choosing the words in which he can evade or obfuscate the truth lest his personal image be tarnished.

From the perspective of "style," we see a great range of behavior among World War II senior officers of outstanding professional competence:

Gen. George Patton cultivated a flamboyant image; General MacArthur, one of aloof but condescending and colorful grandeur. Both had repeatedly proven their professional competence and courage, both were outstanding leaders.

Adm. William F. Halsey was the epitome of fighting spirit, exuberant and uninhibited in his relations with the press, and a competent inspiring leader of Joint Army-Navy Forces in the critical battles of the South Pacific. In contrast was the modest poise of his close friend, Adm. Raymond Spruance, who refused to hold press conferences because he thought that his awareness of a public image might, at some critical time, sully his objective military judgment.

Then there was the superb quartet in Washington—Adm. W.F. Leahy, the President's advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George Marshall, Adm. Ernest King, and Gen. "Hap" Arnold—diverse in personality, united in the determination to let nothing, no selfish motive or image making interfere with the vital work at hand. Behind this facade of armed forces unity, strong differences about operational command and policy and the allocation of resources were fought out. This is the normal type of healthy contention that should be expected under such circumstances. Beneath the surface there was, however, a longstanding struggle over the organization of the armed forces, particularly as control of the air forces was critical to the older argument about centralization of command in an increasingly technological military environment. This battle was joined by subordinate officers testifying before the House of Representatives "Select Committee on Post War Military Policy" convened in March 1944. The Joint Chiefs themselves remained apart from the fray partly because of the need for unity in the conduct of the war, but also to some extent because of a distaste for publicity.

At the start of World War II, the senior officers of the U.S. Armed Forces were men who had grown up in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. That war had been characterized by the inflammatory propaganda of the Hearst newspapers, a lack of effective military planning, extraordinary logistic ineptitude and the brief military career of Theodore Roosevelt who shared charisma with dashing and colorful war correspondents. It was followed by the disgraceful public controversy between Admirals Sampson and Schley over who won the Battle of Santiago Bay, Adm. George Dewey's abortive try for the Presidency, the formation of the U.S. Army General Staff, and the subsequent battle between Chief of Staff Leonard Wood and Adj. Gen. Francis Ainsworth for control of the U.S. Army.

Some of our World War II leaders, therefore, viewed "public relations" with disdain. General Marshall remarked that a man can accomplish a great deal if he does not care who gets the credit, and, when asked to hold a press conference, Admiral King allegedly commented: "Tell them to come around after the war and I'll tell them who won!"

This attitude had been explicitly stated by Rear Adm. William Moffett (the most frequent target of Gen. Billy Mitchell's violent attacks on naval aviation) who in 1925 wrote:

... the fight with Mitchell has been going on for the last seven years ... but he attacked me personally ... I battled as well as I knew until recently ... this involved going to the newspapers. ... However my activities in publicity met with criticism in the Navy Department. ... As you know, to the average naval officer the word "publicity" is anathema. I was brought up to hate it myself, and still hate it.²

At the end of World War II, this controversy came into the open with the great public "debate" on unification of the armed forces, followed by the Unification Act of 1947 and the bitter B-36 controversy of 1949. During this controversy the public relations activities and staffs of the armed forces were greatly expanded as each service sought to protect or advance its own interests. With the great increase in industrialization and size of the armed forces, the "Pentagon" became a major political and economic factor in the nation and thus closely involved with power and public opinion.

Public Opinion and Power. As politics always involves the development and use of power, the politician in any society must be keenly aware of the sources of his power and those of his associates and rivals. He must understand the tools and methods at his disposal to influence these allies and opponents.

The media, the Fourth Estate, are among the most important, as newsmen and editors are well aware. They, too, like power, seek to attain it and, in general, use it for what they perceive as the general welfare.

In some nations, the deliberate incitement of mob violence is an accepted form of political power. In some instances its use is successful; in all instances it is dangerous, for it involves an unstable form of public opinion and power that easily can be turned against its instigator. It contributes more to dictatorship than to freedom. In authoritarian states the centers of power include the army, the center of intelligence, the police, and the media.

In a free society, the military services, the intelligence organizations, and the police are all theoretically dedicated to the service of the state and thus are not involved in this struggle for political power. The degree of their involvement, however, is a rough index of both the freedom of the society and their professionalism. Inexorably, nevertheless, senior military leaders are drawn into this power struggle, inevitably they become subject to its

inherently corrupting effect, and some degree of self-deception occurs.

If they recognize the nature and strength of these natural forces, their involvement can be lessened and more circumspect, the corrupting effect is lessened, their professionalism is enhanced and the nation is better served. This underscores the great paradox: military leaders by definition must be able to use great power. No man can be expected to use power effectively who does not enjoy the use of power. How do they perceive the distinction between their personal interests, their service interests, and the nation's interests?

Aggressive investigation, interrogation and criticism by the media are the best safeguard against this confusion of interests. But as Alfred North Whitehead repeatedly said "... what plays the devil in human affairs is mistaking a half-truth for a whole truth."³

The doctrine that the end justifies the means is a dangerous fallacy. Intellectual arrogance and the unscrupulous use of power are just as evil when exercised by a member of the Fourth Estate as by a politician or soldier; and about as frequent in the United States. The law of diminishing returns applies inexorably to all areas of human activity. It applies directly to freedom of the press.

News Media, Newsmen, and News. To be free, the media must operate at a financial profit; otherwise, it becomes so beholden to the source of its subsidy that independence of thought is suspect.

If there is to be competition in ideas, there must also be economic competition within and among the various types of media. News is the *unusual*, therefore, it is normal for the media to emphasize excitement, for it is to their financial benefit. Hence it is natural for reporters and commentators to emphasize color, personality, and charisma in the public figures they discuss. It is natural for them to emphasize the elements of conflict and difference among leaders and proposals and to use terminology that generates a "semantic reaction."

The media behave this way because people generally enjoy excitement. They vote for "exciting" candidates for public office: it takes many years for a voter to become mature in politics and to learn to discriminate between the leader of solid accomplishments and the shallow pretensions of a skilled demagogue. This evolved naturally from the essential nature of the human species. We should not expect it to change. Judgment, poise, discrimination,

and discipline are qualities that must be cultivated by an individual if he is to make wise choices in his daily life.

The instant exposure via television of all personalities, ideas and proposed policies is a hazard to sound thought. It is another invitation to massive and widespread superficiality in which instant appeal, i.e., glamour, is "the message of the media." That this is a communicable disease seems evident from the "personality" sketches that characterize many of the official and semiofficial publications of government and business. Nevertheless, we should always bear in mind that newsmen and media executives behave as do other human beings. When caught *flagrante delicto*, they display about the same degree of righteous indignation and specious rationalization as do the public officials, executives, and military men they so effectively criticize.

The men who operate and write for the news media generally are subject to the same type of social, human aspirations and faults as are men in other occupations. In many notable instances they are able, objective and skilled in analysis with a high sense of personal integrity. In other instances, they are hard-working unimaginative people with an aptitude for certain routine tasks. In rare instances, they are shrewd, adroit, and at the same time ignorant, shallow and unscrupulous. There is great variation among experienced professional writers on the nature and desirability of objectivity or responsibility in news reports. This question will never be wholly resolved.

In a free society, the media representatives should keep continuous pressure on government authorities, seeking to gain as much information as possible. What constitutes "news" is a matter for the press to decide—not the source!

Any good reporter must understand the nature and methods of investigative reporting. There is a distinction, however, between such a reporter, particularly after he matures, and the one who makes it his continuing specialty. Such a professional investigative reporter, sometimes known as a "muckraker," has a special legitimate and important place in the news world. Without his activity, the dishonesty and incompetence of our society would probably be greater than it now is. He is not expected to be objective, nor can he be wholly accurate because he must extract his evidence from reluctant or highly prejudiced sources. Unfortunately, however, he frequently becomes expert in deliberate semantic distortion and propagation of the half-truth.

The qualities that make a good investigator, however, do not necessarily make a good leader or administrator. Therefore, any

remedies he may propose for the evils he exposes should be regarded with skepticism. In this shifting interplay of people, perceptions and interests, some factors persist:

There is a continuing public demand for glamor and excitement with a continuing effort of the media to satisfy and at times cynically to exploit this demand.

There is the continuing effort of political and military leaders to use the media to advance their own causes and sometimes their own personal interests.

There is the continuing effort of political and military officials to use fictitious claims of "military security" to prevent the disclosing of their mistakes, ineptitude, and misconduct.

There is a continuing effort to substitute formal codes and laws for an innate sense of decency and justice.

Some Government-Media Relations. The concept of responsible officials answering publicly to the questions and criticism of their colleagues in the legislature or to newsmen as a means of informing the people about the state of public affairs is a basic feature of a free society. This is a great and fundamental source of strength to the society. Ideally, the reporters and commentators are themselves well-informed and responsible professionals. Ideally, too, they are objective in their approach. However, the real world of public information is far from ideal and, therefore, an intuitive sense of practicality and various tacit understandings are required.

The government uses the media to keep its own people and foreign nations informed, and to send reassuring or warning international signals. Foreign officials scrutinize the reports of conferences for such signals and evaluate the rank and authority of the official, as well as the content of the message.

Officials and experienced newsmen fully understand the value of the background news conference at which the media are given important information on a nonattribution basis. These conferences also give officials a chance to develop and test new ideas with a select group of highly intelligent, experienced, well-informed men.

In addition, officials sometimes use news leaks either to obtain the favor of a reporter or to embarrass or frustrate a rival. Sometimes they release news of an impending proposal to test public opinion.⁴

In recent years public opinion polling and evaluation have grown both in amount and accuracy. Sometimes the results are

published, sometimes they are kept private. The news media conduct their own polls and try to discover and publish the results of private polls. Additionally, they seek to keep their own inner knowledge private while at the same time expose the private affairs of others. The reason is obvious: knowledge is power.

Stemming from a desire for personal advancement or an excess of zeal, because of the frustrations of a cumbersome system of security classification, because of a certain knowledge that bland questions do not elicit the kind of information that makes news, and also because the truth sometimes is exposed only when an official's self-assurance and poise are shaken, media questions sometimes take the form of savage accusations both in content and tone. There are frequent attempts to make an official speak when silence would be in the best interests of the nation. Sometimes statements are quoted out of context; sometimes critical qualifying phrases are omitted.

The thirst for sensation creates an extensive illicit traffic in classified or otherwise privileged information. As a consequence, some able and honest men who have no taste for this kind of confrontation and turmoil are reluctant to take public office. Others, however, relish both the combat and the accompanying notoriety of this battle of wits.

At times, military necessity requires that the news media be deliberately deceived. Such deception should be used only when the stakes are very high and success in deception has high probability for the length of time necessary to accomplish the purpose. We must always remember that such deception decreases the bank account of credibility, always a limited asset.

When, however, deception or deliberate misrepresentation is used to protect a reputation or for a trivial or unworthy purpose, the account of credibility is soon exhausted and may be overdrawn at the critical time. In general these matters are well understood by mature men in public life and in the news media. These men know who is competent and who is to be trusted. Nevertheless, because their perceived interests sometimes may conflict, it is wise that friendships between officials and newsmen be tempered with caution regardless of the degree of mutual respect.

This situation seems to be typical of the ferment of freedom, the continuing contradiction and paradox of human affairs. In a real sense, it is a process of the survival of the fittest where toughness and poise as well as honesty and professional competence are the requirements for effective high military command.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize the difference between domestic and partisan political controversy with primary concern for personal political survival and the planning and conduct of combat operations against a competent enemy. The matter of effective control of combat is so important and in a free society involves so many conflicting ideas about press freedom and the "public's right to know" that comments on the United States-Vietnam war are appropriate before exploring the substance of operational control.

The Media and Vietnam. During the Vietnam war a unique situation developed with many complications and contradictions in matters of news media and public opinion. The war developed as a gradual involvement without any specific decisive attack or crisis to galvanize public opinion and clarify the issues. Furthermore, the major cultural differences between the people of Vietnam and the Americans who were working and fighting in Vietnam created differing political and social concepts and perceptions. These decisively affected both the course of events and their reporting and evaluation. As a consequence, within the U.S. Government there was no conceptual unity about the nature of the conflict and how it should be handled or fought.

This equivocal condition provided the President with a plausible reason not to declare a national emergency, mobilize the nation and demand civilian sacrifice. This policy of both "guns and butter" cast doubt at home and abroad on the determination and "national will" of the United States and stimulated the skepticism of newsmen. Furthermore, other related factors enhanced this feeling:

The short term of duty for the Army created a situation in which it appeared that many officers looked on Vietnam duty as a means to promotion rather than of service to the nation.

The attempt to judge the political and military situation largely by means of a set of Washington-dictated formal statistics distorted and concealed the truth and frequently insulted the intelligence of the newsmen.

The U.S. effort was characterized by huge civilian and military administrative staffs both in Washington and in Vietnam. The great size and luxury of the headquarters and support area facilities were not only a mark of unprofessional self-indulgence but also inevitably stimulated the logistic snowball and greatly expanded all staffs.

The great expansion and use of untrained officers and men in public affairs staffs, particularly in the early stages, created a general atmosphere of confusion and ineptitude. Some naive officers did not understand that the experienced newsman has a highly developed intuitive ability to detect fraud. Hence, their amateurish attempts at evasion or deception and coverup were both silly and self-defeating.

On the other hand, the media sent many inexperienced and sometimes deplorably ignorant young reporters to Southeast Asia. They too wished to establish good records and to do so stressed "color" and sensationalism. In so doing, they frequently reported in terms of half-truths and sometimes deliberate misrepresentations, even staging "events" to create "news."

An enormous corps of newsmen gathered from all over the world. Those from the United States were equipped with instant communication, instant television, tremendous resources in transportation, and burdened by no formal censorship. Furthermore, the news media had essentially free communication with the enemy government and representatives in North Vietnam and in Europe and, at times, even in South Vietnam.

The media was literally flooded with information and news releases. But it was not necessarily the information the media considered significant. Furthermore, the age-old problem of interpreting information to conform to one's wishes or expectations frequently afflicted both the media and the military.

The faults of the military exasperated the newsmen; the faults of the newsmen exasperated the military: the inherent complexity of the situation baffled and frustrated both. The faults of the few outweighed the competence and decency of the majority; mutual respect and mutual trust diminished. Unfortunately, many military men and civilians concluded that the actions and attitudes of the media created much of the opposition and protest in the United States and thus actually aided the North Vietnamese and prolonged the war.

Within a year after the active U.S. involvement, strong adverse reaction grew up in the United States and in Europe. This was expressed through the literature, the electronic media, and particularly through public protests that were organized very largely with the purpose of attracting the electronic media. The result was a major confrontation in which there were four distinct areas of polarization: youth versus age, black versus white, "intellectuals" versus "blue collar workers," and conservatives versus liberals. Each of these confrontations was characterized by

exaggerated charges and countercharges, an enormous amount of semantic distortion, and ultimately an unprecedented "credibility gap" that subsequently has had a major effect on the conduct of national affairs.

There was also a general assumption on the part of many of the opponents of U.S. policy that any statement out of Washington or Saigon was false and any statement from Hanoi was true. For this reason and because of a peculiar inversion of values, enemy successes were frequently greeted with enthusiasm in the United States and Europe. American servicemen's families were harassed by anonymous telephone calls. Men in uniform in the United States were sometimes treated with overt contempt, and the desecration of the American flag became commonplace.

Ultimately, the massive force of public opinion was reflected in a change in American policy and withdrawal of combat forces, but only after there had been near mutiny in parts of the armed forces both overseas and in the United States. Throughout this turmoil there were great differences of concept and opinion between military and civilian executives, among officials of the U.S. Government, and among newsmen.

In 1971 these extensive arguments were climaxed by the publication of the "Pentagon Papers" and the frustration and exasperation of the subsequent litigation with the issue finally being crystallized in the concepts of freedom of information and the "public's right to know." This slogan, so often stated glibly without any regard for its implications, challenges the entire concept of the effective conduct of foreign relations and diplomacy; for example, the contrast between the public statements of officials of friendly and independent nations and the attitude taken by their heads of government and diplomatic representatives in their private discussions with U.S. officials. This is illustrated by an item in *The New York Times* of 15 April 1974. Senator Hubert Humphrey is reported as commenting on his experience while serving as Vice President of the United States, recalling a visit he had with Mrs. Gandhi in India in 1966, when she was publicly condemning the U.S. involvement in Vietnam:

She and her ministers privately told me that it was absolutely essential that we were there. . . . Because without us being there, China would be a menace that no one could control. That's all they could see, was China.⁵

Obviously, Mrs. Gandhi felt uncertain as to the sources of her power and, therefore, felt unable to speak the truth in public. It is still too early to know all the other heads of government who publicly condemned, but privately supported U.S. policies.

During the Vietnam war, American officials, both civilian and military, were well aware of this dichotomy, but were constrained by political considerations from discussing it openly. The media representatives were equally aware of the situation. While sometimes it would be mentioned, it was seldom discussed in terms that reflected the dilemma this created for politicians as they tried to weigh the various factors affecting their decisions and policies.

One of the chief arguments for freedom of speech and freedom of the news media is to insure that civilian political authority maintains adequate control over the military system. Because of the normal behavior of politicians and newsmen and the unique requirements for the exercise of military command, this creates special problems that not only complicate military-media relations but have major implications for military justice and discipline. Basically the issues are as old as civilized man: What is truth? What is personal veracity?

Sir Richard Livingstone in 1945 gave four lectures in Canada⁶ and in the course of the last, "On Speaking the Truth," he said:

Here you will demand that I should define truth. Not being a philosopher, I shall not attempt such a task. What puzzled Pilate, baffles me, and anyhow I am not dealing with truth in the sense in which he used the word. I mean by it that veracity which does its best to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; where it is uncertain confesses to uncertainty, where it lacks knowledge does not pretend to it; which is candid and frank, takes no unfair advantage in argument, is careful not to misrepresent an opponent or to ignore the strength of his case and the weakness of its own.

... In scientific work misrepresentation or suppression of facts is rare. No one could say as much of writing on political or social questions; here we find ourselves in a different world ruled apparently by different principles, where the law of veracity may be admitted but is habitually broken.

... On controversial issues we do not expect to hear from all politicians or all journalists an impartial statement, which conceals nothing and does justice to opponents.

... I am not disparaging party politicians; I am only saying that a man must be superman if he can be a party leader and yet be, as a university teacher should be, always ready to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.⁷

With these thoughts in mind, we can consider some of the facts and implications of the reporting and discussions of military affairs.

In World Wars I and II, the government, the military, the media and the people of the nation had a high degree of conceptual unity on the merits of the issues of war and the methods of its conduct.

In the 1960s there were wide and bitter differences of opinion, not only between these groups but within them. For instance, on the one hand, some experienced newsmen objected to the lack of objectivity and rigor in the reporting; and, on the other hand, many military men objected to the gross ineptitude with which the Southeast Asian war was conducted.

Where previously there had been trust and mutual respect between the media and the military, there developed a real and great credibility gap, together with suspicion and violent antagonism. The faults of each increased the faults of the other. Some newsmen at home as well as in Vietnam seemed to relish reporting American faults and failures, while many citizens and military men blamed the American media for the stubborn persistence and successes of the enemy.

Nevertheless, the reports and critical analyses of the Vietnam war published in the media seemed on the whole more thorough and accurate than those furnished by official sources. In this respect civilians and military in the Defense Department seemed equally guilty of equivocation and misrepresentation. This was caused by a curious combination of wishful thinking, misplaced loyalty, and intellectual corruption—all largely associated with an unrealistic concept of "military security." The question of military security has always been a source of friction between the media and the military.

In recent years, however, with more and more government agencies being involved with the technical and economic aspects of military affairs, the volume of "classified information" has grown to unreasonable and self-defeating proportions. The most commonplace matters are frequently classified so as to gain importance and attract executive attention. "Political sensitivity," which is legitimate at times, is used for trivial reasons and to protect the image of incompetent or unscrupulous officials. The

mass of security information expands to a point where it impedes the conduct of business. Several harmful results occur, specifically: It clutters our administrative and communication systems with extra people and procedures. It slows down the accomplishment of useful work. It is a continuing source of challenge and ridicule by the media. It is frequently used to cover up mistakes which should be exposed. And, worst of all, it tends to induce self-deception on the part of command.

Finally, breaking "military secrets" becomes a kind of game in which newsmen compete for "scoops" and prestige and government employees and officials compete for the favor of newsmen. Legitimate military security is greatly reduced as foreign espionage and intelligence are facilitated. The ability of the responsible members of the media to discipline their irresponsible colleagues is limited. Nevertheless, it is significant particularly for short periods.

While there are times, such as in the 1962 missile crisis, when it is necessary to deceive the media and the public, deception should not be undertaken for trivial or even secondary purposes. Two instances from the United States-Vietnam war are typical—one of them is trivial, one is secondary.

The background of these and similar instances of attempts to deceive the media is not simple. It basically lies in the lack of conceptual unity within the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government and among the people of the nation during that war. The Congress accurately reflected public opinion in the period 1954-1961. It was largely indifferent to affairs in Southeast Asia. However, with increasing involvement in 1961 and the murders of President Kennedy and President Diem in November 1963, congressional concern began to mount.

The Tonkin Resolution that furnished the authority for President Johnson's subsequent actions was highly popular in the nation and Congress. But in 1966 and 1967 a major change occurred. The young people in the colleges led the dissent—but in general their parents, who had the experience of World War II and Korea, tended to support the President. Congress was listening to the dissidents who demonstrated, but voting in accordance with the parents who voted. Thus, their legislative actions were equivocal: they denounced the war, but passed the supplemental budget bills that the Administration requested in order to support the fighting. From 1964 until 1972 the Congress by specific legislation or resolutions took many contradictory steps to support, guide, or end the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war.

After 1967 these acts more and more reflected the unhappy "public opinion" in the United States and were designed to limit U.S. action and hasten the withdrawal of U.S. Forces. They took two general forms: limits on funds and restrictions on the geographic areas in which funds could be used. There were various resolutions to assert the warmaking power of the Congress and limit that of the President. However the lack of conceptual unity persisted, divided the Congress and prevented decisive direct action.

The Congressmen feared that casualties among American troops would be increased if the freedom of the Chief Executive were unduly restricted. Nevertheless, the equivocal nature of the legislation encouraged evasion in military action and falsification of combat reports.

The most important congressional act was the Cooper-Church Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1970-1971. Finally passed after 7 weeks of debate in the Senate, it read:

In concert with the declared objectives of the President of the United States to avoid the involvement of the United States in Cambodia after July 1, 1970, and to expedite the withdrawal of American forces from Cambodia, it is hereby provided that unless specifically authorized by law hereafter enacted, no funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this act or any other law may be expended after July 1, 1970, for the purpose of—

- (1) retaining United States forces in Cambodia;
- (2) paying the compensation or allowances of, or otherwise supporting, directly or indirectly, any United States personnel in Cambodia who furnish military instruction to Cambodian forces or engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces;
- (3) entering into or carrying out any contract or agreement to provide military instruction in Cambodia or to provide persons to engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces; or
- (4) conducting any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in direct support of Cambodian forces.

Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional power of the President as

Commander-in-Chief, including the exercise of that constitutional power which may be necessary to protect the lives of U.S. armed forces wherever deployed.

Nothing contained in this section will be deemed to impugn the constitutional power of the Congress including the power to declare war and to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces of the United States.⁸

In late January 1971 a dispute arose between the media and the Department of Defense⁹ over the use of military personnel to assist in the recovery of damaged helicopters from Phnom Penh, Cambodia. About 15 men from the U.S. Army 520th Transportation Battalion, stationed in South Vietnam, were photographed *wearing civilian clothes*, carrying sidearms, leaving three *unmarked standard U.S. Army helicopters* at the Phnom Penh Airport to salvage some damaged Cambodian helicopters. The colonel in charge obviously evaded newsmen. Later the Department of Defense acknowledged the incident.

In a more important matter with direct bearing on national policy and international politics, on 19 May 1974 *The New York Times* reported that during a top-secret hearing before a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and an officer representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Subcommittee that from March 1967 to July 1972 extensive rainmaking missions had been undertaken in North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. It also reported that in January 1974 Defense Secretary Laird apologized for having categorically denied in July 1972 reports of such action.¹⁰

The question becomes: Were the U.S. Armed Forces using deceptive measures to evade the will of the U.S. Congress?¹¹

Taken in the context of the rancorous arguments of the time, these incidents exemplify:

A. The futility and far-reaching harmful effects of deception in an essentially trivial case.

B. The harmful effects of a legislative body attempting to regulate the operational details of a war and of attempting to impose precise compartmented limits to the activities of the interlocking, multipurpose units of a military force.

C. The far-reaching harmful effects of habits of semantic distortion, particularly when semantic distortion is used to deceive

one's own people, and to justify a legislative body's unwillingness to take a clear-cut unequivocal position.

Corruption and the Integrity of Command. A much more serious matter, however, was that of the B-52 raids on Cambodia. The corruption associated with power takes several forms. Moral corruption is most frequently discussed, for it obviously has the most emotional connotations and it seems to defy any agreed criteria other than the Ten Commandments. But intellectual corruption is just as serious, particularly from a military point of view. Whether this is the cause or the result of moral corruption is beside the point. The two are closely related. Intellectual corruption is frequently indicated by the kind of semantic distortion that reached an outrageous level in some of the press releases and conferences of the Vietnam war.

In July 1973 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee disclosed that in 1969 and 1970, 3,630 previously unreported B-52 bombing raids had been made in Cambodia and that these sorties had been falsely reported by official sources as having been made on targets in South Vietnam. Former Chief of Staff Gen. Earle Wheeler testified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, following instructions "of a very general nature" from President Nixon, who "wanted the matter held with the greatest security," instituted a system of dual reports.

The Committee also released a letter from Gen. John D. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff saying that similarly falsified reports had been made of raids over Laos between February 1970 and February 1972. Gen. George S. Brown, newly appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in a letter to the Committee wrote:

... I do not believe it is correct to characterize reports under special security precautions directed by higher authority as "false" so long as the reports met in every detail the requirements imposed^{1 2}

In all of these reports and in amplifying testimony and letters, the justification for such reporting and record keeping was " . . . to ward off diplomatic problems . . . to insure that we did not have a diplomatic explosion."^{1 3}

Many persons familiar with the contradictions inherent in domestic and international politics will sympathize with the positions taken by Generals Wheeler and Brown. They certainly had very plausible reasons for their actions. But this element of

plausibility lies behind too many major disasters to allow it to stand unchallenged.

The problem goes to the heart of the concept of the effective use of military power in a free society, the concept of strategy and the great importance of maintaining control of one's sources of power. It also points up the freedom of action in the use of military power in an authoritarian society that controls the media. Finally, it involves the questions of military discipline and of the integrity of command.

In the first place this action was in no way designed to deceive the intelligence systems of our opponents or of our allies. It was designed to deceive the American public and their elected representatives in the Congress. It demonstrates a series of differences:

There is the difference in the use of military power when a society sees its existence directly threatened and when that threat is not so perceived by the public.

There is the difference between deceiving one's enemy and deceiving one's own people and legislators.

There is a difference in the use of "public relations" to inform and to fortify the spirit of one's own people and the attempt to manipulate "public opinion" in order to do things that would not be approved by "public opinion."

In cases in which contradiction and paradox are so obvious, eventually the situation becomes a matter of responsible personal judgment and personal opinion. In that case, to indulge in semantic acrobatics is silly, for no one is either deceived or reassured.

Finally, one cannot expect to conduct continuing combat operations effectively on the basis of a dishonest combat reporting system. The compromise of the system for a plausible political purpose can start an uncontrollable erosion of the integrity of the whole system. This is all the more important because combat reporting has long been notoriously inaccurate. Throughout history, the initial reports of action have tended to exaggerate success and minimize mistakes or reverses. This was especially the case in 1942-1943, when the reports of the Japanese commanders in the South Pacific to the High Command in Japan were particularly misleading and furnished a bad foundation for planning.

Some would contend that the bombing of Cambodia was militarily sound, politically sound, and morally sound. In such case, it should have been done long before. The manner in which it

was done, however, showed a combination of both ignorance and overt contempt for the process of government in a free society and, as such, was thoroughly unsound.

The question of whether it was moral or immoral to bomb Cambodia can be debated endlessly. Regardless of how one decides the moral issue, however, the incident and the attendant circumstances illustrate inadequate understanding of the nature and elements of power, the control of power, the control of the sources of power, and the effective use of power.

It also indicates weakness of perception in some members of Congress and government. Many legislators and officials have so repeatedly demonstrated such habits of indiscretion that they invite deception, and thus have helped to create the distrust that they now deplore. But the military professionals are most to blame, for they failed to understand the nature and effect of the fabric of deceit and its cumulative effect in defeating itself, the purposes of the state, and the integrity of their own services and professions.

Finally, this falsification represents a breakdown in the mutual confidence that must be the heart of civil-military relations; the heart of the conceptual unity that is essential to success. The acceptance of such falsification by even a small number of military and civilian executives indicates a deep intellectual corruption and blindness.

Public Opinion and the Conduct of Military Operations. One of the most critical and difficult problems that confronts a free society is the question of how military power and force can and should be used to accomplish the political purposes of the society. The nature and structure of a government, its special characteristics and traditions, will influence the course of events. The freedom of a society and of its news media create special difficulties both in the employment of military forces in combat and in the conclusion of a peace settlement. These factors lead us to some basic questions:

What is the place of public opinion in the initiation and control of the use of military force?

To what degree and to what extent does the operation of the free media influence the effectiveness of the use of military force?

How does the exercise of media freedom influence the attainment of our political purposes?

Does the untrammelled exercise of freedom impair the defense of freedom? And, if so, how?

These questions are difficult to answer in specific terms. Nevertheless, a few fundamentals are in order.

The process of sound military decision consists of three major steps—the estimate of the situation, the development of the plan, and the running estimate of the situation which governs the supervision of the planned action. The first step provides the major decision and the second provides for the details of the measures necessary to carry it out. The running estimate of the situation is a continuing analysis of events designed to provide for the adjustments that are inevitably required during the execution of any plan. Experience has repeatedly shown the necessity for conceptual unity throughout the three phases of this command process.

Once the use of military force is initiated, the operations of that force will necessarily have to be adapted swiftly to the actual rather than the expected reaction of the opposing force. Thus, final results are determined by the supervision of the planned action. This requires two intangible characteristics in the exercise of command: intuitive feel for the unfolding situation as it is influenced by enemy reaction; and freedom of action to make quick positive operational decisions.

Both factors are vital. They make the difference between a successful operation and a bloody disaster. Critical operational decisions cannot possibly be made effectively by any individual or group outside the “command group.” No command group or chain of command can operate without conceptual unity throughout the whole decision process and the whole chain.

The fatal expedition against Syracuse and the divided command structure of the Second Peloponnesian War in 414 B.C., the First Battle of Bull Run, the Spanish-American War, and the overly hasty U.S. demobilization in 1946-47 were all precipitated by ill-formed “public opinion.”

On the other hand, public opinion can profoundly affect what government should attempt to do; what political objectives it should seek. Public opinion can *limit* the employment of military force; it cannot properly determine *how* it should be employed. Public opinion can force a government to bring hostilities to an end.

The media has a dual role: It both informs and influences public opinion, and at the same time, informs the government as to the state of public opinion: the media can influence but not determine government action. In other words, the combination of public opinion and the media can determine what we should try to do but not how to do it; it also can tell us what not to do.

Looking at the problem from the other side, we should recognize that the opponent is making an estimate of one's public opinion and to an unpredictable degree is being influenced by it. The strategy that is suitable for a totalitarian government is not necessarily suitable for a society in which there is freedom of press and information and a low degree of social-political discipline. This applies particularly to military strategy and grand tactics.

This is related both to the degree of freedom of action of the high command and to the matter of making an intuitive evaluation of the limitations imposed by public opinion. Furthermore, it is a dynamic rather than static situation as each nation or group within the nation responds to the inexorable forces of social-economic change in a different manner and rate.

A totalitarian government has more freedom of action to make changes of policy than does a government operating with a free news media. Therefore, it frequently can cut its losses and extricate itself from a bad situation without serious concern for adverse domestic public reaction. Russia's actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 illustrated this.

Such freedom of action also provides the capability to time public announcements involving change to the best advantage of the government. More importantly, the government can tell the literal truth with impunity when it so wishes. In a free society, because the government is dependent upon the wishes of the people for continuance in power it must usually seek to justify both its past and prospective actions.

In 1954 the Government of the United States was well aware that in seeking to establish and support an independent anti-Communist government in South Vietnam, it was gambling with no better than a 50-50 chance of success. But once American economic and military aid were committed to this admittedly uncertain effort, no American President believed he could openly and unequivocally admit failure.

The foregoing matters were particularly important to the United States during the Vietnam war because of: the peculiar constitutional structure of the U.S. Government; the 1969 debate on the wisdom of the 1964 Tonkin Resolution; the continuing equivocal nature of Soviet behavior; finally, the orientation of U.S. defense policies toward a formal declaration of war, or a formal declaration of national emergency—neither of which was used.

On the other hand, the totalitarian regimes with their controlled press and rigid social-political discipline have the executive

freedom of action to plan and carry out threats and aggressive operations that are equivocal as perceived by the various interest groups within the free nations. Thus, an important part of their strategy may be to attack the decision processes of these governments in order to prevent the attainment of conceptual unity.

Peacemaking. Before World War II, most major wars were concluded by a treaty of peace often preceded by a formal armistice. Truces for such special purposes as succoring the wounded or burying the dead, as well as sending messages between commanders, were common. Third party or neutral country emissaries were frequently used to facilitate communication.

Peace treaties were usually concluded after a few weeks or a few months of negotiation; even the Congress of Vienna lasted only 9 months. At the end of World War II, however, the Allied nations were divided by the deep ideological conflict between Communist Russia at the height of Stalin's power and the free societies, led by the United States and Great Britain.

The surrender of Germany was absolute: her armed forces had been destroyed and her ruler was dead in the rubble of defeat. Japan, too, had to yield to overwhelming military power and to dictated terms even if they were generous and wise. But in each case the final treaty of peace was greatly delayed because of the struggle for political-military control among the formerly Allied nations in the form of the cold war and the expansion and consolidation of Russian power in the Baltic and Eastern Europe.

In the Far East the Communist forces under Mao Tse-tung gained power in 1949 and for about 10 years they worked closely with the Soviet Union following Leninist ideology.

Thus, when the Korean Armistice Conference began in July 1951, the Allied nations were confronted with what to them was an entirely new concept of negotiation. The armistice negotiations between Communist forces and the United Nations Command started in Kaesong, Korea, on 10 July 1951, and finally ended at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953, after a deadlock concerning the repatriation of prisoners that started on 28 April 1952.

During this time, the North Korean Communists and the Chinese steadily improved their military position and power, while the United Nations Forces remained generally static. Thus, as the people of the United States grew progressively more tired of the war, the ability of the government to use conventional force effectively decreased.

In retrospect the critical issue seems to emerge from the fact that in late June 1951, when the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations publicly suggested that a truce be arranged, the Chinese North Korean Forces were in a disadvantageous and deteriorating military situation and the United Nations Forces were in a very strong and improving situation. During the negotiations the casualties were heavy on both sides—125,000 in the United Nations Forces and more than 250,000 among the Communists.¹⁴

The issue is: Did the cessation of the United Nations offensive and the initiation of armistice discussions accomplish the United Nations political objective and decrease their future casualties, or did it *both* defeat their political objectives and increase their casualties? This case illustrates the nature of the problem of negotiating a peace. It is well to note that no further substantial negotiation has taken place since that 1953 agreement and that there still is no treaty of peace.

In these negotiations the Communists used overt falsehood, personal denigration and insult, together with the exploitation of prisoners of war as hostages, for propaganda and for overt disruption. Much of this was designed to upset the poise of the Allied negotiators and much was directed at world public opinion with the Communist charges at the negotiations being echoed in the world press.

It is easy to overlook the far-reaching effect of these extraordinary negotiations. They greatly upset the decision process in Washington, causing changes in objectives that undermined our negotiators. They put the United States on the defensive in the eyes of many intellectuals in the United States and Europe; thus, to a significant degree, confirming Joseph Goebbels' concept of the usefulness of "The Big Lie." At the same time, they greatly increased the fear of communism among other groups, particularly in the United States. Finally, they laid the foundation for American reaction to Communist moves in Southeast Asia and increased Chinese capacity to exert power in that area.

The freedom of the media in the Allied countries and the close control of the media in the Communist countries made this method of negotiation very effective. It was expert control of an important field of political-military action. This pattern was the forerunner of similar strategy in the protracted 5-year negotiations (1968-1973) between the United States and the North Vietnamese.

The Arab-Israeli conflict that burst into the open in 1948 and has since most violently erupted in 1956, 1967, and 1973 has

similar aspects, but also has somewhat different special characteristics, particularly the worldwide terrorism of the various Palestinian groups and their sympathizers. Again we see these intransigent actions being directed toward public opinion. After the initial cease-fire in the Yom Kippur war in October 1973, Dr. Kissinger's work of mediation between Israel and Egypt was greatly complicated by the urgent need for secrecy while, at the same time, all parties were evaluating the force of public opinion in the status of Israeli prisoners. In the spring of 1974 the Palestinian Liberation Army raided Israel from bases in Syria and neutral Lebanon, murdering schoolchildren for the express purpose of disrupting Kissinger's discussions with the Syrian and Israeli Governments.

The grim reality of peace negotiations seem to be that, except in the case of unconditional surrender, no general plan or agreement for a cease-fire will itself bring a settlement. Many details must be set forth, together with provision for enforcement before the agreement is made public or signed. In other words, the troublesome details the uninformed so blandly consign to the "technicians" are, in fact, essential and critical elements of the substance of political-military reality.

These elements are so important, so complex, and at times, so subtle that few people have the capacity and the patience to analyze them and make a responsible appraisal of expectation and consequences.

When negotiations take place without an effective cease-fire, the varying fortunes of the forces in combat will influence the nature and urgency of the issues and the perceptions and attitudes of the negotiators, and their governments. Even when the cease-fire is effective, the actual combat potential of the forces in position or in reserve will tend to change. This depends both on the morale and discipline of home population, and on the course of events in other critical areas of international affairs. Thus, a cease-fire alone does not bring about a stable or a static situation.

Any position other than overt surrender requires elements of compromise and concession, i.e., the development of a practical working agreement in which neither side can expect to obtain total satisfaction of every claim it may make. In the development of such working agreement, the negotiators on each side must be authoritative representatives of the government actually exercising sovereign power in their state. In the case of various liberation groups or "nonstate nations," this can be very difficult. The degree to which any government delegates negotiating authority to

its representatives will vary greatly among governments and in accordance with the urgency and nature of the issues at stake. If the negotiating representative is expected to be other than a mouthpiece and a reporter for his government, he must have at all times a clear idea of the hierarchy of political objectives for which the negotiations are taking place.

Adm. Turner Joy's comment based on bitter experience is pertinent:

... Thus the political objectives of the United States in Korea weather-vaned with the winds of combat, accommodating themselves to current military events rather than constituting the goal to be reached through military operations. Consequently, the delegation and indeed General Ridgway, never knew when a new directive would emanate from Washington to alter our basic objective of obtaining an honorable and stable armistice agreement. In such circumstances it is most difficult to develop sound plans, to present one's case convincingly, to give an appearance of unmistakable firmness and finality. It seemed to us that the United States Government did not know exactly what its political objectives in Korea were or should be. As a result, the United Nations Command delegation was constantly looking over its shoulder, fearing a new directive from afar which would require action inconsistent with that currently being taken.^{1 5}

Even after a peace agreement has been signed, its effectiveness is dependent on many variable factors that are so interrelated that it is difficult to distinguish cause from effect. All of them are related to the general world political economic environment of which the stability of the peace agreement itself is a component.

Among these factors are the perception of national interests; the perception of equity and justice; the perception of available military power, its readiness and effectiveness; the perception of the strength and effectiveness of peacekeeping forces; the perception of the power and influence of international forces and organizations; the government's control of its own people, i.e., its state of political unity and the power of dissident or rebellious elements;^{1 6} the attitudes and degree of support of friendly or sponsoring states; the disruptive actions of third-party governments or paramilitary organizations using terrorism and blackmail for their own purposes.

In recent years settlement procedures have followed a general pattern of: cease-fire in place; negotiations for partial withdrawal; stabilization and formal cease-fire; negotiations for an armistice; and, finally, a conference for a formal treaty of peace. The establishment of neutral or demilitarized zones with the provision for neutral or international supervision is an important part of most settlements. In some instances the negotiations are directly between the adversaries; in others a mediator is used. In all cases the press releases, the news conferences, and the public statements of officials must be carefully calculated—not only to inform the public sufficiently to maintain support, but also to forestall domestic opposition and maintain an atmosphere of conciliation.

In many situations, however, silence is golden! The public's right to know must be subordinated to the public's right to responsible diplomacy and responsible negotiations. The public, the diplomat, and the executive need courage, wisdom, and poise to balance intuitively the conflicting forces, to withstand the pressure of demagogues and public clamor, to serve the long-range interests of the state.

By some sort of curious transformation, public opinion as it develops and is expressed by the media and in the continuous partisan struggle to control the government frequently seems to threaten, or at least make more difficult, the attainment of the political objective for which hostilities were undertaken. If the welfare of prisoners or other hostages becomes more important than the political objective, then it seems obvious that hostilities should not have been initiated at all.

The high emotional content of public opinion not only makes it a poor guide for operational planning, but also may hamper the conclusion of a peace, even when it becomes clear that no further political gain can be achieved by a continuation of fighting. A strong authoritarian government that controls public opinion and exercises a high degree of social-political discipline on its people can act effectively to conclude a war as well as to initiate one.

Just as human conflict is a continuum ranging from absolute peace to unlimited total war, so too the conclusion of peace is a continuum ranging from unconditional surrender of one party to the unconditional surrender of the other. The absolute "solution," unconditional surrender of either party will probably be rare, particularly among major powers.

Thus one should consider the entire process of peacemaking as an inherent part of the overall conflict continuum. This seems to be part of the basic Leninist-Maoist concept of strategy as it is

practiced today both by sovereign nations and the strong revolutionary guerrilla organizations, sometimes called "nonstate nations." In the Korean and Vietnam negotiations, the Communists used many elements of power with great skill and tenacity to achieve their political purposes.

The conclusion of an enduring peace agreement is not only a great act of statesmanship, but also the culmination of events wherein the fundamentals of strategy as control are fulfilled. A successful peace exemplifies control of the field of action, control of the use of power, control of the sources of power. The peace agreement is the test of the basic assumptions, the analysis of objectives, and the fulfillment of expectations.

In other words, strategic theory comes full circle in the peace agreement: this is the ideal of rational political military thought. The test of rationality, however, is in the endurance of the agreement. This is seldom ideal, for each element of the strategic process is a fallible human element, imperfect, frequently contradictory, beset by chance and luck, and always challenging. When man sets out to use force to accomplish his objectives, he is challenging fate. Fate and hubris were the facets of man dramatized by the ancient Greeks in their tragedies.

Conclusion. The essence of good military-media relations lies in the intangible qualities of good faith, integrity, confidence, credibility, professional competence, and mutual responsibility. These eternal verities are sometimes scornfully thrust aside as being trite; nevertheless, they form an interlocking, regenerative complex that, in fact, provides the intellectual foundation on which our concept of a free society is based. At the same time, they provide the intellectual-spiritual foundation of the exercise of command in battle and in war as a whole.

Any attempt to provide an organizational or legal substitute for these characteristics will lead us down a blind alley of self-deception into ultimate frustration. Obviously, our expectations for attaining perfection in these intangible attributes must be modest; but, at the same time, we should realize that the greatest handicap to military-media mutual respect and understanding lies in the deficiencies that have existed in these areas. Similarly, the greatest handicap to the development of a combat-effective economical system of national defense also lies in the deficiencies in the same areas among military and civilians exercising authority throughout the chain of command—the Department of Defense and the Congress. Thus speaks the voice

of idealism which is, at the same time, the best foundation for realism.

It is beside the point to dwell on the undisputed fact that these imperfect people are representative of our society. The significant point is that our leaders, our commanders, our executives and managers must be superior in these qualities in addition to being able operators. Similarly, because we have a free media and because such a free media is an essential safeguard for our liberties, we must demand a superior sense of informed responsibility in the exercise of that freedom. Finally, civilian-military relations, the media and public opinion, truly resemble a kaleidoscope—with each turn of the viewing glass, the patterns of color change. They change, too, as one's own perceptions and cognition change.

On the assumption that he cannot serve the state if he is not reelected, the politician may cultivate an image and promote projects solely for the material welfare of his constituents and area with a blatant disregard for the long-range overall welfare of the nation.

The military professional, feeling in his pride and ambition that he is fitted for the highest command and that the nation will benefit thereby, may bit by bit cultivate the sources of personal power, and seek to create an image of excellence, even at the expense of compromising his integrity, sometimes in small but subtle ways.

Turn the glass and you see thousands of good citizens, civilian and military, honest, dedicated, self-sacrificing, struggling with the contradictions of human conflict, striving to be brave, decent, and just in paradoxical circumstances.

Turn the glass again and you see human nature at its best and at its worst simultaneously as the forces within individuals and in the society contend for supremacy, the balance of good and evil, success and failure, frustration and fulfillment, varying with the times.

Turn the glass again and there is a pattern of devilish humor as mankind struggles with fate in a cold material universe.

Turn it again, hold it steady, gaze intently, and there is a pattern of eventual human progress—based on good faith, but with the everlasting warning: "Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that also shall he reap."¹⁷

Finally, it takes the steady hand of disciplined thought to recognize the contradictions inherent in the facts of life, their implications and the harmful consequences of seeing them from only one point of view.

CHAPTER IX

MILITARY LAW, JUSTICE, AND DISCIPLINE

Background of Cultural Change. In a free society, matters of law, justice, and discipline in the military forces are first, closely intertwined; second, to a large degree dependent on the society's culture; and third, vitally important to military readiness and combat effectiveness. I therefore will again discuss cultural change and offer some generalized statements related to military fundamentals with specific illustrations from recent events, particularly the Vietnam war.

With the tremendous development of electronic communications and transportation throughout the world, the people of all nations are subject to the same interrelated and interacting forces of social and economic change that affect their perceptions and values.¹ These forces, varying greatly in strength from state to state, form such contradictory currents and countercurrents, eddies and whirlpools in the economic, social, and political systems that it is difficult to distinguish between cause and effect, permanent and transient, constructive and destructive. This spirit of change is a massive cultural phenomenon expressing itself largely in increased ethnic consciousness, in symbols of freedom, liberation, individual fulfillment, and individual choice. It is evident in all the arts, in education, and in politics.

This emphasis on liberation of thought and action has occurred at the same time as an extraordinary increase in violent crime and sadistic brutality, major prison revolts amidst charges of organized torture and an increase in local, national, and international terrorism. One countereffect is the rejection of all forms of violence and the dedication to the cause of world peace. Another countereffect is the great concern for the preservation of the natural environment, associated sometimes with the desire to lead a primitive life.

An increased spirit of nationalism accompanied the breakdown of the colonial empires of the early 20th century and the great increase of membership in the United Nations. Paradoxically,

concurrent with the increase in nationalism in newly formed or developing states, there has been a denigration of the virtues of patriotism among the youth of developed nations.

There also is a countercurrent of dedication to a revolution with emphasis on submission to the authority of the leaders of one's own group. In some respects, this is similar to the doctrine of discipline developed by Lenin in his years of exile in which the purge of intellectual dissidents in his own party was essential to the success of his cause.

The term "life style" has come into use with many special connotations among various groups. It frequently implies contempt for all forms of authority, for "The Puritan Ethic," and for "respectability." Part of the style is to accept the language and values of the ghetto, for example, to call theft a "rip-off" and by such semantic change, cloak it in "peer group" respectability. Part of this life style has been to disparage the concept of discipline throughout the society and especially in the armed forces. Part of this life style has been to oppose high recruitment standards for the armed forces on the ground that it constitutes undemocratic elitism.

Obviously, an effective military system cannot be built on a contradictory set of concepts and values, and yet it must to a high degree reflect the basic culture. This can be done effectively only through understanding law, justice, and two types of discipline: disciplined thought based on an understanding of military theory and principle,² and disciplined conduct based primarily on concepts of professionalism and the integrity of command.

Military Law and Justice. From the military point of view, command/management is a continuum of executive authority which, within the limits and in the manner prescribed by law, creates, supports, and employs military forces. From this view, law itself should be seen as an interlocking body of national and international law that forms a conglomerate of specific legislation, common law, precedent and judicial decisions, and treaties. This is further amplified by a great variety of regulations and official rulings of various bodies legally established by the legislature and executive authority. Law is not self-enforcing. It always requires a sanction that may vary from the use of force, or its threat, to the more basic personal sanctions of conscience and self-discipline.

From the standpoint of national policy and strategy, it is essential to understand that law makes possible the use of power for constructive human purposes. Therefore, unless there is a

widespread understanding of law, and its relation to authority, sovereignty, justice, and human dignity, it is not likely that a free society will endure. This, however, should not delude us that law itself is sufficient. Law is imperfect, laws frequently are contradictory, the interpretation of law varies enormously, laws change and public opinion frequently forces changes in laws.

Furthermore, law is frequently changed by the use of power, coercive force, which at the time of its use may be a violation of existing law. In other words, illegitimate force may legitimate itself by being successful. For example, in an article discussing how terrorists have been successful in achieving political goals in Israel, Kenya, Algeria, Mexico, and Cyprus, Gerald Clarke comments: "Terrorism is universally repugnant to standards of human decency, but in the past 25 years sadly enough, it has been essential to the birth of many of the world's now sovereign nations."³

From the point of view of the military professional, law can be seen as national and international. At present, international law⁴ applies to the following specific problems of professional interest:

The laws of war.

The navigation of the high seas and the narrow seas.

The exploration and development of ocean resources, i.e., fisheries, mineral recovery, environmental protection.

Regulation of commerce and shipping and air transport.

Weather prediction and modification.

National sovereignty and military reconnaissance, including military base rights and overflight rights.

Protection of national citizens in other countries.

The conduct of diplomacy.

Arms control and limitation.

The formation and operation of alliances.

In the United States the basic law that establishes the form of government under which we live is the U.S. Constitution. For the purposes of this discussion, national law includes the general and special laws that govern the recruitment, education, training, maintenance, medical care, pay, discharge and retirement of military personnel, particularly the Unified Code of Military Justice. The general and special laws that govern the procurement process and the general creation and operation of military installations and facilities.

The laws governing the Civil Service.

The major laws of states and cities in which military personnel operate.

The laws governing interstate commerce, transportation, communication, and public health.

The laws governing the relations with foreign governments and foreign nations.

While most of this huge body is the province of legal specialists, military commanders and managers must themselves understand the basic nature and structure of law and those specific parts that affect their decisions. Generally, laws exist to provide for an orderly system of government under which the state or community can be maintained, and social and economic intercourse conducted; to protect the rights and foster the welfare of the people; and to provide a framework for the achievement of justice in these affairs of the people. However, justice and law are not synonymous. Justice, in the sense of the quality of being just, impartial, or fair, as the ideal of right action or righteousness, is one of the objectives for which law exists whereas law is a rule of conduct or action prescribed as binding and enforced by a controlling authority.

Throughout human history, the relations between law and justice have been argued: for instance, St. Paul's famous statement, "The letter killeth but the spirit giveth life."⁵

In a satirical vein, the Lord Chancellor in W.S. Gilbert's "Iolanthe" sings:

The Law is the true embodiment of everything that's excellent.

It has no manner of fault or flaw,
And I, my Lords, embody the Law.

Again, the law of diminishing returns operates inexorably. When laws, particularly technicalities and esoteric legalisms, proliferate, justice is hampered or else is totally defeated. The statement that justice delayed is justice denied has much truth.

While the complexity of law is a reflection of the complexity of modern society, it nevertheless is dangerous to rely too much upon law for the improvement of the human condition. Four consequences are likely: the fundamental cause of trouble will not be understood, hence not corrected; so much effort will be devoted to trivial matters that important ones will be ignored, delayed, or mishandled; the silly or unenforceable law will bring the whole concept of law into disrepute and will encourage the violation of good laws. Many such unenforceable laws will create enormous and frequently corrupt bureaucracies that in themselves will undermine the foundation of the state. The tragic American experience with the prohibition of

alcoholic beverages, the Eighteenth Amendment, is a monument to such folly.

The greater the number and detail of laws and regulations, the more readily they can be exploited for ulterior or unworthy purposes and the less likely will be the attainment of justice.⁶ It seems almost incredible that some legislators and crusaders continue to increase the volume and complexity of our laws with little or no regard for the cumulative effect both as to order and justice as well as to the cost of the ensuing administrative and judicial bureaucracy.⁷

The Uniform Code of Military Justice. In the United States the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), since revised, was first enacted by Congress on 5 May 1950, as a statutory unification of the separate codes of the Army and Navy first adopted by the Continental Congress in 1775 and thereafter modified by the 1806 Article of War for the Army, the 1800 Articles for Better Government of the Navy, and subsequent changes. Both the Army and Navy derived their original codes from British laws of the 17th century that, in turn, were based on ancient customs and Roman treatises.

The U.S. Constitutional Basis for the UCMJ is Article 1, section 8, "The Congress shall have power . . . to make rules for the government and regulations of the land and Naval Forces." The right of the military to administer such a special code has been challenged. For example, Mr. Charles Morgan, Southern Regional Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, addressing a predominantly military audience at a panel discussion of the Federal Bar Association in Washington on 16 September 1970, said in part:

Now, I take the position flatly that you gentlemen should be deprived of your jobs, as they now exist. I favor the complete removal of the right to try anyone in the military. I take the position . . . that men should be granted civilian trials and every protection that's accorded under the Constitution. They should be tried under Federal laws that are standard for the community as a whole with the exception of certain kinds of offenses that are peculiarly military. They then should be tried in civilian courts for those crimes. . . .⁸

The concept of special military law has been strongly defended. For instance, Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., has written:

The basic reasons for the existence of a separate system of military justice may be summarized as (1) the need for swift and summary machinery for the maintenance of discipline; (2) the fact that the adjudication of military crimes may require military expertise by the court; and (3) the fact that the armed forces may be stationed abroad, outside the jurisdiction of their country's civil courts. . . .⁹

But, more importantly: on 19 June 1974 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld 5 to 3 the conviction of Capt. Howard B. Levy, USA, for urging black soldiers to refuse to go to or fight in Vietnam and in so doing affirmed the constitutionality of the "general articles" of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice. In so doing the Court stated that it "recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society . . . [arising] from the fact that it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight" ¹⁰ The essence of military leadership, morale and discipline is found more in the sense of justice with which the command operates than in the formal legal procedures. Thus, we are dealing with the intangible, the intuitive.

It is important to recall Sir John Hackett's statement on professionalism quoted in Chapter VII: "It is the unlimited liability which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian." ¹¹

Thus the commission of an officer and the oath of office are not mere administrative formalities; they represent a special obligation and a special personal commitment.

Know ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities of____, This officer will carefully and diligently discharge the duties of the office to which appointed by doing and performing all manner of things thereunto belonging.

And this officer is to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time as may be given by me or the future President of the United States of America or other Superior Officers acting in accordance with the laws of the United States of America.

Having been appointed an Officer in the Army of the United States . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter: SO HELP ME GOD.

A military justice system exists primarily to maintain and support the military discipline of the armed forces in order that they may effectively support the security and interests of the nation/state. The military justice system also has the purpose of ensuring that the armed forces conduct their affairs in a manner consonant with the laws of the nation and with due regard for the rights of their members as citizens of the nation. The military justice system not only has a distinctive purpose, but also operates in a distinctive environment.

Nevertheless, because a military man is obliged to abide by civil law as well as military law, we should see the civil justice and military justice system as they blend and complement each other and accommodate our thinking to the necessity for them working together under overall civilian control. Only then can we avoid bogging down in the many arguments regarding the faults and virtues of the differing elements in our complex society.

As pointed out by Robert Sherrill and other critics,^{1 2} there have been serious misuses of command authority in the operation of the U.S. military disciplinary system. But these have not been the fault of the concept and system of military justice. One of the most notorious was the highly publicized Presidio mutiny case of 1969. Fred Gardner reveals the sordid details of the brutality that developed in the overcrowded stockade at the U.S. Army Post, The Presidio, in San Francisco in 1968 and the subsequent court-martial of 27 inmates for mutiny.^{1 3} These misuses have been caused by faults in the exercise of command in two major areas. First, faults in the integrity of command. This has been discussed elsewhere in this work and includes but transcends matters of justice. Second, the general failure of senior officials, both military, civilian, and of legislators, to understand how the inexorable operation of the logistic snowball excessively loads the military justice system and inevitably allows many incompetent or badly educated officers to assume position of responsibility and power. This eventually produces failures in the command

supervision of both operational and administrative military activities. These factors are aggravated when there is a sudden major increase in the scale of activity and particularly when major combat action takes place under conditions in which there is a lack of national conceptual unity.

Both factors appeared in the U.S. Armed Forces from 1963 to 1971, and it is not surprising that the system of military justice itself came under attack. Under no circumstances would justice in the Military Establishment be improved by abolishing the system of military justice and placing the military wholly under the U.S. system of civilian justice. This civilian system has become bogged down by a notoriously bad and self-defeating penal system, by too many unenforceable laws, by overcrowded courts, and by "pettifogging" lawyers who defeat justice by exploiting the intricate mass of nonsubstantive legal technicalities introduced in the vain search for legal perfection.^{1 4}

The Effect of Vietnam. Beginning in 1965 and as an integral part of cultural turmoil and also as part of the overall concern for civil rights, there has been a concerted drive to emphasize the civil rights of the members of the U.S. Armed Forces.^{1 5} It was a part of the organized protests of the Vietnam war that culminated in the disintegration of the U.S. Army morale and discipline and lengthy and painful withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Vietnam.

Various well-organized and loosely coordinated groups who objected to U.S. policy and operations in Southeast Asia set out to change this policy and stop these operations by taking mutually supporting actions. While the full analysis and evaluation of the worldwide Vietnam protest movement is far beyond the scope of this work, several parts are well-known and very pertinent. Two specific actions of the movement were:

Deliberate attacks on the discipline of the armed forces, encouraging dissent, disobedience and sabotage. It took specific form in the establishment of GI coffeeshops, underground newspapers that advocated desertion, and training in methods of obstructing discipline and evading the draft.

Exploitation of all techniques of delay and appeal in the system of military justice, including attacks on the constitutionality of the basic laws and on the jurisdiction and regulations of the services. Appendix C includes a further discussion of these matters.

The situation and the motivation of these various groups were greatly complicated by major differences of opinion in responsible

quarters regarding the specific interests of the United States. The senior military professionals themselves differed widely in their appraisals of the problem. The civilian officials of the U.S. Government differed, as did the leaders of various honest and loyal political, social, and intellectual groups. Thus, there was no sense of conceptual unity in the nation. The refusal of President Johnson to declare a national emergency and impose an equal burden on all classes of society and, in particular, the scandalous manner in which the administration of the draft placed the greatest burden on the uneducated and disadvantaged had two major effects:

They provided a legitimate sense of injustice which attracted support for protest.

They filled the colleges with a large number of young men whose subconscious feelings of guilt at evading the draft combined with their legitimate indignation at the inept conduct of affairs to create an unprecedented condition of chaos.

As a consequence, in the name of peace, many protesters encouraged a spirit of civil dissent and personal violence which they could not at times control; in the name of freedom they rejected academic freedom in the colleges.¹⁶ This was further aggravated by the racial tension of that era and the experimentation with and addiction to drugs and narcotics. For the purposes of this phase of the discussion, the question of the degree to which this protest movement may have been stimulated, financed, or exploited by any foreign nation or conspiratorial group is wholly irrelevant. The chief relevant points are:

The combination of these factors put an enormous burden on the military justice and discipline systems.

Once again it was shown that when sound fundamental principles are violated, the harmful consequences are inevitable and at times incalculable.

One of the most dramatic and far-reaching examples of the violation of fundamentals was the My Lai Massacre of March 1968.

My Lai and the Court Martial of Lt. William Calley. The U.S. Army operations in the village of Songmy, South Vietnam on 16 March 1968 resulting in the mass killing of several hundred Vietnamese civilians at My Lai, and the subsequent investigations and courts-martial illustrate many of the factors and interrelations discussed herein.

The massacre itself had two fundamental causes: misunderstanding the nature of the war itself and incompetence and

mismanagement in the exercise of command. The extensive coverup of the incident by the Army chain of command in Vietnam was the result of corruption of the integrity of command. This not only has moral implications, but also shows the same kind of intellectual decay and self-deception that later was so tragically exhibited in the Watergate scandal that wracked the Nixon Presidency.

Regardless of how one perceives the extensively documented details of this affair,¹⁷ it constitutes a practical illustration of: first, the interrelation of command, law, justice, and discipline; second, the far-reaching harmful effects of the logistic snowball; and finally, the importance of the interaction of the military, the media, and public opinion in the development and use of military power in a free society.

The major facts of the incident and the coverup were brought out in Chapter XII, "Findings and Recommendations," of the summary volume of the Department of the Army review of the preliminary investigation into the My Lai incident.¹⁸ These facts as stated in the review were confirmed and amplified by the participants in the operation when they testified in the court-martial of 1971 of Lieutenant Calley and Captain Medina.

A poorly educated, poorly qualified junior officer, 1st Lt. William L. Calley, was in command of a mediocre Army platoon, itself part of a larger group that was later characterized by the Army investigation as inadequately trained, indoctrinated, and disciplined.¹⁹ His platoon made an attack on a village that had previously been reported as harboring Vietcong. The attack had been planned to kill every living creature and was carried out without any opposition whatever. The inhabitants were herded into ditches and slaughtered mercilessly. The report of the operation stated that 128 *enemy* had been killed, whereas in fact only civilians had died.

The report of the Department of the Army investigation: "... shows that scores of officers, many of them high ranking, learned of the extent of the atrocity within days or weeks but did nothing."²⁰

On 29 March 1969 Ronald Ridenhour, a Vietnam veteran wrote to President Nixon, the Secretary of Defense and 23 Congressmen, charging that a massacre had taken place at My Lai. On 24 November 1969 Lieutenant Calley was charged with murder, and Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, USA, was directed to study the nature and scope of the original investigation by Colonel Henderson that was itself a coverup. On 18 March 1970, as a result of General

Peers' report, the U.S. Army accused 14 officers, including the Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, of involvement in the suppression of information of the Songmy-My Lai incident.^{2 1}

As an illustration of the contradictions and paradoxes of the free society, it is important to note the contrasts in the reaction of the American public during and subsequent to the trials of Calley and Medina. This was a mixture of righteous indignation that such mindless savagery could take place in the U.S. Army and a pseudo-patriotic defense, particularly of Calley, as a good soldier being punished for "killing the enemy."

In sharp contrast is the somber appraisal of a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, who wrote:

... Not before in my lifetime—and I was born into the army in the nineteenth century—has the Army's public image suffered so many grievous blows and fallen to such low esteem in such wide areas of our society.

This is of national relevance, though it portrays but one of many manifestations of the spiritual malaise presently pervading all levels of our people, and for the first time, to my knowledge, all armed forces ranks.

The degeneration of the Army's Sergeant Major, his indictment, and that of several other senior non-commissioned officers by a Federal Grand Jury on charges of embezzlement of N.C.O. club funds overseas; the award of battlefield decorations for acts never performed; the pending charges against the former Provost Marshal General of the Army; and most damaging of all, the Mylai court-martial, are grievous blows.^{2 2}

The incident and the subsequent coverup were brought to public attention in November 1969 by the investigative reporting of Seymour Hersh of *The New York Times* who was awarded a Pulitzer prize for this work.

On 29 March 1971, at Fort Benning, Georgia, a military jury convicted Lieutenant Calley of the premeditated murder of not fewer than 22 Vietnamese civilians at My Lai on 16 March 1968. The military court sentenced him "to be confined at hard labor for the rest of your natural life: to be dismissed from the Service: to forfeit all pay and allowances." This sentence was reduced by the Convening Authority to dismissal and confinement at hard labor for 20 years.^{2 3}

The public concern and controversy were increased when on 1 April President Nixon ordered that Lieutenant Calley not be sent to Fort Leavenworth for confinement, but instead be released from the stockade at Fort Benning and returned under house arrest to his apartment on the base. A few days later the President, even though he was not required by law to take any action, again intervened by stating that he would personally review the whole matter.^{2 4}

This action prompted the prosecutor in the case, Capt. Aubrey M. Daniel III, U.S. Army, to take the extraordinary action of writing to President Nixon and releasing to the press a letter of protest which included such statements as:

The trial of Lieutenant Calley was conducted in the finest tradition of our legal system. It was in every respect a fair trial in which every legal right of Lieutenant Calley was fully protected. It clearly demonstrated that the military justice system which has previously been the subject of much criticism was a fair system. Throughout the trial, the entire system was under the constant scrutiny of the mass media and the public, and the trial of Lieutenant Calley was also in a very real sense the trial of the military judicial system. However, there was never an attack lodged by any member of the media concerning the fairness of the trial. There could be no such allegation justifiably made. . . .

These six men who had served their country well, were called upon again to serve their nation as jurors and to sit in judgment of Lieutenant Calley as prescribed by law.

From the time they took their oaths until they rendered their decision, they performed their duties in the very finest tradition of the American legal system. If ever a jury followed the letter of the law in applying it to the evidence presented, they did. They are indeed a credit to our system of justice and to the officer corps of the United States Army

But how much more appalling it is to see so many of the political leaders of the nation who have failed to see the moral issue or, having seen it, to compromise it for political motive in the face of apparent public displeasure with the verdict.

Your intervention has, in my opinion, damaged the military judicial system and lessened any respect it may have gained as a result of the proceedings.

You have subjected a judicial system of this country to the criticism that it is subject to political influence, when it is a fundamental precept of our judicial system that the legal processes of this country must be kept free from any outside influences

That action was taken, but the greatest tragedy of all will be if political expediency dictates the compromise of such a fundamental moral principle as the inherent unlawfulness of the murder of innocent persons, making the action and the courage of six honorable men who served their country so well meaningless.^{2 5}

It would add nothing to this work to go into the further details of the other courts-martial and disciplinary actions concerning the other men involved in this complex case. The essence is in the case of Calley. Even here it is not useful to describe all the actions of civil and military courts. It is enough to note that on 25 September 1974 Judge Robert Elliot of the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Georgia reversed the verdict of guilt in the case of Lieutenant Calley on the grounds that he was denied a fair trial because of the inability of the military justice system to limit or cope with the massive pretrial publicity; damaging public remarks by highest civilian and military officials; the refusal of the Department of Justice to enforce the military judges' orders attempting to limit comment by those involved in the case; and the denial by the U.S. House of Representatives of access to testimony before that House.

As a consequence, Lieutenant Calley was set free on 19 November 1974, after serving less than one-third of his prison term.^{2 6} The case for the time being seems closed;^{2 7} however, the background deserves consideration.

Col. William F. Long, Jr., USA, has pointed out a fundamental aspect of this tragedy. In a paper "My Lai—A Matter of Nerves and Muscle": he wrote:

My Lai had to happen. It was inevitable.

My Lai is what the Vietnam War is all about. It is the generic name for the folly of attempting to substitute combat

muscle for the nerves of control in a revolutionary war. It is the ultimate emotional wound for the failure to understand the nature of the conflict. Saddest of all, if the interest in My Lai is confined to the court-martial of Lieutenant Calley, the domestic cross currents of racism, anti-authoritarianism and political opportunism may forever obscure the real significance of this event.

Modern revolutionary warfare is a set of techniques aimed at destroying the nerves of government. Starting at the lowest level, people who function as the nerves of government (village mayors, schoolteachers, tax collectors) are systematically terrorized, murdered, corrupted, or co-opted Frequently, minuscule existing legitimate governmental functions and functionaries are permitted to continue to operate in order to mask the situation and delay governmental response.

When the legitimate government finally does respond, the stage is carefully set to facilitate the misuse of muscle. The goal of the skilled revolutionary is to trigger a mindless over-reaction. Deliberate stimulations are arranged to tempt excesses against the general populace, which is usually innocent of anything other than being controlled by new masters. When these excesses occur, they are exploited. The revolutionary says, "See, the government (Saigon, French, U.S. Imperialists, etc.) despise you and their soldiers behave like beasts. We are your only friends." Hate and the human desire for personal revenge make it so.

The revolutionaries will never stand and fight to protect the people they control. They run away and preserve themselves as the nerves of control, while their opponents exercise their muscle against the people—in keeping with the revolutionary plan. But let a wise and capable low level leader try to install himself in a My Lai to bring honest, considerate contact between the existing government and the people and the revolutionaries will not rest until he is murdered, preferably in a terrible public way for maximum effect. The nerves of government, once severed, are not permitted to re-knit. Or let a My Lai attempt to become a village independent of revolutionary terrorists by developing their own defenses in a courageous way and it will be ruthlessly

destroyed by superior revolutionary forces. The history of the war is replete with examples, and no one on either side denies that this is true.

In the Indochina War there were numerous My Lais. The French were goaded and maneuvered into attacking villages which might otherwise have welcomed their presence. This is an easy matter to arrange. A few casualties inflicted on an advancing column by revolutionaries located in the village would result in countermeasures destructive to the villagers, but frequently not touching the revolutionaries. In one celebrated case, the road to the village was lined with stakes upon which the severed heads of Frenchmen were impaled. Needless to say, the legionnaires wreaked havoc upon the village. Predictably, until that time, the village had been neutral, or even pro-French.

When the United States entered the war on the side of the South Vietnamese government, it brought enormous resources into the struggle. But, great as were these muscles of war and economic development, they were not—could not be—the nerves of government necessary to regain control of the people

The wonder is not that there was a My Lai, but rather that it took so long to happen

My Lai is the real war; Hamburger Hill, Khe San and even the Tet Offensive are simply military maneuvers peripheral to control of the people.

My Lai by some name will result whenever men of muscle are goaded beyond endurance by calculating men of nerves.

The victims of My Lai are more than the pitiful pawns and controlled people of My Lai killed on that sad day. Add to the list Lieutenant Calley, the United States Army and even the American people. For lacking understanding of the situation we were sucked into, we are sentenced to suffer.

In a war of nerves we could only supply muscle.^{2 8}

With the foregoing in mind, we can gain a better perspective. A mediocre, poorly trained and indoctrinated military unit fell into a

typical revolutionary guerrilla psychological trap of provocation to savage action against rural civilians who themselves were caught up in the confusion of guerrilla warfare. The massacre was bad enough, but it was made worse by the manner in which officers in the chain of command were so bemused by their personal ambitions or the supposed need to protect a public image of organizational excellence that they belittled, ignored, or falsified the evidence.

The manner in which so many Americans sympathized with Calley and some of the others involved shows first that they felt a few juniors were being punished for the sins of their superiors in command and, second, that the American public did not understand the nature of the Vietnam conflict. Few, indeed, in the Army and among the politicians and the people have recognized that such revolutionary guerrilla warfare requires both a very highly disciplined *small* military force and a sense of discipline in the people opposing such warfare.

Standards of Performance, Leadership, and Discipline. This brings us to the question: How do these matters influence the ability of a free society to use military power to protect its freedom?

The institutionalism and civilianizing of command, the great and necessary concern with technology and with industrial and business management and the implied important functions of supporting the social welfare programs of the society, vastly complicate procurement, routine administration, and military justice. As previously noted, the increased level of tactical defeat that is politically acceptable has placed an extra burden on the commander to maintain combat effectiveness in conditions of grave adversity.

The law of diminishing returns operates in the application of the sound principle of civilian control of the military system. If this control extends too far or if it is unwisely exercised, the effectiveness of the military system will be greatly decreased and its cost unnecessarily increased.

If a society is to remain free, it must tolerate vast diversity in its people, their ideas, and their practices. Furthermore, it must accommodate a great variety of standards of performance and support many shiftless, incompetent, and, at times, wicked people. If a society is to remain free and, at the same time, the nation is to take an active part in the exercise of world power, its armed forces

must have a standard of competence, performance and ethics far superior to that relatively low level that the society tolerates within its general population.

Here we find an important paradox. Some groups in the United States are urging a great "democratization" of the military and a greater civilianization of the Code of Military Justice. Other groups of equal or better credentials, however, are decrying the fact that the U.S. courts and judicial system are so cluttered by appeals based on technical trivia and legalistic delays that justice is greatly delayed and frequently totally defeated. Judge Fleming comments:

... But today's dominant legal theorists, impatient with selective goals, with limited objectives, and with human fallibility, have embarked on a quest for perfection in all aspects of the social order, and, in particular, perfection in legal procedure

But in the field of criminal law, where the impact of this phenomenon has been greatest and where the concept of effective procedure has been almost completely displaced by the ideal of perfect procedure, the consequences have been disastrous.

What has occurred during the past twenty years is that the legal theorists in their zeal for perfection in procedure have become prisoners of their own concepts, and in their preoccupation with techniques they have lost sight of the ultimate objectives of a legal system. This Holy Grail of perfectibility has been sought before, and with equally disastrous results

Yet the dilatory course of criminal proceedings is scandalous. The scandal lies not merely in the handling of the celebrated case, but extends to disposition of the routine, run-of-the-mill case involving neither extraordinary issues of law nor fact²⁹

A professor of law with 30 years teaching experience writes:

Incompetent judges, far more than incompetent lawyers, are the weak element in the American legal system.

It is simply scandalous that so many judges, led by some of the best-advertised ones, so loudly and often excoriate the lawyers who try cases before them. Under our judicial system all but a few judges are successful political office-seekers primarily and lawyers only incidentally. Particularly in the lower (trial) courts the bench all too often is the refuge of the low-competent or incompetent lawyer who cannot cope in the competition of active practice.

Our system of political election or selection of judges contrasts badly with the European system. There, the selection process tends to develop the best law scholars for careers as judges. Our system tends to select the poorest ones, relatively speaking.

... It is interesting to speculate on how much of the breakdown in American law and order, in recent years, is attributable to the system of selection of the least qualified as the judges in our first-line trial courts.³⁰

The military justice system is operated by trained professionals. It is setting a high standard of performance that the civil courts can well emulate. In particular, trials are speedy, witnesses are made readily available, and the rights of defendants are scrupulously protected. Furthermore, the civilian penal systems, both national and state, are considered to be brutal, self-defeating, and almost totally ineffective in their rehabilitation function. With generally high crime rates, with much concern for loss of moral values and with widespread corruption in government and business, is it wise to take civilian behavior as a model for the military?

In 1974, the corrupt practices of high public U.S. officials, both elected and appointed, were a major topic of both the news media and private conversation. Many of the courts were occupied with the trials of public officials. Many municipal police departments were conducting special investigations into illegal behavior of their officers. Legislators, judges and municipal officials in the metropolitan area of New York were being tried and convicted of charges of bribery at an unprecedented rate. The head of a major labor union was convicted of murdering a rival official. In a report on people and business, *The New York Times* quoted the head of a management consulting firm as stating that: "...kickbacks, bribes and conflicts of interest have become a dominant factor in

business." And that "employee dishonesty has reached an all-time high and is growing at the rate of 15 percent a year, . . . "3 1

Time magazine, reporting on police crime in the United States, cited widespread corruption in law-enforcement agencies, specifically in Chicago, Philadelphia, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Houston, Denver, and finally in New York, where in 2 years, four judges were among the 85 indictments obtained by a special prosecutor.^{3 1} In July 1974 Otto Kerner, a former Governor of Illinois and former Federal Judge, entered a Federal prison to serve a 3-year sentence after his conviction on charges of mail fraud, conspiracy, perjury, and income tax evasion.^{3 3}

According to *Time*, this situation seems to be an improvement over the situation in past decades. Nevertheless, while there is more concern and more investigation, police unions and legislators still oppose more funds to extend the fight against such official corruption. This pattern of corruption and ineptitude must be seen as a contrast or counterpoint to the basic decency of the majority of the people and the excellence of many of their institutions. Thus, decency and corruption, excellence and ineptitude, live together, exemplifying the great human diversity of the free society and forming the contradictory often confusing moral background of the civilian community from which the military forces are built and which they defend.

While human corruption has many aspects, one phase of intellectual corruption applies particularly to military leadership. Concepts of truth, accuracy and precision are not only the foundation of civilization but also essential to military leadership, discipline, and justice.

The moral, intellectual corruption that inevitably threatens all large and powerful organizations will never be subject to precise definition and cannot be controlled by laws and regulations, even though they may be both necessary and helpful. The control ultimately rests on ideals, the standards of personal integrity, and the intuitive judgment of individuals.

Military Leadership. It is appropriate to emphasize some central features of military leadership, features that are not dependent on laws, regulations or codes of ethics, but depend on more fundamental human characteristics.

Certain principles of leadership and discipline that have been recognized for many centuries have been forgotten or obscured by the rush of technology and by factors associated with the large size and rapid turnover of personnel in the armed forces since

World War II. While they tend to be neglected in the general literature, these fundamentals have been repeatedly expressed in service publications.^{3 4}

The first basic principle is that discipline, morale, leadership, and motivation are all so interwoven that one cannot be understood without understanding the others. Nevertheless, for purposes of detailed discussion they sometimes should be treated separately. The second is that the U.S. Armed Forces are created for a special purpose and operate in a unique environment that imposes on officers both special obligations for performance and certain restriction of their freedom of action in the exercise of leadership.

Associated with this is the fact that the armed forces and the national society interact: the armed forces inevitably reflecting and to some degree influencing the habits and mores of the society. Nevertheless, the military is not and cannot be a "democratic" organization in the sense that the so-called democratic process is popularly perceived today. Consequently, the administrative and judicial procedures, and the exercise of constitutional rights that may be appropriate in the civilian society cannot be automatically applied to the military system without substantially decreasing the effectiveness of the system and greatly increasing its cost.

Therefore, and most important, the standards of ethics, duty, performance, and justice must be higher in the military system than they are in civilian life. Those who tend to disparage the traditional military habits of personal order and discipline on the grounds that they are unnecessary harassment over trivia^{3 5} fail to realize that, in addition to stimulating self-respect and unit pride, these habits arose from the necessity to save life.

For example, aboard a ship at sea one cannot expect a sailor to be sloppy in his personal habits and careless in the wearing and stowage of his clothing and personal belongings and, at the same time, be careful and orderly in the use, stowage and cleanliness of the ship's equipment and working spaces. Many shipboard fires have been caused by the spontaneous combustion of oily rags carelessly left in the bilge of an engineering space. Many compartments have been flooded and many a boat has been sunk when the suction strainers of the bilge pumps have been clogged by rubbish that should have been cleaned up. Many a seaman has been injured or killed when the falls of a lifeboat were not coiled clear for running. In my own case, in the 1920s after acting as an observer on an exercise of a submarine, I left the ship thankfully,

having been shocked by the careless habits of the officers and ship's company. I was not altogether surprised when later this submarine was sunk in an accident in which only two men survived.

The price of safety is eternal vigilance; an old saying, but as true today as it ever was. Vigilance is a habit, not a controlled flow that can be turned on or off as the stream of a water faucet. Safety at sea is the culminative effect of discipline and attention to details.

In combat—on land, at sea, or in the air, under otherwise similar conditions—the unit with poor or mediocre discipline will suffer many times the casualties than will a unit with high discipline. This applies not only to the undisciplined unit but also to the disciplined units that are taking part in the same action.^{3 6} Nothing causes casualties to rise at an exponential rate more than poor discipline in combat. This is an incontrovertible fact well known to all military historians.

While the foregoing do not constitute all of the factors to be considered, they all are fundamental. They form an interwoven conceptual pattern that is an essential part of substantive military knowledge.

Effective military discipline is always a matter of command: it is produced by the character, the personality, and the competence of the commander of a military unit. It must always leave room for certain types of swift, decisive, and sometimes unorthodox corrective command action. This is why the study of command should not be confused or considered to be synonymous with the study of management. A further point is even more important. The employment of poorly disciplined armed forces will usually guarantee military disaster, perhaps on a catastrophic scale. Thus, the political purpose for which the armed forces are employed will not be achieved and, therefore, the entire effort devoted to the creation and support of those forces will have been wasted.

Certain basic human characteristics, generally shared by all people regardless of age, sex, or circumstances, affect how command should and must be exercised. While these characteristics are generally to be expected, individuals will vary greatly in the degree to which any particular one of them affects his behavior in a military environment. Every man wants to be treated and recognized as an individual. This means that he wants his name to be known and used. When his individuality is recognized, he usually is willing to sacrifice his own immediate personal interests for the sake of the larger interest of the group.

Conversely, when he is treated as a robot or merely as a number

without personality or personal identity, his interest in the success of the group, the organization, or the ship will be reduced. Continuation of anonymity may even lead to frustration and active opposition or rebellion. Given understanding leadership, most people want to be proud of their group and of their own work. This in turn implies and also derives from confidence and pride in their leadership. Thus the competence of the leader, of the commander, is an important element in the motivation of the men.

Part of the pride is confidence in their ability to do the hard job, to respond to challenge. Thus, the knowledge or belief that their work is easy or unimportant reduces morale. The feeling that it is important and difficult increases morale. Also implied are the elements of trust and loyalty—they trust their leader more when they know he trusts them. In other words, throughout the subject of motivation, we see a series of reciprocal factors and relationships.

Somewhere in every man there is a spark of creativity. This can be encouraged or inhibited by his working and living environment. It will be directed toward constructive or destructive ends by this same environment. In particular, the more he understands the purposes of his organization and identifies his interests with these purposes, the more this will be constructive.

The word discipline—properly understood—bears directly on this, and I repeat my previous statement: Discipline in its deepest sense means a sense of values, the knowledge of cause and effect, the willingness to make decisions and to accept personal responsibility for the results of such decisions. In this sense, the word discipline ultimately includes the understanding of the whole interacting complex of abstract terms—justice, law, order, power, and force. Such discipline is always relative, never absolute. It implies both enlightened self-interest and unselfishness. Discipline in this deeper sense is the foundation for the other forms of military discipline that have their practical application in the smart, effective performance of duty in the operating units.

If we understand these fundamental factors, then it becomes relatively easy to develop the various techniques of motivation. But all the techniques are useless and can be self-defeating if the men do not feel that there is a sense that officers and men share alike the needs and characteristics here mentioned. This is in fact the essence of loyalty—up and down.

Therefore, the senior enlisted men play a major part in the system of justice and discipline. If their authority and prestige are

diminished or if they are allowed to act with arrogance, the whole structure is damaged. Of course, in any large group there will be those who for one reason or another have formed habits of thought and behavior that disqualify them for military service. Extreme selfishness, habitual lying, vicious brutality, sheer stupid incompetence, and outright hatred of all forms of authority will still be found. Men with these characteristics must be eliminated through due legal process. Furthermore, it is almost self-evident that a rapid turnover of officer and enlisted personnel always diminishes the motivation of individuals, and the morale, discipline, and effectiveness of the organization.

In 1841 the Secretary of the Navy, Abel P. Upshur, summed up the essence of the matter as well as anyone before or since:

... He who finds it necessary to be always exerting his authority, lest those who are under him should forget that he possesses it, gives proof that he is deficient in that true dignity of character which impresses itself silently and without effort upon all who behold it.

This rule of conduct is still more important, with reference to the just claims of the subordinate officer. If his superior will not trust him, his inferior will not respect him. It is impossible to maintain a commander in the authority which properly belongs to him, when those under his immediate command are in the habit of seeing his orders unnecessarily superseded, his plans of discipline set aside, and his official conduct controlled and directed in matters to which he ought to be supposed perfectly competent. Wherever this state of things is found, a correct system of discipline cannot be established. Indeed, there can be no system at all, and no discipline, when rightful authority in the subordinate is thus checked and controlled. The young officer and the sailor soon learn to despise an authority which their commander himself has no assurance that he can maintain, and from which the transgressor is constantly encouraged to appeal. The surest means by which a commander-in-chief can strengthen his own authority is to strengthen that of the commanders under him. And this is due to the subordinate for another reason. His *competency* to command can never be tested if he be kept in a state of unnecessary pupillage, and he can never acquire that confidence in himself which is necessary in every commander, and which is best imparted by

throwing him, on all suitable occasions, upon his own resources.

The only safe rule of discipline is, to trust each man fully, in his own peculiar department of duty, holding him strictly responsible for a proper discharge of it

It is a prevailing error, in the commanders of all grades, to prescribe too many rules for the internal police of their commands. This inordinate love of *regulating* everything, even to minute trifles, is not always restrained by a proper respect for the laws of the country. The captain of a ship is not an autocrat, authorized to do what he pleases with his vessel and crew. His power is only so far absolute that no one under his command can question it; but it is limited by the law, and qualified by the very nature of his duties. He has a right to prescribe rules necessary to the good order and good government of his command, and within the usages of the sea service; but his right is to be exercised in good faith, when it is really necessary; and not capriciously, under the pretense of enforcing discipline

There is an inherent dignity in all lawful authority, judiciously exercised, which commands the ready respect of all mankind. The order of system and regularity and promptitude of true discipline are extremely beautiful; and such is the comfort which they confer that there are very few who feel the restraints they impose The military man should feel there is a positive dignity in his submission to authority, and should place his chief pride in his ready obedience to command. He should also feel respect for his superior, confidence in his justice, reliance upon his honor, and an assured hope in his skill, vigilance, and wisdom. The commander who can inspire these feelings is *worthy* of command. But he can never do this by acting as if he regarded himself as the only person in the squadron worthy of consideration. There is no necessity that the weight of his power should be constantly pressing upon those beneath him. On the contrary, it is his chief excellence so to impress his authority upon his inferiors, that they obey without feeling it. This is discipline truly worthy of the name ^{3 7}

Discipline and the Logistic Snowball. Good discipline reduces the need to apply the system of military justice. It prevents the

adversary situation so beloved by legal perfectionists and debaters. It is ridiculous to assume that even a theoretically perfect system of justice can be a substitute for competence and integrity in the exercise of command. The most one can expect is that the system of justice will partially compensate for the harm done by incompetence and bad faith.

On the other hand, the atmosphere of good discipline that is supported and enhanced by a good system of justice will both prevent and deter carelessness and overt misconduct that otherwise would bring the system of justice into play. The atmosphere of good discipline and its supportive system of justice works on the perceptions of the entire command to bring conceptual unity and positive action. When this has been well established by excellent top command and leadership, it will acquire a momentum that may enable the command to survive a short period of incompetence in its leadership without impairing its essential effectiveness.

In addition to the vital influence on combat action, good discipline based on high-quality personnel is the most important element in control of the logistic snowball. Discipline and quality of personnel are intertwined. The higher the quality of personnel and discipline the shorter need be the training periods, the better the health of the people and the less time lost for illness, the fewer the mistakes made in the operation and maintenance of expensive equipment, and the fewer the accidents that injure men. The less the requirement for expensive spare parts, the less the time and facilities needed for repair work, the less the administrative paperwork and the fewer clerks needed to perform. The fewer the violations of discipline that require the time of officers and the lost working time of offenders, the less the requirement for the use of the system of military justice and the fewer the personnel and administrative facilities needed to apply it.

As we look at these savings, we see only the tip of the iceberg, only part of the vast amount of unnecessary slush that overwhelms the hard core of essential combat support. All of these unnecessary personnel require housing, clothing, food, equipment, training, transportation, recreation, medical attention, hospitalization, induction, discharge, retirement pension, and eventually burial. Furthermore, because in our modern culture most military enlisted men are married, the time and money and support of all kinds spent on dependents becomes a significant factor.

With this snowball in mind, we can see that when the armed forces are intentionally used both as a form of rehabilitation for

delinquents and as a social educational corrective for the failure of the civilian society as was done with Secretary McNamara's "Project One Hundred Thousand," we are putting an intolerable burden on the system of military injustice.³⁸ And when we do so and at the same time grossly mishandle the higher direction of an unpopular war, we stimulate the growth of stupid and arbitrary disciplinary action, followed by senseless brutality in many of the correctional institutions.

It then becomes a case of regenerative institutional decay—the worst side of which was so graphically portrayed in Robert Sherrill's book *Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music*. The civilian society must solve its own social and economic problems and must not turn to the armed forces or in any way sacrifice the effectiveness of these forces by expecting them to reform, educate, and care for the misfits, delinquents, and criminals produced by the basic civilian society.

If the armed forces have high standards of induction, if they have a high standard of discipline, backed up by an effective system of military justice, then several important consequences can be expected. There will be little need for a large military penal system. The armed forces can be depended on for their prime function of defending the state. Men who return to civilian life after service in the armed forces will be better citizens for this service and will contribute to the social, economic, and political welfare of the nation.

With high standards, the military will be able to absorb, use, and mature many young people who have been troubled or bewildered by the pressures, difficulties, and unfairness of the world they live in and classed by sociologists as disadvantaged or borderline. *Thus, purely as a byproduct of their own excellence*, the armed forces can serve some of the social needs of the state. But this can happen only as a byproduct, not as an objective.

The Horns of Dilemma. The free society is always on the horns of the dilemma of subversion. Defense against subversion always has been and always will be a difficult and controversial matter in a free society whereas harsh arbitrary defensive measures are taken for granted in an authoritarian society.

On the one hand, when one overtly or subconsciously attributes to "conspiracy" every organized objection to one's actions or policies, the truth is obscured, necessary improvements are prevented, and the flow of constructive criticism is obstructed. On the other hand, to ignore the existence of organized, well-financed

efforts to destroy or hamper the discipline of the armed forces is a mark of naiveté.

In the last 20 to 75 years, the techniques of subversion and the overthrow of established governments have been thoroughly developed, widely published and carefully studied. The *Manual of the Urban Guerrilla* is only one of many books and pamphlets on this subject.³⁹

When viewed pragmatically from the perspective of continuing human conflict, subversion, like terrorism and other clandestine operations, is a prevalent and accepted tool of conflict, a form of power, used nationally and internationally to attain political purposes. These purposes and hence the methods and application of subversion will fluctuate according to circumstances.

Having in mind the previously discussed relationship between national strategy and national values, a free society cannot expect to use these weapons with the same degree of freedom as can an authoritarian society. However, they cannot be ignored; they are being used, they must be withstood.

Not all subversion is necessarily undertaken for the overthrow of a national government or for conquest. In the world power struggle, subversion of the military forces of another nation may be for the purpose of decreasing its world influence, decreasing its capability to use military power. In this instance, the immediate objective of the sponsors would be to make the military services unpopular, and to stimulate continuing harassment of the administration or the service. Thus, it would be logical to exploit every means of legal complication and appeal to higher authority in the operation of the Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, the creation of an adversary relation between the officers and enlisted personnel of the armed forces becomes an initial step in a program of subversion.

In the discussion on the desirability of establishing or legalizing the formation of labor unions in the armed forces of the United States, there has been little mention of the matter of recourse by the government should a strike take place. In the United States in recent years there have been many work stoppages, strikes or job actions by unionized government or municipal employees in fields in which the law specifically forbids such strikes.

As in the labor disputes in private industry, the government has legal recourse to the courts for action in such cases, and in fact the process of injunction frequently prevents or greatly shortens a strike or other job action. In some cases, union leaders have been imprisoned or otherwise punished by the courts for violation of an

injunction or other judicial process and large fines have been imposed upon the treasuries of the offending unions.

In private industry, a civil suit with monetary damages being imposed is one form of legal recourse available to an employer if a strike occurs in violation of a formal agreement. The military situation is unique. The government has no effective recourse in case of strike or job action by a military union. In time of crisis and even more in time of actual combat, the two elements of tactical timing and unquestioned reliability of the forces are each vital and vitally intertwined. No recourse, legal or otherwise, after a major defeat can in any way regain the lost ground (in its broadest sense), the lost time and the lost lives incurred by such defeat. Fines or imprisonment after the event are useless. Recourse to punitive or compensatory damages after a tactical defeat in combat is meaningless and useless because of the fundamental fact that no one can appraise the true cost of such tactical defeat.

Thus the issues posed by the advocacy of military unions transcend both in nature and magnitude the issues of industrial and routine government unionization. The criteria of the latter are irrelevant to the former.

Just as strategy itself is cumulative, the various measures proposed for the socialization and democratization of the armed forces, each of which has a plausible reason, have a cumulative effect on combat effectiveness. The overall result can be that enormous sums are spent to achieve military impotence together with an unsupportable foreign policy. This indeed would be tempting fate. As in some other political-military matters, the advocates of measures that affect the combat effectiveness of military forces seldom relate such advocacy to the ultimate consequence of the alternative presented.

The essential points are that the armed forces exist to safeguard the security of the state; an ineffective and unreliable armed force is a menace to this security rather than a safeguard; if cultural change makes unionization inevitable, we should immediately and drastically reduce the size of our armed forces to exercise limited police function only; and we should modify our national policy to conform to this reality. The final irony is that the same cultural change that stimulates the demand for military unions also stimulates world conflict of a kind that demands the quality and flexibility of military power and force that would be destroyed by unionization.

The foregoing brings into sharp focus the fundamental relations between the systems of law, justice, discipline, and command. This

is why the perceptive comments of Secretary Upshur are pertinent. This is why the whole chain of command and responsibility with loyalty up and down is vital. This is why the status, authority, and responsibility of the enlisted noncommissioned officer is so important. This is why we cannot tolerate the formation of labor unions in the armed forces.⁴⁰

Summary. In many instances the laws are designed to protect the people from the encroachments by their own government processes and officials. Large corporations have repeatedly used delaying tactics based on legal technicalities to obstruct actions brought by parties who could not afford the great cost of protracted litigation. In recent civil rights cases, defendants and their lawyers have successfully disrupted courtroom trials, thus impeding or destroying the process of justice.

The many and well-known techniques of obstruction are so extensively employed that substantive matters dealing with the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a criminal trial are frequently sidetracked and overwhelmed by a mass of attacks on the process of arrest, the constitutionality of the law, the jurisdiction of the court, and even the character of the judge. Even when the substantive issues are considered, various motions to delay proceedings may be made.

A code of justice can never be taken for granted. While it represents and expresses the law and while laws may restrain foolish or evil men in the exercise of power, no code of justice, no group of laws can be a substitute for the transcendent spirit of personal integrity. A code based on the implied assumption of continuing antagonism between officers and men—an assumption that their interests and loyalties are basically different will certainly detract from the effectiveness of the force. Thus, while the techniques of adversary debate may be essential to good courtroom procedure, the implication that there is a natural officer/enlisted adversary relation is unacceptable. The officer who uses his power with cruel self-interest should be eliminated if necessary by decisive command action.

When command authority is excessively centralized, when decisions are increasingly raised to the top, the ability of the subordinates to exercise good judgment is lost. The case of the capture of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* is a striking and tragic illustration. So, too, the sense of personal responsibility for justice is lost.

It is indeed ironical that the very measures of legal technique that are designed to protect the rights and liberties of the citizen

of the state can also be used to subvert the state. The more the Code of Military Justice provides for extensive delay and appeal on technical and legalistic grounds in the attempt to insure the attainment of the ideals of abstract justice, the more it attempts to divorce command from justice, the more it complicates legal procedures, the more this code of justice can be exploited by unscrupulous, subversive, or even by overly romantic purists to diminish the discipline and hence the combat effectiveness and reliability of the armed forces.

But even if an extreme insistence on legal technicalities is based on an ideal of pure justice, it nevertheless constitutes an emphasis of a secondary function at the expense of the primary function. We should bear in mind that if the primary function of the armed forces is to insure total and perfect justice for its members rather than to serve as an effective fighting arm of the state and nation, it would be better to abolish the armed forces and depend for national security on the good will and sense of justice of the peoples and governments of other nations.

Finally, the concept of military professionalism must include a superior sense of discipline and a sense of responsibility that includes the concept of sacrifice. When a man accepts an appointment or commission and takes the oath of office, he acknowledges that he is making a sacrifice. He is willing to sacrifice the lesser to accomplish the greater: his personal convenience, his comfort and his life, if necessary. The question of the civil rights of the officer or enlisted man of the armed services must be seen in this context.

Because some stupid, incompetent, or dishonorable men have become officers and sometimes have reached high rank and have handled discipline and military law with unreasonable and brutal disregard of justice, some people say that the standards of military discipline should be lowered. This is arrant nonsense. The answer is to improve the quality, the education, and the competence of all personnel, particularly the officer corps, cutting the size of the permanent armed forces to whatever may be so sustained regardless of how small that may be.

CHAPTER X

MARITIME POWER

The use of military power by the free society is inextricably bound up in the understanding and application of the fundamentals of maritime power. While the whole question has many complex ramifications, the understanding of a few simple fundamentals will enable one to deal with its complex and perhaps largely technical details.

Maritime power is one element of overall national power and of national strategy. Thus, the understanding of national power and of strategy is necessary to an understanding of maritime power and vice versa. Maritime power has various components, one of which is seapower. These components can be broken down into various elements and the relation of one element to the others can be described. Maritime power and seapower are based on an economic and logistic foundation and maritime power itself makes an enormous contribution to the same economic logistic foundation. Thus, maritime power, economics, and logistics are inextricably related, and none can be understood except in relation to the others.

Man is a land creature. He uses the sea to further his interests as a land creature. A nation's relation to the use of the sea rests upon its perception of the sea as a medium in which it must operate to further its land interests: water transportation has always been the chief means of economic intercourse among nations. The use of the sea for communication between distant peoples stimulated the spread and interaction of those new ideas that so often challenged the dogmas of authoritarianism. The sea has frequently furnished the essential linkage among allies in time of conflict.

Consequently, for 2,500 years maritime power has been a major factor in international affairs and strategy. The concept of the freedom of the seas and the ability to exercise and to exploit a high degree of control of the sea have been critical in the continuing struggle between nations, especially between the free and authoritarian societies.

The Mediterranean was the center of Western cultural, economic, and political development for about 2,000 years and its history is, in effect, the history of the practical development and use of maritime power. From about 1000 A.D., the Viking use of the northern seas and later the great Portuguese explorations, largely based on Prince Henry's formal teaching of navigation, opened up the Western Hemisphere and also established regular trade with Eastern Asia. The struggles for Empire in the 18th century culminated in the Napoleonic wars.

Nevertheless, until Mahan's grand historical analyses of the late 19th century, writers of military affairs had paid relatively little attention to the subject. Even so perceptive a writer as Clausewitz, experienced in the Napoleonic wars in which seapower was ultimately a major deciding factor, never discussed it. But in the early 20th century, with the work of Mahan, Corbett, the Colomb brothers, and Castex, the subject of seapower in its many meanings and applications became more prominent. In World Wars I and II maritime power in its fullest sense determined the final outcome. Today, the political, economic, and military interests of the United States and its allies are sustained by the use of the sea.

Environment and Humanity. Even more important than these obvious and immediate political, economic, military aspects of maritime affairs is the recognition of the vital symbiosis of the oceans, the atmosphere, and the thin layer of fertile topsoil that covers *part* of the land area of Earth. These three determine and dominate the survival of the human species.

Through their photosynthetic and thermal activity, the oceans largely create and dominate the composition and movement of the atmosphere and consequently the weather patterns and rainfall. The biological, chemical, and mineral resources of the oceans and of the ocean beds must be used wisely and their use controlled. The pollution and exploitation of the ocean must be controlled by international law enforced by some form of maritime power. The problems of territorial sovereignty regarding transportation, defense, and resources must be resolved. The maritime world thus becomes the major area both of confrontation and of cooperation between nations and blocs of nations, between freedom and authoritarianism.

Scientific research, national security, politics, economics, and eventually sociology are all bound up in the matters of maritime control, maritime law, and maritime power. Contemplation of these maritime affairs thus must take us back to the fundamental

concepts of freedom, of power, of military power, and of strategy discussed in the early chapters of this work.

Maritime Power and Seapower. William Reitzel's analysis of Mahan places maritime power and seapower in perspective.¹ In this, he brought out the following major points: When brought into being and kept in motion by national productivity, a system of maritime power exists. Maritime power is a comprehensive and complex system that, in addition to certain attributes of the system as a whole, contains the subsystems of seapower and its subsystem sea force (the Navy). Maritime power rests on a geographic location and productive society. Seapower is shipping and the Navy together with bases and their supporting adjuncts.

Maritime power, seapower and sea force all rest on institutional machinery and specialized industry. The institutional machinery consists of financing, insurance, exporters, importers, brokers; and the specialized industry includes shipbuilding, ship repair, cargo handling, all merging with the general economy. The control and use of sea movement is but one link in the chain by which wealth accumulates, but it is the central link. The capacity to move freely on the sea and to inhibit as need be a similar capacity in others is a critical consideration. Thus, maritime power is both the means to build and expand the nation and to protect the nation and its interests.

Maritime and Naval Strategy. Maritime strategy is a national strategy based on the full use of maritime power. Maritime power is indispensable to the attainment and employment of purposeful "Great Power." Seapower cannot be understood save as a component of maritime power, and thus naval strategy cannot stand alone. Therefore, from the strict analytical point of view, the term naval strategy can easily be a misnomer used for polemic purposes to enhance naval appropriations, the domestic political position of naval authorities, and to protect the Navy from the similar polemicists of the Air Force and Army. On the other hand, the understanding of the naval aspects of an overall maritime strategy and of the creation and wide employment of naval force is vitally important.

In somewhat different terms, one should strive to attain an intuitive appreciation of how a maritime power system behaves, how it can be expected to respond to the various disturbances induced by conflict, and how it can be expected to respond to the measures of control instituted by command and/or management.

Geoffrey Marcus' splendid book, *The Age of Nelson*,² which covers the British Navy from 1793 to 1815, gives many examples of the nature and employment of maritime power. In particular he shows the coherent relationship between maritime power, sea-power, and sea force, and the interaction with economics and strategy wherein the exploitation of the resources of the land is made possible by the use of the sea. Further, he shows how this is accomplished only when there is a coherent relationship between strategy, tactics, and logistics as blended in the mind of command and controlled through the elements of morale and discipline.

Control of the Sea. Chapter IV stressed the concept of strategy as control. We can now further develop these ideas as they apply to maritime power. *Command of the sea* is an absolute term that today rarely has any significance. On the other hand, control of the sea is a continuing matter of vital importance that can be expressed and applied in specific operational terms. Control of the sea is a relative matter that must always involve geography, time, relative fighting power, and consequent degree of risk.

Sea control is expressed in five general categories in terms of degree of control of specific sea areas for specific times.

1. **Absolute Control**, that is, Command—complete freedom to operate without interruption or interference. The enemy cannot operate at all. This can be exercised only in limited areas for limited periods.

2. **Working Control**—general ability to operate with high degree of freedom. The enemy can operate only with high risk.

3. **Control in Dispute**—each side operates with considerable risk. This often involves the need to establish working control of limited portions for limited times to conduct specific operations.

4. **Enemy Working Control**—position 2 is reversed.

5. **Enemy Absolute Control**—position 1 is reversed.

The exercise of seapower always involves these characteristics of sea control as related to the strategic environment and the issues at stake. This brings us back to the analysis of objectives: what is the effect desired? The concepts of strategy and sea control are useless unless the physical economic substance of maritime power can be created, sustained, and usefully employed.

The free societies and the authoritarian states use inherently different approaches to the creation and use of maritime power. In free societies, maritime power emerges almost haphazardly from the relatively free interplay of individual enterprise reacting to the competitive economic forces within the nation and in world markets. The free governments exercise varying degrees of control in the form of regulations, subsidies, tax incentives, and military construction programs. The labor unions and the business and financial interests and institutions compete or cooperate in accordance with their widely differing perceptions of self-interest and national interest. As a consequence, for example, a large portion of American-owned shipping operates under foreign registry (flags of convenience) with an uncertain availability and reliability in time of emergency.

In the summer of 1974 the Seapower Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee was conducting hearings into the difficult situation wherein private shipyards were refusing to submit bids for the construction of ships for the U.S. Navy. In a paper submitted to this Committee, the president of the Shipbuilders Council of America referred to:

... the consensus of our membership detailing major procurement policies, problems and circumstances . . . which continue to contribute to increasing shipbuilding costs and which contribute to further disenchantment among private shipbuilders with respect to the construction of Navy ships³

Another reporter wrote: "As a result the Navy's six year 22 billion program to construct a modern sea-control fleet may be in deep trouble."⁴ This problem is directly related to, even if not solely caused by, the monetary inflation now common in the industrialized free nations. For instance, *The New York Times* reported:

... Between inflation and budget cuts . . . the Defense Department finds itself more than \$11 billion short of funds to carry out its planned procurement Unless there is budgetary relief . . . the Defense Department . . . faces the prospect of cutting back substantially on its planned procurement of major new weapons.

The article went on to report that:

... the Budget Bureau permits the Defense Department in making its original appropriations request to add 3.5 percent annually for inflation ... this has been insufficient ... on major procurement which ... is running at least 9 percent and much higher in such areas as shipbuilding.⁵

In contrast, the Soviet Union creates and uses maritime power as an arm of the state to serve the state in a manner specifically directed by the state.⁶ In such a controlled economy, the various economic trade-offs are made for better or worse by the central government as it perceives the situation. How this authoritarian political-economic control works to the ultimate benefit or to the harm of human progress and welfare is, of course, not yet wholly clear to the historians.

Thus, while the Soviet Merchant Marine includes many relatively small ships of moderate draft capable of operating in unsophisticated small harbors of the developing nations, the new merchant ships being built by the United States are for the most part very large, special purpose ships that require deep harbors and fully developed port facilities. The Russian merchant ships are useful as naval auxiliaries. The new American ships are generally useless for this purpose.

In summation, while the creation of the various elements of maritime power in the free societies is a matter of great uncertainty with little coherent planning, the control of the employment of this power seems even more diffused through the economic-political system. There are, however, important compensations that are sources of great potential strength to the free societies. Putting this in somewhat different terms, the maritime world presents both a challenge and the means to respond constructively.

On the one hand, as the competition for scarce resources grows, it becomes clear that this world includes most of the areas and many of the important causes of human conflict. There is economic competition for oceanic trade, transportation, and for minerals on the ocean bed. There is the question of fishing rights as they are related to national sovereignty, the area and zonal control of waters, and, in particular, to the worldwide need for more food. There is the concept of "Freedom of the Seas" as it relates to zonal and territorial waters and the right of "Innocent Free Passage" for warships. There is the urgent need to protect the world oceans from pollution by atomic waste, oilspills, industrial wastes, and sewage. The measures of control, however, conflict

with the economic development aspirations of various "Third World" nations.

The shortsighted attitude toward maritime affairs born of ignorance and ambition that characterized the U.S. defense disputes of the 1940s and 1950s is paralleled even more dangerously by the attitude of the representatives of "developing nations" toward worldwide measures to reduce population growth.

Malcolm Brown, reporting on the United Nations World Population Conference in Bucharest in August 1974, stated:

Most of the delegates from developing nations and the Soviet bloc hold that priority should go to development and that population pressures will then take care of themselves. They contend that attempts to persuade governments to adopt population policies are often self-serving "imperialist" positions on the part of rich nations.⁷

The continuing United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea provide a vital focus for the complex ramifications of the maritime world and of maritime power in its broadest sense. These conferences represent the international recognition that: the mineral resources of the earth are finite; as new nations develop industrial economies, the competition for these limited resources will intensify and may cause dangerous conflict among nations; the wasteful use of these resources will create serious shortages that threaten domestic stability and political freedom, because in many instances it will be impossible to distribute the burden of commodity shortages except by authoritarian controls.

These conferences represent a synthesis of the major political, economic, and military factors discussed in the first four chapters of this book. Specifically these attempts to deal with the conflicting interests of the developed nations and the undeveloped nations show the interweaving of national sovereignty, world commerce, world food supply, and world energy resources. They involve the naval concept of free transit; that is, the ability to move naval forces freely in support of the national interests, which in turn tends to conflict with the political-economic interest in the protection and utilization of natural resources. Because all "seapower" nations share this concern, it tends to align them against the other nations. They also involve the continuing conflict between the advocates of operation by national governments or international authorities.⁸

When the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference met in Caracas, Venezuela for 10 weeks in the summer of 1974 to make a comprehensive revision of the principles and rules that have guided ocean affairs for several hundred years, no one expected it to produce substantive results. Brown and Fabian's comment is a good appraisal.

The fashioning of a new public order for the oceans, adaptive to technological, economic and political developments now emerging can hardly be accomplished by one conference or wrapped up in a single treaty.⁹

When the conference adjourned, *The New York Times* reported:

The delegates . . . dealt with more than 100 issues and reached agreement on none. Serious differences remained even on the two receiving perhaps the most universal support—12 mile territorial limit and a 200 mile economic zone.¹⁰

All that could be hoped for was that the 5,000 representatives of about 150 nations could in 10 weeks state their positions and agree to discuss and possibly negotiate their differences subject by subject in subsequent conferences.

In May 1975 the Geneva Law of the Sea Conference concluded an 8-week session after drafting a proposed Charter for the Oceans that would establish: an international authority to exploit the ocean floor in joint ventures of companies or countries, a 200-mile economic zone and a 12-mile full sovereignty territorial zone. While a representative of the United Nations considered this draft a sound basis for future negotiations, an American official stated his opinion that it might be impossible to compromise the demands of the developing nations in a manner acceptable to the U.S. Congress:¹¹

The fifth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adjourned September 17 of this year [1976] with agreements on many matters and disagreement on others. The disagreements are so sharp that it has become clear that a long time will pass before a convention acceptable to the developed nations and the developing world can be achieved

The issues include:

- width of the continental shelf;
 - breadth of the territorial sea and contiguous zone;
 - rights of transit through straits;
 - width of the economic zone;
 - limits of coastal state authority in the economic zone;
 - regulation of mineral exploitation beyond the continental shelf;
 - freedom of scientific research in the economic zone;
 - rights of access of land locked states;
 - coastal states' rights as to pollution control;
 - regulation of fishing in and beyond the economic zone;
- and
- dispute settlement.^{1 2}

At the conclusion of the fifth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in New York in August-September 1976, the Chairman of the First Committee on the Seabed and Ocean Floor, Mr. Paul Bamela Engo, reported that while there had been progress in clarifying the issues: "... we thus find ourselves in an impasse... it can only be resolved through a change in the positions and attitudes that go to create this situation."^{1 3} In this case the issue was the developing nations' desire for a strong international authority and the desire of the developed industrialized nation that any international authority have power only to license seabed and ocean floor exploitation.

The Second Committee dealing with the exclusive economic zone, rights of access of landlocked states and freedom of transit, payments and contribution, and definition of the continental margin, reported: "No concrete results were achieved at this session regarding any of the questions considered by the various negotiating groups."^{1 4} Mr. A. Yankov, Chairman of the Third Committee on Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, Marine Scientific Research and Transfer of Technology, reported important progress even though many issues remained.^{1 5}

While these problems are primarily economic and political, effective political action in supporting economic-political interests is impossible without the supporting strength of military power. Therefore, all of these conferences are influenced by the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that directly relate to the whole structure of the defense system and particularly to strategic arms limitation, including the construction and operation of nuclear missile submarines.

Can these urgent needs be met? Can disastrous military conflict be avoided without resorting to authoritarian government in all the major nations of the world? The foregoing constitute a group of interrelated interacting difficulties that challenge the best abilities that humanity can muster. The implications for military professionals are profound; the opportunity for constructive even if limited action has been recognized.

Seafaring people have a strong perception of the interdependence of nations. On the foundation of their common heritage of the sea and consequent intuitive appreciation of relationships, naval professionals can meet quietly and work effectively to explain and reconcile conflicting views and reduce suspicion. As most of the issues involve the delicate matter of national sovereignty, the chances of constructive results will be enhanced if the discussions are private and the results announced objectively and with restraint. Furthermore, ships of friendly navies can participate in various types of combined exercises and cruises that lay an effective groundwork for the practical operations of international control measures. They can do this without encroaching on valuable arable land or infringing on national sensibilities. This has been emphasized at The International Seapower Symposia originated in 1969 at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

The tone of the third conference was established by the President of the Naval War College, Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, who said in welcoming the 16 foreign Chiefs of Naval Operations to the Third Symposium in October 1973:

Finally, is it not we in the military who are the most skilled in cooperation on an international basis? Can we and should we not in these days set an example for the economist, the diplomatist, the agriculturalist, the industrialist, and the others who are attempting to forge links of international relationships? In so doing, we can not only help further their efforts but we can do a great deal to preserve that sense of cooperation between the free nations of the world which, I would suggest, is going to be critical as we continue to probe and explore the possibility of detente with the Communist side of the side.^{1 6}

He was followed by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Imo R. Zumwalt, Jr., who said:

Now if we accept what I believe is the undeniable premise, namely, that we are essentially a group of nations closely tied together, if not specifically by alliance, at least through economic relationships which involve the usage of the seas, then it is clear that we would do well to consider the nature of peacetime oceanic forces and to do anything we can to strengthen them. Unlike ourselves here in this room and the nations we represent, the Warsaw Pact, which is now both a major land and sea power, is largely self-sufficient with secure internal lines of communications. For them the disruption of external lines of communication would be, at worst, an annoyance; whereas for us as a collective group, such disruption would be, at best, a disaster.^{1 7}

Vice Adm. Benjamin F. Engel of the U.S. Coast Guard stated:

The vast oceans that once divided the world now bind us together. We are linked by instantaneous worldwide communications. We can travel between continents in a few hours. Each modern advance of technology has immediate global impact. The result is that our cultures and our economies are completely intertwined. But while we can share our cultures generously, it is natural that each nation must carefully guard its own economic interest.

These same oceans which are now huge highways of maritime commerce are also the source of great potential economic resources. Aside from their traditional role as a source of food, the seas also cover untapped mineral deposits and unmeasured petroleum and gas reserves. Modern technology has brought these new sources of wealth within the grasp of man. Deepwater exploration and drilling is now commonplace. Offshore structures are now seen in many areas of the world. Small commercial submersibles are now a reality.^{1 8}

These remarks of Vice Admiral Engel are particularly significant because, while the U.S. Coast Guard has fought as part of the Navy in every major war, it is essentially a service with peacetime missions whose importance is growing as the use of the oceans accelerates. It functions as a law enforcement agency without any inference of military involvement in civilian affairs. Its National Response Center, a command post for dealing with major oilspills,

plays a major role in preventing pollution. Maritime inspection and ship traffic control in congested ports and waterways reduce accidents, thus saving enormous sums of money and further preventing pollution. It enforces international fisheries agreements for the United States and, finally, it participates in many international forums dealing with maritime safety, oceanography, meteorology, telecommunications, civil aviation, and aids to navigation.

The several days of subsequent discussion brought frank statements of problems, special interests, and differing opinions—all presented and received with constructive understanding. In recent years these major symposia have been supplemented by regional meetings—in Venice, Italy, in October 1972, and The Hague, The Netherlands, in April 1973. Each of these regional meetings focused on the broad economic, environmental, and humanitarian aspects of maritime affairs with effective cooperation and leadership made possible by the common technical language and point of view of the naval professionals from the nations involved.

Professional conferences such as these symposia and exercises establish a wide area of mutual understanding and mutual interest that in turn improves the quality of the major international conferences such as those concerned with the Law of the Sea and the Sea Bed. As these gradually provide a foundation for the constructive and humane regulation of the uses of the oceans, the need for both national and international forces to insure legal control will grow. This poses a difficult question of resource allocation for the major powers.

When well-designed, organized, and controlled, seapower is flexible and highly mobile. It can perform many functions and can do so on a sustained basis. Its missions may include disaster relief, search and rescue, salvage, protection of fishing, and finally, when required, it can protect shipping, move armies and fight. Thus, the same basic equipment and personnel can serve international humane and economic interests and, at the same time, protect the sovereign rights and interests of the state. Furthermore, this can be done quietly and effectively, without overt or spectacular violations of the territorial rights or political sensitivities of other nations.

In contrast to the size, speed, and destructive capability of the heavy Navy striking forces and the complex, very expensive missile submarines—the ocean control ships, even though they may carry a few powerful missiles, are slower, smaller, lightly armed and

more versatile. The ships of the U.S. Coast Guard are representative. This brings up a further and very complex question which of necessity must be treated all too briefly.

Arms control is so vital to the survival of our form of civilization that no discussion of either military power or the free society can ignore the subject. The number of books, periodicals, organizations, and conferences devoted to it has become so great and the discussions so technical that the subject itself has become a special academic discipline drawing from political science, sociology, and international law. Nuclear physics, economics, and industrial engineering provide the grim realities that must be understood and weighed. Nevertheless, the critical decisions in this area must and will be made by the generalists rather than the specialists.

For the United States, the critical question becomes that of appraising the intentions of the Soviet Union. If that nation desires to use its great and growing seapower to coerce other nations to accept its domination, then the United States must maintain and be prepared to use a very large and powerful sea force with major emphasis on the heavy striking forces and less emphasis on those resembling the Coast Guard types.

If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union is increasing its seapower, missiles, and other military forces to insure its own territorial integrity, to insure that its European satellites remain within their orbit, and to insure that it can pursue its own world political-economic interests without danger of military interference, and if it has no intention of pursuing those interests to a point that is intolerable to the United States, then the situation is different. With such an assumption, the U.S. Navy can reduce its emphasis on the heavy striking forces.

There is, however, the possibility that the Soviet Union is following a deliberately equivocal, opportunistic course designed to upset the decision process in the governments of the free nations. Such a policy would have special implications for U.S. naval policy because of the very great cost and procurement leadtime of major naval ships and weapons systems. Fluctuations in naval procurement programs are enormously expensive not only in monetary cost but also in the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of the entire Navy as well as in the specific items being procured.¹⁹

While there are differences of opinion in Russia, these are not as clearly expressed nor are their holders as specifically identified as they are in the United States. While in private conversations,

Russians from all walks of life may appear to be reasonable and understanding, their military-political literature and their official behavior in the conferences shows that mutual accommodation must be a slow and difficult process of bargaining. This bargaining process involves interpretation of the meaning of words related to forces and weapons,²⁰ arguments about what is offensive and what is defensive, matters of quality versus quantity in nuclear weapons, and whether or not agreements on nuclear weapons should be related to the size, quality and location of conventional forces of both of the principal parties and their allies. In all cases the matter of verification of compliance with any agreement presents grave difficulties. The establishment of good faith and mutual trust through a satisfactory arrangement for small problems is essential to the development of trust in major matters.²¹

I do not pretend to know the answers to the problems presented by the combination of international competition for natural resources and the uncertainty over Soviet intentions. It is indeed a major "difficulty" within which many "puzzles" remain to be worked out and contradictions resolved. This process requires the continued concentrated attention of first-class men of strong character who understand political-military realities and who have the best possible political and technical information and intelligence. It is a matter of intuition, perception and patterns of cognition plus a vital sense of personal responsibility.

The industrially developed nations of the world are, for the most part, maritime nations, their development having been largely based on the use of the sea which has been the chief mode of transportation and exchange of the natural resources of the earth. These natural resources have been directed, exploited, and controlled by the human resources of science, technology, labor, management, finance, and politics—all as developed by education.

In all cases, the relative emphasis on one use or resource as opposed to another, within categories or between categories, will be greatly influenced by economic values and exchange rates. As was so clearly shown by the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and 1974, these may be profoundly affected by political factors that reflect not only long-term cultural sources but also internal and external struggles for power and prestige. As nonrenewable natural resources become scarce or more expensive to extract, their possession will be an increasingly important form of power that will be used to advance the economic-political interests of their possessors.

President Carter, on 18 April 1977, declared to the American people that the world energy problem was urgent, that the alternative to the adoption of his proposals to conserve and develop new sources of energy might be national catastrophe, and that "further delay can affect our strength and power as a nation If we fail to act soon, we will face an economic, social and political crisis that will threaten our free institutions." He was in fact addressing the same fundamental problems that are being discussed in the Law of the Sea Conferences. When the President stated: "... the cornerstone of our policy is to reduce demand through conservation," he was in effect calling upon the people to use both enlightened self-interest and social-political discipline in their truest sense.^{2 2} Certain trends seem clear.

As the developing nations gain in power and influence, the areas of conflicting interest will grow. The resentment at major disparities in standards of living will intensify. The demand for exercise of sovereign rights will grow in sharp contrast to the need for international cooperation. The faster world population grows, the greater will be the temptation to use force to obtain increasingly scarce natural resources.

In spite of the apparent slowness with which sovereign nations are moving toward the resolution of these difficulties, their nature and urgency are being more and more recognized. Various international organizations are working, some as part of the formal United Nations efforts and some on a regional or independent basis. Thus, by a step-by-step process, constructive measures are gradually being undertaken even while agreement on the major issues may seem distant. The problem then becomes one of control—the essence of strategy. What situations and areas must one control to attain objectives? What is the nature and degree of control that one must exercise? One thing is clear: the problems of control of maritime areas and maritime affairs will be very important and will require an understanding of the principles of maritime strategy.

As a corollary, we should seek at sea, a force and naval strategy of the future that is aimed at control—with destruction being used only when there is no other way to gain control. It means discipline: disciplined thinking and disciplined action by disciplined forces. Wisdom in dealing with maritime affairs will largely determine whether or not this conflict of national interests will be resolved without recourse to large-scale violence. If the conflicts of interest erupt into such violence, the outcome will be largely determined by the wisdom and skill with which maritime power is exercised.

In these matters and in all other aspects of power, the perceptions and attitudes of people will be the final determinants. These perceptions and attitudes are now being influenced by a worldwide process of cultural change.

CHAPTER XI

FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

The world is in a dangerous race between the forces of conciliation and international cooperation and the forces of frustration, violence, and disruption. The cultural change induced by the 20th-century technological revolution now resembles a blind juggernaut.

Against a background of rapidly increasing world population, there has been a rising tide of human expectations stimulated largely by a worldwide system of rapid communication that informs the poorest peoples of the luxury and profligate waste of the very wealthy and of the inequities both real and imagined associated with racial discrimination.

The vast production and consumption of the developed nations, particularly the United States, and the recognition of the finite nature of natural resources have combined with an unfavorable weather cycle and the need for environmental conservation to produce a long-term food-energy crisis that has dangerous economic and political implications, particularly for the industrialized nations of the "Free World."

The successful use of terrorism, hostages, retaliatory assassination, and the plea that any kind of armed robbery or bombing of civilian establishments, and the disruption of court procedures and government institutions are justified if done for a political purpose, constitute an important shift in the concepts of power, authority, law, and politics. This shift both creates and exemplifies major contradictions in our culture and our social organization wherein violence, bloodshed, and destruction become diffused throughout society, with the same basic symptoms of frustration, intransigence, and disruption being evident in both the domestic and international communities.

Since the 18th century there has been a continuing liberalization of political thought in which the ideal, if not always the practice, of representative democratic government has been emphasized. Social welfare programs and the legal expansion of civil rights that would have been considered wildly radical 75 years

ago are now taken for granted. In recent years, a recognizable libertarian culture has developed, particularly in the advanced Western nations. This culture is generally characterized by a rejection of traditional concepts of authority and discipline and a concern for increased freedom throughout society. At the same time there have been profound changes in racial distribution and relationships that have produced violence, crime, and destruction in the cities and schools of the United States. The increased frequency and brutality of juvenile crime have been particularly dangerous and disturbing.¹ Simultaneously there has been a corruption of the English language as an instrument of civilized discourse and analysis.

More importantly from the standpoint of this work, this cultural change shows a very high degree of confusion in those values that ultimately determine whether or not a coherent national strategy can be formulated with any expectation of successful accomplishment. It is not a question of whether this cultural change is good or bad or whether it was inevitable or preventable. It has taken place and it has affected the entire political-economic-social structure. While its full implications are only partially understood, we do know that it has affected both the cost and the effectiveness of the military system of the United States.

In a free society there is little evidence that social-political cultural changes take place in accordance with the plans and expectations of the advocates of change. Of course, change takes place; the architects of change may have great power and for a time they may direct its course, but eventually and frequently very soon, the unexpected but inevitable side effects begin to appear. These effects develop unexpected strength in unexpected directions and grandiose plans go awry. The example of Lyndon Johnson's social program for the Great Society foundering on the realities of the Vietnam policy of both guns and butter, coupled with underestimates of a tough enemy, gross semantic distortion, and fiscal deception is a tragic illustration of the paving on the road to hell.

Of course, both Russia and China have been through an enormous planned political and social change in the 20th century, but in each case it was accomplished by the overt and prolonged brutal suppression of opposition accompanied by total control of the press, the radio, the literature, and the arts. Even so, both of these revolutions are showing unexpected side effects.

The problems of a free society are inherently complex and difficult even for the most competent and honest officials and

people. They are made much more so by the kind of semantic distortion that is commonly considered acceptable for political social discourse. Furthermore, semantic distortion is a powerful tool for political disruption and subversion. Freedom of the media and freedom of speech open our society to such disruption. If this society does not create and sustain its inner defenses, it will fall.

There is little that military power can do to counter the process of social decay or economic disintegration. It can protect the security of the state for a short time, but eventually if the natural forces within the society cannot generate recuperative power, the military too will decay and become a threat to rather than a defense of freedom. The basic thesis of the free society is that it not only provides individual liberty but also in the long run that freedom provides a better economic and cultural life than does the authoritarian society.

It is generally assumed that the primary, the overriding national objective of any state is to preserve its statehood and that this includes the elements of national security and sovereignty; i.e., its freedom from outside domination. It is also assumed that to preserve this external freedom the state will go to war and fight long and hard, sometimes against hopeless odds.

The record, however, is not uniform. For instance, in 1938 and 1939 both Finland and Czechoslovakia were free nation-states facing great odds. One fought; the other did not. While the circumstances of the two states were different, nevertheless, this and other instances of seemingly inconsistent behavior suggest we should go beyond these stated assumptions about objectives. In an alliance of free nations, each government can be expected to define and pursue its own interests and objectives, yielding them only when there is a clear perception of some overriding common interest. This perception fluctuates with changes in domestic and foreign political and economic events. The collective leadership of the alliance must be able to define the common interests so clearly that the individual governments can maintain continuing popular support.

Thus, if the preservation of a free civilization is defined and recognized as an enduring and overriding common interest, a vital unifying concept including room for diversity in the interests and objectives of the several states in an alliance of free nations is provided. However, this distinction and this common interest will be so perceived by the people only if the leaders can recognize and explain that continued freedom depends on meeting the threats created by the worldwide cultural change and facing up to the imperatives of action.

If a free civilization is to survive with any resemblance to that in which we now live, we must deal effectively with four major interrelated problems—each of which includes important subsidiary questions:

- Limit and eventually reduce the number of nuclear weapons.
- Limit the world and national population.
- Control the pollution of the earth's biosphere.
- Conserve and seek equity in the use and distribution of natural resources.

In each case the problem grows out of the successful scientific research and technological development of the past. While we must use such research and development to cope with the problem, we must recognize that the intangible and economic aspects arising from man's inherent nature, his aspirations and his sense of values are more important and perhaps more difficult than the technological aspects.

In each case, national policy and international cooperation are involved. In each case there is the potential for violent international conflict that, in turn, requires the ability to enforce or support the measures and laws of international and national control by the use of military power and force. While the threat of overt military conquest of the United States is highly unlikely, it nevertheless remains a distinct possibility for nations with whom the United States has a continuing major interest, both by explicit treaty—NATO nations—and cultural political compulsions—Israel. Therefore, there is a fifth imperative: to create and maintain a balanced and flexible national defense system.

No one of these five imperatives is going to be perfectly achieved. Every effort toward them will be met by the stubborn opposition of selfish shortsighted people and organized vested interests. Failure to achieve them will not necessarily mean the destruction of the species or of civilization. While the precise course of events is unpredictable, the general trends and general results are clear from history. As political-economic confusion increases, most people will turn to authoritarian measures rather than accept the consequences of mass starvation, mass bankruptcy, and anarchy.

These imperatives of control should be seen as politics in its highest sense, dealing with the intractable questions of nationalism and sovereignty in a world of competition for resources and prestige, of small new "nations" seeking development and resentful of concepts of control of that development; the "have nots"

envious and suspicious of the “haves” with ideology and cultural background driving people in ways they do not wholly understand. It becomes a matter of strategic realism—objectives, assumptions, and expectations.

The War Powers Act. In the United States, the whole question of the use of military force in defense of the freedom of the society and the security of the state must be considered in the light of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. When the Joint War Powers Resolution of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives was enacted on 7 November 1973 as Public Law 93-148 it was considered to be historic legislation. The purpose of the act is:

... to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.^{2,3}

This Resolution and the various legislative restrictions on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Freedom of Information Act should be seen from several aspects collectively and individually. Collectively they represent: a reaction to the misuse of executive power as disclosed in various congressional investigations of recent years; a reaction to the failure and political-social turmoil of the Vietnam war; an affirmation of the U.S. Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights; and an assertion of the power of the Congress. Collectively they reduce the freedom of action of the executive agencies in dealing with problems of national and domestic security.

The War Powers Resolution substantially restricts the freedom of action of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and by doing so it may induce damaging delays or indecision in time of a major crisis. Perhaps even more important, these restrictions, together with other aspects of major cultural change, raise questions about the future value of the use of overt military force to attain a political objective.

Will they thereby encourage other nations and groups to use irregular force or clandestine operations and terrorism to achieve objectives? This question is important because in no way does this

legislation reduce the causes of world conflict or change the political objectives of any nation. Their ultimate collective effect is yet to be tested by time and actual major crises. This uncertainty therefore emphasizes the need for understanding the leading principles of the use of military power and force that have been presented in this work.

A Recapitulation of Leading Principles. While many aspects of power and of military force are changing, some fundamental principles remain. The fact that such principles have not hitherto been reduced to a simple, orderly, and generally accepted formulation does not decrease their importance, for it was the repeated violation of these principles by civilian and military leaders alike that contributed greatly to the tragedy of Vietnam.

While each of these fundamentals can be elaborated extensively, they are relatively few and relatively simple. Their practical application, however, is almost infinitely varied and at times very difficult. This practical application is especially difficult in those military-political situations in which the scales of power are in approximate balance. When overwhelming force is available and usable, mediocre high command and indifferent quality of the armed forces may produce results that appear to be successful. But such success will be dangerously deceptive, for it will encourage reckless adventurism by giving the illusion that mediocrity is acceptable. Thus, the application of these fundamentals requires a high degree of intellectual creativity and a highly cultivated military intuition.

—The use of military power and force without a clear political objective is futile and ultimately self-defeating.

—The decision to use military force to attain a political objective is a political decision and is perhaps the most difficult and important decision that a government can take.⁴

There is tremendous difference between two ways of deciding to use force. The right way of making this decision is to study the elements affecting the conduct of military operations before making the decision. The wrong way is to neglect these factors, decide to use force and then attempt to manipulate the various factors by means of a public relations campaign or speciously rationalize them. This results in serious and perhaps fatal self-deception.

Revenge or frustration are bad reasons for the use of military force. Both set in motion forces of regenerative hatred that tend to become uncontrollable. The use of military force in self-defense

against overt armed invasion is relatively simple and in many respects conceptually obvious even though it may be operationally difficult. The use of military force in the broader context of an active role in world affairs is another matter entirely. It usually is very complex and very difficult, both in concept and execution. In either case, an accurate appraisal of one's own operational readiness and combat effectiveness is essential to a sound decision to use force. Timing, which has always been important, has now become critical.

The essence of civilian control of the military is that the political objective to be attained by the use of military force, the decision to initiate hostilities, the limitations on the nature and scope of the action taken, and the decisions when and how to conclude hostilities are political decisions made by civilians. The fact that these decisions have a vital military content and that the civilians must have competent professional military advice does not alter this essential relationship. The civilian leaders must be able to depend on the competence and loyalty of a professional nonpolitical military force prepared to fight effectively regardless of whether or not a state of war has been declared, and subject to the limits of logistic capability regardless of the geographic location of combat.

Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives. The concept of strategy as control is fundamental and has several critical aspects and implications. Specifically, strategy involves the use of power to exercise control of a field of action. It involves the control of the use of that power and it involves the control of the sources of power.

The sense of authority, which always includes prestige, is an essential element of national strategy because it is the essence of control both of the use of power and of the sources of power. The sense of authority is fundamental to military leadership and discipline. When founded on competence and courage, it brings forth not simply blind obedience, but rather enthusiastic and, if necessary, sacrificial cooperation based on understanding and confidence in that competence. The ultimate source of national strategy lies in the sense of values of the people. In a free society, a strategy that is contrary to that sense of values is not likely to succeed.

Because strategy is concerned primarily with objectives, and because in major political-military affairs and conflict such objectives are seldom simple, the analysis of the objectives is the

major and continuing concern of the strategist. Once military force is brought into action the reactions of the opponent and thus the course of events become unpredictable. They may and usually do change the relative importance of the various elements in the hierarchy of objectives. But always the concept of the effect desired must be dominant.

The creation and maintenance of conceptual unity of objectives—the effect desired—is a paramount duty of high command (the Chief Executive) regardless of how such command is constituted. If such unity cannot be attained, the use of military force is not likely to succeed.

This Chief Executive has the further task of judging how the degree of conceptual unity he has been able to maintain will influence the outcome of his strategic plans and operations. He also has the task of initiating changes in these plans appropriate to changes in his position of power relative to that of his opponent. Furthermore, conceptual unity is the heart of control of the sources of power.

Except when the context is unmistakably clear, the terms strategy and power should have the same adjectival modifier. Thus we should associate global strategy with global power, national strategy with national power, military strategy with military power, and maritime strategy with maritime power.

Just as national economics is a vital factor in national strategy so, too, military economics, i.e., logistics, is a vital factor in military strategy. The understanding of logistics is therefore an essential part of the understanding of strategy. This principle applies throughout all the levels of strategy and tactics, with only minor modification of adjectives as one shifts levels of consideration. So one can talk of international strategy, grand strategy, national strategy, military strategy, maritime strategy, grand tactics down to unit tactics, as long as one remembers that one is dealing with a combination of:

Objectives (effect desired);

Scheme or Plan;

Physical means available (economics or logistics).

There should be no great difficulty in grasping the essentials of a major practical strategic or tactical discussion.

Because the essence of strategy is found in the controlled use of power to exercise control over situations and areas to attain objectives, in any major combat operation and particularly where there is not overwhelming power and clear initiative, both policy and the major operations to carry out such policy must be part of

one coordinated command structure where operations are immediately responsive to real events.

As previously stated, command-management is a continuum of executive authority with management being a group of techniques generally used in both the producer and consumer phases of logistics. Thus "management" generally deals with procurement in all its parts. But "command" at the top level also deals with procurement, chiefly in that it establishes the values that will guide management in its allocations of all kinds of resources.

In time of crisis, and especially if combat begins or is imminent, these values may and probably will shift. Furthermore, it is unlikely that they will shift in accordance with any preconceived plan or "scenario." It is the duty of command to determine how these values shift, to insure that management is informed and that management decisions conform as closely as possible to the new values.

Both high-level military procurement and military operations in the theater of war will always be dominated by the dynamics of policy, strategy, economics, logistics, and tactical capabilities; i.e., fighting power. This relationship must be understood by all military-political executives regardless of whether they are civilians or military professionals or whether their responsibility is called command or management.

This relationship is so dynamic, and in times of crisis, speed of decision becomes so pressing, that the evaluation must be highly intuitive. This evaluation, however, must use, to the extent possible, the techniques of formal analysis that require quantitative facts and relations. At high levels these quantities must be highly aggregated; as the level of planning descends, these numbers become more detailed.

Thus the essential features of practical operational planning will persist regardless of how command is organized. They must be intuitively judged by one man. Obviously, at high levels, with complex situations and complex forces at his disposal, no single man can be expected to have equal knowledge in all of these matters. He must have information and advice. Nevertheless, his decision still rests on his intuitive evaluation of this information and advice.

From the standpoint of theory, this is the commander's formal "estimate of the situation." Today few commanders make such a formal estimate. Nevertheless, without gathering these elements into one intuitive thought process, little military success should be expected where there is an even balance of power on both sides.

They are: the effect desired, the elements of power available, enemy capabilities and intentions, own capabilities—operational readiness and disposition, and logistic leadtime.

The ability of a free society to create a defense system and to use military power effectively to preserve the state and defend its interests is dependent on the nature and situation of the state, the nature of its interests, and on the leadership, discipline, and morale of its armed forces. While the size and technological capabilities of these forces are, of course, important, they are secondary.

Technical excellence is founded on an economic-industrial base and is achieved by a combination of scientific, engineering, and management ability. It is essential for a modern military system, but it is practically useless if not employed on the basis of sound concepts of strategy, command, morale, and discipline. Quality of command, morale, and discipline are essential elements in combat effectiveness without which technical excellence simply cannot pay off.

A relatively small, well-equipped, well-trained, highly disciplined force is much more effective than a very large force that lacks such qualities. A large well-equipped armed force that has poor discipline is a menace to the state rather than a safeguard. Military weapons and force structures and deployments do not determine the strategy to be used; they merely reflect, to some degree, one's strategic concepts and limit one's capabilities. This is a critical distinction.

While in a war or long campaign the strategic effect is usually cumulative, nevertheless, one of the greatest challenges to command excellence is to make a strategic exploitation of a tactical success. This is almost always dependent on the commander's recognition of opportunity and the skillful use of tactical and logistic reserves. Thus, the competence of a military commander is largely but not wholly based on his ability to make swift and reasonably accurate approximations of how his and his opponent's operational capabilities are limited by logistic factors. In high command, this competence also includes an appreciation of logistics leadtime and of the importance of command authority in controlling the growth of the logistic snowball.

Only a person familiar with current operational and strategic intelligence is qualified to make specific strategic and operational decisions and plans. Operational planning and action cannot possibly be referred back to the uncertainties of public opinion with any expectation of military success. Public opinion can do

nothing more than indicate the limits within which policy can and must operate. It cannot successfully dictate the details of operational plans. Similarly, only a person familiar with technological developments, prospects, and intelligence is competent to make specific long-range strategic and procurement decisions. That does not mean that persons by reason of that knowledge are necessarily competent to make such decisions. On the contrary, much more is needed. In particular, they must have a special political and military intuition and be able both to evaluate situations and to take risks. There is no absolute security today nor will there be in the future.

Finally, the nature of the military force of any nation is primarily dependent on the role that nation expects to play in world affairs. The force suitable for a passive role is entirely different from that suitable for an active role. The greatest of disasters can take place when a nation pursues an active policy based on the assumption of control of a military force suitable for an active role only to find, after the die is cast, that the force is suitable only for a passive role.

The foregoing are the major principles whose practical application governs the successful effective use of military power and force in any society, free or authoritarian. The successful application of these principles requires special qualities of mind and character in high command, regardless of how that command is constituted and exercised. Such special intuition extends to and must link both political and military affairs. In particular, there must be an intuitive evaluation of such intangibles as objectives and the opponent's intentions. It must also include the ability to deal with concrete and quantifiable elements of logistics, especially as they apply to one's own and the opponent's military capabilities.

This ability to apply intellectual rigor to both the abstract and the concrete must be dominated by a sense of personal responsibility and personal integrity. It is a kind of political-military morality and it is substantially reduced by the deliberate ambiguity and exaggerated promises used in the struggle for elective office and by the semantic distortion and linguistic sloppiness characteristic of much military discussion in the United States and other so-called free nations.

Military intuition is not a matter of certainty, it is more a matter of recognizing and evaluating risks in relation to the effect desired. It always will be a highly personal affair that understands both the value and the limitations of quantitative factors. All of

the foregoing fundamentals had been learned and discussed before the 1964-1965 decisions to use major overt military force in Southeast Asia. Many of them were blatantly disregarded by senior officials, both civilian and military, with predictable results. It is immaterial whether this was ignorance or arrogance or both. In the future if they are so ignored, even a greater disaster can be expected.

The fundamentals have been formulated on the basis of historical analysis and practical experience. There is no such practical experience that directly guides us in dealing with the extraordinary political-military dilemma posed by the existence of large numbers of long-range and short-range nuclear and atomic weapons ranging from megaton to half-kiloton explosive power.

This dilemma is very real, seemingly intractable. Informed opinion among politicians, scientists, and military professionals is greatly divided. Each move in so-called nuclear strategy is founded on an uncertain assumption regarding the intentions and psychological reactions of an opponent who is simultaneously making a similarly uncertain appraisal of you and your reactions. Two critical questions are seldom mentioned, let alone answered:

How will the existence or the absence of a good civil defense and urban evacuation capability influence the national decisions in a time of nuclear confrontation?

In a free society, what would be the public reaction to the news or rumor that the heads of state and government had gone to the safety of a distant secure command post, leaving the people of the Capital City wholly defenseless?

It is worse than Plato's shadows in the mouth of the cave. It is rather as if two men were standing between two rather dirty mirrors, almost but not exactly parallel, looking down the corridor of reflections seeking to discern the last of a long series of reflected images. My personal convictions are: No useful political purpose can be served by the actual use of any nuclear atomic weapons, large or small, "strategic" or "tactical," at sea, in the air, or on the land.

We should make every effort to prevent their use, limit their numbers, control their production, and eventually eliminate them. Until such time as they can be done away with, however, the United States must maintain a strong long-range nuclear weapon capability in a high state of readiness.

Since nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, we must live with their threat and in so doing accept a risk. Living with this threat,

accepting this risk, refusing to yield to blackmail or terrorist pressure is another important feature of the quality of social-political discipline which in other forms and in other ways is essential to the maintenance of a free society.

It is fashionable to say that the military always prepares to fight the last war all over again. It is also fashionable to neglect the fact that many of the same fundamental errors recur in each war. Of course, gross mistakes of judgment will always occur in war as in all other human affairs—we cannot expect to eliminate them. The analysis of wars is useful to the extent that it helps us to understand the errors that tend to recur and helps to reduce them. No matter which viewpoint one takes, no matter which avenue one explores, the same fundamentals recur, differing indeed in detail and specific application, but still essentially the same.

The trend of our whole society has been toward less discipline. Yet if this society is to retain its freedom, it must develop more and better discipline. Even so, that required by troops in modern conflict must be of a higher order than that of society.

The enemies of our society will attack the concept of discipline in order to destroy our society. Loyal romanticists may attack the concept because they are ignorant of its principles and necessity. The irresponsible elements in the news media may attack the concepts and principles of discipline because of ignorance, greed, or self-aggrandizement.

The widespread availability of nuclear missiles has raised the level of tactical defeat acceptable to achieve a higher strategic purpose to a hitherto unparalleled degree. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons also increased the freedom of action of the leaders of revolutionary warfare, and the use of sabotage, terrorism, and subversion. This factor requires that military leaders have greater intellectual capacity, education, moral courage, and integrity than their predecessors if they are to maintain the morale, discipline, and combat effectiveness of their men under the adverse physical and psychological stress of such tactical defeat. The foregoing has enormous and hitherto unrecognized implications for civil-military relations and for the freedom and responsibility of the news media.

Ultimately, such discipline for the nation includes the ability and the willingness to reduce the armed forces in some areas and in some categories without either precipitating or falling victim to a headlong abandonment of policy. Thus, it means a firm resistance to the domino theory of collapse either in policy or

defense. Returning to the concept of strategy as control in Chapter IV:

Comprehensive control of a field of action means a concentration upon those minimum key lines of action or key positions from which the entire field can be positively controlled On the defensive, strategy similarly seeks to constrain the enemy attack to such a form and degree that while the defense may be forced back, it still maintains control of its actions and avoids collapse.⁵

Finally, we must realize that mistakes and tragedies are the natural result of normal human beings reacting in the normal human manner to the forces of normal individual human aspiration and the normal need for self-fulfillment in a world in which normal inevitable human change is now taking place at a rate faster than normal human beings can adjust to it.

What we must seek, therefore, is to find superior men, give them a superior education and subject them to an unfair process of selection and promotion. I use the word "unfair" deliberately because an absolutely fair process of promotion will always produce the kind of political and military mediocrity that produced the Vietnam disaster, and if continued may destroy our free society.

The concepts of "Don't make waves," "Don't let it happen on my watch," "Your job is to make your commander look good," etc.,⁶ exact a dreadful and inexorable penalty that may be postponed but will be inevitably paid in loss of operational readiness, combat effectiveness and economy. The ultimate penalty, the cumulative effect of continued violation of military and moral principles will be paralysis in foreign policy, domestic frustration and disorder; and, finally, the destruction of our free society.

Because of the enormous complexity and danger of modern conflict and because of the continuing necessity for the ability to use military power and force effectively in support of the national political purposes, the military profession will continue to require a moral and intellectual quality superior to that which has been acceptable in civilian professions. Military standards must be higher than civilian standards.

The conventional-sociological concepts of norms, peer groups, the concepts of soda fountain morale, of an egalitarian military force, of participatory democracy in the determination of military

power and operational planning, can never build a military system that can support national policy and defend a free society.

Pride, loyalty, weapon morale, and above all the integrity of command are the essential foundations for effective military power, and they can never be precisely defined or finally measured by the uninitiated. Throughout history, men have cheerfully accepted danger and hardship when a positive, professionally competent command is exercised with courage and integrity. Throughout history military men in the ranks of our services have recognized this element of integrity in their military seniors and have responded in kind—whether for good or for bad, depends on the seniors. The men are not deceived.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

The structure of society rests upon:

Law—with the clear implication that it is supported by force.

An economic system that is relatively stable and that uses money or an equivalent thereof.

Language—Communication.

Both the law and the economy ultimately rest on good faith, a sense of values, and communication in a common language. No one of these essential elements can ever be expected to be perfect. The society is good or bad, strong or weak, enduring or transient in accordance with the manner in which these elements work together in harmony. This is not a static forced rigidity but, like mankind itself, a growing changing development. The attempt to maximize one value without considering the effect of this on the others will reduce the effectiveness of the social system as a whole. It will increase injustice.

The working of the law of diminishing returns is inexorable. The appreciation of its operation and the moderation of its excessive harmful effects before they reach disastrous proportions is an intuitive process. However, strong differences of opinion are inevitable; thus ferment, turmoil, conflict are inherent in the nature of man and society.

The corruption of the economic system by excessive monetary inflation will break down the society. The corruption of the language by excessive semantic distortion, either intentional or unintentional will destroy the communication necessary for the element of good faith to act.

In the 1920s, our fathers saw monetary inflation wreck the economy of Germany. In the 1930s, our fathers saw the willful semantic distortion of Joseph Goebbels pave the way for the rise to power of Adolph Hitler and the destruction, bloodshed and consequences of World War II.

As social organizations such as governments and military services grow in size there must be more delegation of authority. Thus, conceptual unity based on the analysis of objectives

becomes more and more important. Here again, integrity, good faith and semantic clarity are essential. These are nontechnical matters—intangible but transcendent. They are the eternal verities, derided by the ignorant, yet finally they determine whether or not the free society survives or, as so often in the past, lapses into chaos and then tyranny.

When one tries to formulate specific plans for military force structure and deployment best suited to the needs of a free society, the amount of uncertainty and conjecture is enormous. In the absence of personal responsibility for military planning, access to timely and reliable intelligence, and accurate diplomatic and political information, the best one can do is state personal opinions and challenge the conventional wisdom. Anything beyond that would not only be presumptuous, but also futile.

And yet in time of crisis, with the lives of tens of millions of people at stake, their fate may rest on the judgment and swift decision of one man who has imperfect intelligence, incomplete information, awesome personal responsibility, and, we hope, an understanding of the elements, factors, and principles that have been imperfectly discussed in this work. Successful political leadership in a free society requires the ability to define the central issues and present them in such simple terms that people of good will and average intelligence can recognize the merit of the proposals one makes.

Applying this basic principle to the decision to use overt military force one can say: The task of leadership is first to recognize, define and then to simplify the objectives and issues in order to gain the conceptual unity and popular support that is necessary for effective military action. This also implies the ability to recognize what constitutes a satisfactory attainment of the objectives in order to bring about a peace settlement.

The potential for large-scale international violence and the consequent need for nations to be ready to use military power and force lie in:

The continuing hostility between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China;

The continuing Arab-Israeli conflict;

The black-white conflict in Africa;

The continuing increase and improvement of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the uncertainty this creates about Soviet intentions. This matter is complicated by the internal problems of the Soviet Union and the possibility of separatist

movements developing among its ethnic minorities and among the satellite nations of the Soviet bloc.

Even if these specific problems are resolved, the fundamental causes of conflict remain and violence can be expected to emerge in new forms and areas. Specifically, there is danger in the growing competition for scarce natural resources and the aggravation of this competition by the growing economic-political aspirations of the peoples of the undeveloped nations.

The contradictions inherent in the nature of nuclear weapons and the development of nuclear energy together constitute a "difficulty" that complicates and overshadows political, economic, and military aspects of world affairs. This guarantees that the people of the world will live at great international and domestic risk. There is no hiding place. Nuclear weapons and nuclear energy cannot be uninvented. They can be controlled; but only if the other factors that stimulate violent conflict are controlled. Therefore, for a nation-state, such control is an essential element of national strategy.

Strategic purposes are attained by the use of positive means, by the positive elements of power. Nuclear deterrence is a necessary but negative form of power. All it can do is provide a shield to allow time for the positive factors to operate. Resources are always limited. The more resources one expends on the negative elements, the less the resources that are available for the positive elements of power.

The possession of a strong military force constitutes a "political utility" as a source of political self-confidence without which a government cannot expect to negotiate successfully with an adversary or "to explore prudent modifications of the international environment."¹ When wisely employed, military power and force can enhance the survival of freedom and welfare of a nation.

Just as national sovereignty and national security cannot both be maximized in any nation-state, so too freedom, order, and prosperity cannot all be maximized within any nation-state. As a consequence, free nations will continue to have differing perceptions of their national interests and the concepts of domestic political, judicial and social organization and behavior best suited to their national culture and interests. This will affect their perceptions of the distribution of their military forces between external and internal security. To deny nations the right to make such judgments is to deny their freedom.

If it wishes, a state may adopt a passive role in world affairs, renounce the use of military power for any purpose, and for its

continued freedom and independence depend on the elements of power and influence other than military. How reliable such dependence will be is very uncertain. The state cannot, however, renounce the use of military power itself and expect that other states will come to its aid and use military power to defend it, unless it occupies such a strategic position that its neutrality or the use of its territory is to the military-political interest of the defender. Iceland is a *partial* case in point.

As a consequence of this condition, those who in this world of continuing conflict advocate the renunciation of military power should have a clear idea of how freedom and independence can be maintained or renounce them too. Ultimately, this becomes a matter of objectives, assumptions and expectations. And always there is the question of responsibility. Is one willing to accept moral responsibility for the consequences of the policies and actions one recommends? It is well to bear in mind that the free societies survived in Western Europe subsequent to 1940 only because of the effective exercise of military power by the United States.

Furthermore, when thinking in terms of common defense in cases of aggression, they should bear in mind that in spite of the long efforts of a United Nations Committee, the distinction between aggression and defense is still not clear.

It is not likely that in the near future any effective world government can be created except by the application of authoritative military power in a manner that greatly restricts human freedom without necessarily providing a better economic or cultural condition for the people of the world. If, however, a world organization with the authority to supersede or overrule the sovereignty of individual nation-states eventually is evolved, it too will need to use military power and force with wisdom, restraint and effectiveness. In either case, national or supernational, the same fundamental principles governing the creation and use of military power will apply. The foregoing applies generally to all nations that value their freedom. The United States because of its great power and wide responsibilities is, however, a special case.

The United States must develop its defense policies, create and deploy its armed forces in the face of four major uncertainties—three foreign and one domestic:

Is the Soviet Union increasing its armaments in order to: support military aggression or blackmail to achieve world domination? Defend its territory and political-economic position against

outside aggression? Attain a better bargaining position in its negotiations with the United States?

As for the Soviets, they themselves probably are not certain precisely why they are taking these actions. Therefore, the best policy for the United States is to maintain strong balanced flexible forces but not to strive to maintain maximum "security" in all contingencies. We should take risks, while at the same time pursuing a policy of negotiation. The domestic uncertainty is quite different:

How will the 1973 War Powers Resolution and the recent legislative restrictions on intelligence activities affect the ability of the United States to use military power and force effectively?

This might be a stabilizing factor; it might be dangerously destabilizing. No one knows and no one even knows how to find the answer before the crisis confrontation itself.

A simple summary: the structure, the size, and organization and the equipment of the U.S. Armed Forces, and hence the nature and scale of its military procurement, are directly dependent on two critical concepts—the concept of nuclear strategy and the concept of power projection.

It would be ridiculous to attempt to discuss all aspects or concepts of "nuclear strategy" or "power projection" in any depth. Suffice it to say that honest, powerful, well-informed and competent men differ very widely in these matters, and that there is no reason to expect such men to change their opinions and advocacy of programs easily or quickly. Rather they can be expected to use their positions of power both to influence the actions of government and to gain and increase legislative, bureaucratic and popular support for their positions.

We can expect the continuing controversy to include semantic confusion and deliberate obfuscation. We can expect that, as so often in a free society, the decisions taken will be compromises and that no individual program will be funded to the degree desired by its advocates. We can expect that most of the programs actually authorized will subsequently be modified by the acts of legislatures.

In other words, the U.S. position will be equivocal because that is the way our system of government actually operates. This creates its own "security risk" that probably is as great as the risk incurred by any other position. The Soviet position will appear to be equivocal because we don't know enough about the Soviet decision process to distinguish between what is inherent in the process and what is an intentional act to create uncertainty in our decision process.

Insofar as the military system is concerned the most important part of internal freedom lies in the principle of civilian control of the military. This, of course, has many features, but in this context the essentials can be stated briefly. The theory, doctrine and philosophy of civilian control of the military establish that:

The decision to use overt military force is a political decision of the gravest importance. In a free society this decision should be made at the highest political level by civilians who can depend upon the loyalty, competence and combat effectiveness of a professional and nonpolitical military force.

This professional military force must be prepared to fight effectively regardless of whether or not a state of war has been declared and, subject to the limits of logistic capability, regardless of the geographic location of the combat.

Finally, in developing national policy and strategy, it is important to distinguish between morality and moralism. Specifically, it is not only silly but it is moralistic to advocate activist policies to support and preserve freedom throughout the world without recognizing the implications for the creating and sustained support of military forces. It is moralistic to propose the construction and maintenance of large armed forces without being able and willing to deal with the harsh realities of morale, discipline, and combat effectiveness as they are related to the inevitable working of the logistic snowball and national economics.

Above all it is both moralistic and naive to think that a free society based on freely elected representative government can be permanently protected from destruction by any amount of military organization, men, and weapons if within that society:

Profligate careless waste is a style of life encouraged by the example of fools and the exhortations of advertisers;

The administration of law is concerned more with legal technicalities in pursuit of an abstract concept of perfect justice than with the substance of guilt or innocence;

The people are unwilling to pay the cost of a modern segregated penal system that provides a decent chance for rehabilitation;

The basic economic system is dependent on the avoidance of labor-intensive business and industry, while at the same time population growth and an urban ghetto education system produce vast numbers of uneducated and untrained young men and women who are irresponsible and incompetent. Unrestrained, these factors in combination, together with inflation, will wreck the internal

freedom of a society regardless of how secure its external freedom may be.

The concept of a free society in our modern world is now being weighed in the balance of fate; for rather than live in continued chaos and anarchy, people will accept authoritarianism for a generation or more. A small, dedicated, well-educated, professional military force of balanced capabilities, high morale, and discipline can provide the military protection the society needs; and, at the same time, provide the core of a system of national service that extends the concept of useful work and responsible citizenship without which all the pretension to sustained freedom are moralistic delusions.

Such a military force can be designed and built, not by writers and scholars but by military professionals in positions of responsible authority who not only understand military theory, but also have the courage, the good sense, and the faith of the eternal verities.

Finally, freedom, justice, tranquility, and prosperity are fundamentally incompatible. If by chance in any one large area, they all happen to be achieved at what may be called a satisfactory level, it will be a temporary condition:

None is ever absolute. They all are relative.

"Satisfactory" itself is uncertain.

Man's dissatisfaction with his state of being, whatever it may be, is inherent in his sense of imagination and personal aspiration. When I say that the survival of the free society is at stake, I refer to individual nations that now so class themselves. I do not refer to the concept, the spirit, and the ultimate return of free institutions. If a particular society falls to authoritarianism, it means that the custodians of freedom have failed to preserve their inheritance. It does not mean that freedom is dead. It does mean that at another time other men will strive and die to restore freedom. How many generations must live and die in chaos or under tyranny before such restoration is unpredictable. Will it be one generation? Five? Ten? Twenty?

The free societies' greatest hope lies in the concept that the ferment of freedom creates a strength and resiliency whose endurance despite turmoil defies logic and confounds the pessimists. This is the Faith of Our Fathers.

APPENDIX A

COMMENTS FROM THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS¹

For 27 years the clock of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* has symbolized the threat of nuclear doomsday hovering over mankind. The minute hand, never far from midnight, has advanced and retreated with the ebb and flow of international power politics, registering basic changes in the level of the continuing danger in which people have lived since the dawn of the nuclear age.

A few years ago the minute hand was pulled back to 12 minutes to midnight as a consequence of the signing of the first arms control agreements that emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was an event that seemed to usher in a new era of sanity in superpower nuclear arms policies. In recognition that our hopes for an awakening of sanity were premature and that the danger of nuclear doomsday is measurably greater today than it was in 1972, the clock has been moved forward to 9 minutes to midnight.

We do not thereby venture a prediction of when, or even whether, a nuclear holocaust may come, or to imply that the likelihood of its occurrence can somehow be closely calibrated. We offer instead an assessment and a warning. Our assessment is that in these past years, and in particular these past few months, the international nuclear arms race has gathered momentum and is now more than ever beyond control. Our warning is that so long as control continues to elude us civilization faces a growing risk of catastrophe

In anticipation of limitations agreements that have never come to pass or were of little consequence, more and more weapons have been built and tested, and more and more weapons systems have been developed and deployed. Far from restraining the forces which it was intended to curb, SALT has sustained and nourished them, providing acceptable channels for conducting business as usual.

* * *

Thus we find that the United States today, while talking peace, is developing new generations of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, each more terrifying, more efficient, and more lethal than the last, and that the situation in the Soviet Union is much the same. We find policy-makers on both sides increasingly ensnared, frustrated, and neutralized by domestic forces having a vested interest in the amassing of strategic inventories. The worldwide arsenal of nuclear warheads continues its astronomical upward spiral

To these threats from the established nuclear powers we must now add the new threat of continued proliferation of the nuclear powers themselves. India's explosion of a nuclear device in May further broadened the geographical and political base for nuclear weaponry. It loosened another restraint on nuclear weapons development and raised anew the spectre of the spread of nuclear arms to other governments and regions. India's decision to join the "nuclear club" may have set in motion a train of reaction which could greatly enhance the chances of a local dispute igniting a nuclear conflagration.

* * *

Indeed, the adaptability of nuclear fuels for use as weapons poses a growing danger to all people in these times of increasing reliance on nuclear energy to meet the power demands of industrial societies that are increasingly vulnerable to the disruptive acts of desperate individuals and organizations. The nuclear trigger which threatens the lives of millions, if not the peace of the world, is no longer within the grasp of just a very few. The failure of governments to face this ugly fact constitutes another measure of the increasing danger in which we all live.

Taken together, these considerations impel the forward movement of the *Bulletin* clock.

APPENDIX B

POWER

Men who immerse themselves in the maelstrom of power and political maneuvering survive by their intuitive grasp of the manipulation of power. They think so much in terms of the self-serving reactions of their rivals and associates that they may become unable to think in other terms. Their powers of objective analysis and constructive thought become atrophied or stultified. They assume that all men are the same.

In Washington, D.C., in addition to elected and appointed officials, three groups are of special interest for the power they exercise—the Congressional aides and assistants; the lobbyists; and the regularly assigned members of the Washington press and news media, professional public relations men and organizations. They constitute an important part of the informal organizations of government based on special lines and control of information.

The first two groups have a special association and interaction with the upper level of government bureaucracy and civil service.

The press and media have their special informal association and hierarchy of prestige and power. They both cooperate with and oppose the working of the other two groups. Alcohol, sex, gossip, expense accounts, clubs and restaurants are part of the environment in which they operate.

Chester Barnard in his splendid book, *Functions of the Executive*, devotes one chapter to the "Informal Aspects of Organization."

The political romanticist regards this situation as an evil that should be extirpated by stringent laws and codes of ethics. The opportunist tries to exploit it. The realist accepts it as inherent in the process of a free government and tries to understand it.

The resignation of Daniel Moynihan as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in January 1976 is used by one writer to illustrate "...how Washington works. It showed how power brokers maneuver to bring about resignations and to avoid outright dismissals... public words of praise are often the signal that privately something quite different is going on."¹ Gelb

further states that the vehicle for such action is usually the news organization, but that often the drawing rooms of Washington society are used. If the signal to resign, conveyed privately through columnists, reporters, or social conversation is not accepted, other techniques are used to induce the person to resign rather than cause the damaging controversy of outright dismissal. These techniques include: stating indirectly that the person no longer has access to his superior in office; discrediting the person openly or implying that he is "not objective"; cutting him off from the normal and expected sources and channels of information.²

This is a combination of charade and political ritual that is well understood by the participants.

This may well be considered as the legitimate lubricant of politics. But still it is more than that. In many respects, it is similar to the blatant deception of much advertising, the specious moralism of many editorials and the posturing of political candidates who endorse the varying objectives of many groups and make absurd promises to the electorate—all for the purpose of creating an image that may well have little or no relation to the substance of the major issues that affect the welfare of man. In fact much of this may be for the deliberate purpose of distracting attention from such issues.

While considered both inevitable and harmless by many people, this nevertheless constitutes a significant part of the cultural background in which more serious corruption finds justification in the rationalization of businessmen and officials who must deal with each other on the basis of protracted and intimate discussions and negotiations to accomplish the legitimate business of government.

This kind of political maneuvering has semantic implications of special importance to the conduct of military operations. For instance, the 14 July 1967 conference between President Johnson, Secretary McNamara and Generals Wheeler and Westmoreland was deliberately designed to convey an impression of unity and confidence in the outcome of a difficult and frustrating conflict where unity was sadly lacking and confidence was so weak that within a few months Secretary McNamara had changed his mind and was replaced and within 8 months President Johnson had admitted his failure by refusing to run for reelection.

For many good men such posturing literally was a death sentence.

This maelstrom is a lawyer's paradise, for among other matters it involves the intricacies of contract law, tax law, legislative

procedure and the power and operation of congressional committees.

Overlooking all we find the Diplomatic Corps with all its social prestige and special channels of information.

Those in power, such as described, are well aware of the power of the news media and consciously or subconsciously (instinctively) seek to manipulate the media by various means such as "background talks" to selected reporters, the slanting of news releases in a manner favorable to a particular cause, news leaks, and careful timing of news releases.

The exercise of power and influence in this environment poses important and at times difficult problems of ethics and personal integrity.

Some of the news reported in January and February 1976 illustrates how the great size and global diversity of defense industry serves as an inducement to improper conduct.

A 23 January 1976 news release stated:

The Defense Department announced today that 38 Pentagon civilian officials and officers including 9 Admirals and 17 Air Force Generals had been admonished for accepting entertainment at a Maryland hunting lodge maintained by the Northrop Corporation, a major defense contractor.³

These officials were informed that they had used poor judgment in such action that violated the Defense Department regulations prohibiting accepting gratuities from defense contractors. The article went on to report that other contractors had similarly entertained officials and that members of Congress and Congressional aides had also accepted such hospitality.

On 15 February 1976, *The New York Times* published a list of reported payments abroad by American companies for political contributions, sales commissions, bribes and other purposes whose legality both abroad and in the United States is uncertain.⁴

This followed disclosures of admitted bribes of a total of \$22 million by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to foreign government officials to promote the sale of its aircraft.⁵ Among other things a Lockheed employee wrote to a Lockheed official that the company "... must be prepared to go as high as \$120,000 per airplane for the cumshaw part"

The news magazine, *Time*, in an eight-page feature article described the reports of a U.S. Senate Subcommittee as:

The unending flow of disclosures of corporate bribes and illegal political contributions to officials in the U.S. and abroad has spread a darkening stain over the global reputation of American business.⁶

After tracing the history of these disclosures from the investigation of the Watergate scandal and subsequent investigations of the Securities and Exchange Commission and others, *Time* further commented:

What surprises many U.S. businessmen who have any knowledge of overseas markets is that the bribery revelations have so shocked Congress and the public . . . *dash, baksheesh, pots de vin, la mordida*—in a word bribery—is an ancient and accepted practice necessary in many countries to get any business done.⁷

When Opinion Research Corporation polled upper and middle-level managers on the question of whether bribes should be paid to officials in countries where such practice is standard, 48 percent said yes. Another survey of 73 international executives produced similar results, three-quarters saying that they had been solicited while others added that such demands are a serious business problem.⁸

Later, in discussing the work of agents and middlemen, legitimate occupations requiring great knowledge and ability for success, *Time* listed some of the details of their normal, important and legitimate work and pointed out that “. . . it often is next to impossible to determine how much of the agents fee is a legitimate expense and how much is passed on in bribes”⁹

The reaction of some of the employees of the Lockheed Corporation to the reports of secret payments to government officials abroad is an interesting commentary on the cultural environment and the pragmatic perceptions of ordinary people on matters of self-interest, business ethics and public morality.

One secretary said: “Everybody’s doing it That’s the name of the game, that’s the way business is done all over the world these days. Why do they need to pick on Lockheed.” Many employees conceded “that self-interest was at the root of their acceptance of the practices. The morality of the issue . . . was less important than their own job security.” One man commented: “This attitude that a company has to bribe somebody to get business is really ingrained.”¹⁰

In considering these matters we should remember that official and business bribery has been accepted as the normal way of life in many parts of the world for several thousand years. It has only been in a few countries for a few generations that it has been popularly regarded as particularly reprehensible. This has been especially true in those nations where the military personnel and civil servants have been very poorly paid or when excessive inflation has destroyed the value of their statutory salaries.

Some authoritarian governments (for example, apparently the People's Republic of China) have overcome this by wholesale summary executions or long terms of hard labor for those accused of bribery and other government corruption.

APPENDIX C

ETERNAL VERITIES

From time to time in this work, I have used the term "The Eternal Verities" without specifying what they are and what they signify other than being generalized pious exhortations to wisdom and virtue.

To me, the Ten Commandments and certain aphorisms represent basic truths drawn from man's cumulative experience in recorded history. These expressions, these ideas, most frequently come from our classics, the Bible, the Greek tragedies, the poets and playwrights of Western civilization. There never will be a definitive list.

They are generalizations, they are trite in the sense that most people have heard them repeatedly—so much so that "familiarity breeds contempt." And yet from time to time the recognition of their continuing applicability comes with surprising force.

For example: "Honesty is the best policy" is a shocking commentary of the American political scandal, Watergate. "Of course, everyone knows that!" one might say. But how often do we remember that the entire structure of human organization and economic and social intercourse must be based on the assumption that most human beings act with good faith and honesty most of the time; that bad faith and dishonesty are the exception, not the rule, and must so continue lest we collapse utterly.

It has been fashionable to sneer at the motto of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and General Douglas MacArthur's great speech on "Duty, Honor and Country."

We should be contemptuous, not of the ideal but rather of those who take the oath of office with no intention of trying to live by the ideal.

Could there be a better commentary on the U.S. Government's policy in Southeast Asia from 1963 to 1972 and subsequent political tragedies than "Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall." Can any modern critic speak more aptly than the Book of Proverbs?

The sins of the fathers are visited upon their children. This is the perfect commentary on both the pollution of our environment and the destruction of the central areas of major American cities by degenerating ghettos.

The Eternal Verities are valuable to the degree that they serve as a continuing warning to people that no amount of science nor of technological devices ever can be a substitute for intellectual and moral discipline and integrity.

The brain and the mind are not identical and only as the transcendent mysterious workings of the mind govern the brain of man will the free society survive.

The distinction and the relation between the human brain and the human mind are far from certain. In a recent abstruse but provocative article, a distinguished neurophysiologist and neurosurgeon commented:

Let us consider what light our positive neurophysiological evidence can throw on the nature of man's being.

If there is only one fundamental element in man's being, then neuron action within the brain must account for all the mind does. The "indispensable substratum" of consciousness is in the higher brainstem. Action in the highest brain-mechanism seems to correspond with that of the mind. This mechanism, as it goes out of action in sleep and resumes action on waking, may switch off the mind and switch it on. It may, one may suggest, do this by supplying and by taking away the energy that might come to the mind from the brain. But to expect the highest brain-mechanism or any set of reflexes, however complicated, to carry out what the mind does, and thus perform all the functions of the mind, is quite absurd.¹

Sir Richard Livingstone commented:

The most highly civilized nation is the one whose values are highest, which knows the first-rate and achieves it in the qualities and activities which crown human life.²

Politicians assert that the measures they advocate will give to us the peace and prosperity we all pretend to seek! Occasionally wealthy men will produce fine creative work, but this is not normally to be expected.

The great artistic and intellectual achievements of man come out of situations and circumstances associated with turmoil, violence, suffering, disorder, and discontent.

This is one of the great and permanent paradoxes of the human state!

Bernard Shaw's comment is pertinent:

There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The other is to gain it.³

Happiness and beauty are by-products. Folly is the direct pursuit of happiness and beauty.⁴

Great original achievement requires the driving force either of some ideal vision or of a passionate discontent to build up the inner tension that is fulfilled or released by creative expression.

As the first rate is nurtured in the mind of man, it may take on the quality of nobility, both in concept and in manner of expression, such that it both adorns its source and transcends its national origin so as to inspire all mankind.

William Blackstone has said:

These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator Himself in all his dispositions conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to everyone his due: to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be attained than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wanted some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance its inseparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to enquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self love, the

universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly furnished (sic); but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, "that man should pursue his own happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics or natural law. For the several articles, into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating that or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is part of the law of nature: or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's real happiness and therefore the law nature forbids it.⁵

NOTES

PREFACE

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1. Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 289.

2. Jerome S. Bruner, *The Process of Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 31-32, 58, 62.

3. B.H. Liddell Hart, "What Is Military Genius?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1959, p. 21.

4. Vivian J. Rohrl-Wedge and Bryant Wedge, "The Role of Perception in International Politics," *International Studies Newsletter*, Preliminary Issue A, Fall 1973, pp. 32-50. This paper has an excellent bibliography of over 100 basic related studies.

5. Ernest W. Lefever, "Moralism and U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Brookings Institution Reprint No. 276*, 1973. Originally in *Orbis*, Summer 1972, pp. 396-410.

6. T.D. Weldon, *The Vocabulary of Politics* (Hammondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1953), pp. 75-79.

7. Wendell Johnson, *People in Quandaries: The Semantics of Personal Adjustment* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), pp. 13, 14, 15, 18.

8. Lefever, p. 407.

9. Adapted from an outline of ideas in a *Study of Comparative Culture* conducted in 1971-1972 at the U.S. Naval War College by Dimitri B. Shimkin.

10. The term "semantics" first appeared in 1900 as the title of the translation of Michel Breals' 1897 *Essai de Semantique*. In 1923 C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards wrote their book, *The Meaning of Meaning*, an inquiry into the modes and causes of verbal misunderstanding. Thereafter, the students of Alfred Korzybski, who founded the Institute of General Semantics, wrote extensively on the pervasive importance of precise language. Among these, Samuel I. Hayakawa, Irving J. Lee, Wendell Johnson, Stuart Chase and Anatol Rapoport have discussed the harmful political and social consequences and the misuse and distortion of words.

11. Editorial, "The 'Galilean Accent' Today," *The Living Church*, 20 October 1974, p. 13.

12. Richard Gambino, "Watergate Lingo—A Language of Non-Responsibility," *Freedom at Issue*, November-December 1973, p. 8.

13. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Politics and the American Language," *The American Scholar*, Fall 1974, pp. 555-557.

CHAPTER II—THE FREE SOCIETY: ITS NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS

1. Sergei Kovalyov, "Sovereignty and International Duties," *Pravda*, 26 September 1968 quoted in *Survival*, November 1968, p. 377.

2. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications*, Reprint No. 246 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 42.

3. C.L. Sulzberger, "The Army Ploughs the Sea," *The New York Times*, 7 December 1975, p. 15.

4. Raymond D. Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," *Freedom At Issue*, January-February 1973, p. 2.

5. "The Comparative Survey of Freedom VII," *Freedom At Issue*, January-February 1977, p. 15.

6. *U.S. News & World Report*, 12 August 1974, p. 28.

7. *Sound*, The Sony Guide to Music 74/75. A new annual magazine dedicated to student interests in music, published by Approach 13-30 Corp., Knoxville, Tenn., September 1974, under Sony sponsorship, p. 5.

8. Illustrative of the semantic problem of today, the word "violence" is used to indicate both the physical form and injury by profanation or infringement, not as separate meanings but as equivalent meanings with one being allegedly justified by the other and with the second meaning being almost boundless in definition and ultimately used to justify all forms of terrorism.

9. To cite only one of many similar news items in recent years, "Crimes by Women are on Rise all Over the World," *U.S. News & World Report*, 11 December 1975, states that in the past decade in the United States crimes by women have increased by 82 percent and that this general pattern is observed in many other nations.

10. Enid Nemy, "Violence in Schools Now Seen as Norm Across the Nation," *The New York Times*, 14 June 1975, p. 1. "Crime and violence in varying degrees have become the norm in schools throughout the country." The article goes on to report that an estimated 70,000 teachers require medical attention each year for injuries from student assaults, that school vandalism costs about \$500 million per year, and that murder, rape, and armed robbery are common; that many students now carry weapons for protection and that when the president of the Cleveland Board of Education proposed to search students or their lockers for weapons and make parents more responsible, he was censured by judges and by the Cleveland branch of the American Civil Liberties Union for invading students' rights.

11. Previous notes discussed the movement of agricultural laborers, displaced by technological advances, to the urban areas.

12. This has reached the point that a well-known political satirist, in commenting on U.S. income tax, writes of: "... the conspiracy of lawyers which is known as government" Russell Baker, "All is Moss and Confusion," *The New York Times*, 6 January 1976, p. 33:1.

13. Personal discussion with author at the Logistics Symposium conducted by the Washington Operations Research Council in Washington, D.C., 17 September 1963.

14. Macklin Fleming, *The Price of Perfect Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 21.

15. Irving Kristol, "Thoughts on Reading about a Summer-camp Cabin Covered with Garbage," *The New York Times Magazine*, 17 November 1974, pp. 133-135.

16. Joseph P. Lyford, "Breakdown of Community," *The Center Magazine*, November/December 1975, pp. 38-39.

17. Joseph B. Treaster, "Crime in Schools Reported on Rise," *The New York Times*, 9 March 1976, p. 38.

CHAPTER III—MILITARY POWER

1. Bertrand de Jouvenal, *Sovereignty—An Inquiry Into the Political Good*, trans. J.F. Huntington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1963), pp. 32-33.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

3. Arthur Larson, et al., *Sovereignty Within the Law* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1965), p. 23.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 28.

5. W.J. Stankiewicz, "Sovereignty," *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 15th ed., v. 17, p. 309.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 313.

7. D.D. Raphael, "The State," *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 15th ed., v. 17, p. 610.

8. Georg Schwarzenberger, "International Law," *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 15th ed., v. 9, p. 747.

9. Raphael, p. 610.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Larson, et al., p. 11.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

13. John N. Hazard, "Soviet Law," in Larson, et al., p. 274.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

15. "Kissinger Speaks of Force As Last Step in Oil Crisis," *The New York Times*, 3 January 1973, p. 2.

16. "Will U.S. Seize Mideast Oil?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 2 December 1974, p. 18.

17. Paul Ramsay, *The Just War—Force and Political Responsibility* (New York: Scribners, 1968), p. 7.
18. Herbert Rosinski, *Power and Human Destiny* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 13, 14.
19. *The New York Times*, 15 April 1974, p. 1.
20. *Ibid.*, 15 December 1974, p. 21.
21. *The Economist*, 21 December 1974, p. 33.
22. Innis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 6.
23. Henry Kissinger, "We Are Determined to Resist Expansionism," *U.S. News & World Report*, 15 March 1976, p. 29.

CHAPTER IV—STRATEGY

1. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy, The Indirect Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1954), pp. 335-336.
2. U.S. Naval War College, *Sound Military Decision* (Newport, R.I.: 1942), p. 9.
3. This was written by Dr. Herbert Rosinski in September 1955, following informal discussions with the President of the Naval War College, Vice Adm. Lynde McCormick, and his Chief of Staff, Rear Adm. Thomas H. Robbins, Jr.
4. Duncan Ballantine, *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 3.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by O.J. Matthjis Jolles (New York: Random House Modern Library, 1943), Book I, p. 16, Book VIII, p. 596.
6. Liddell Hart, p. 336.
7. Edward Lasker, *Chess Strategy* (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 17.
8. U.S. Naval War College, pp. 10-11.
9. See Henry E. Eccles, "Suez 1956, Some Military Lessons," *Naval War College Review*, March 1969, pp. 28-56.
10. Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. IV, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions (May 1942-August 1942)* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1949), pp. 80-81.
11. B.H. Liddell Hart, "Strategy of a War," *Military Review*, November 1968, pp. 80-81.
12. Clausewitz, Book I, p. 18.

CHAPTER V—NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGY

1. Excerpts from Brezhnev's keynote speech at the Soviet Party's 25th Congress, *The New York Times*, 25 February 1976, p. 14.
2. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers, Part I, Targets and Weapons Systems*, Adelphi Papers, No. 106 (London: 1974), p. 2.
3. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy—Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 11.
4. Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 212-213.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
6. Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Defense: A Theoretical Introduction," *American Defense Policy*, Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 99, 103. Reprinted from Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). Glenn Snyder's excellent article "Deterrence and Defense: A Theoretical Introduction," originally written in 1961 as part of a larger work, still stands as one of the best presentations of this complex subject. The compilation, *American Defense Policy*, in which Snyder's article was published, relates deterrence to the other elements of policy in excellent and comprehensive fashion.
7. Comment of James E. King on author's draft manuscript, 10 May 1976.
8. Frank Knox, "Criteria for Strategic Weapons," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1973, p. 53.
9. Implicit in Laurence Martin's "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine," *Survival*, July/August 1974, p. 159.

10. M.A. Milshetyn and L.S. Semeyko, "SALT II, A Soviet View," *Survival*, March/April 1974, p. 66. (Reprinted from *USA/Economics, Politics, Ideology*, No. 12, 1973.)

11. I. Savilov, "Nuclear Weapons and War," *Red Star* (Moscow), 30 October 1970. (Reprinted in *Survival*, March 1971, pp. 90-93.)

The art of conducting military operations with the use of nuclear weapons and that of employing conventional forces have many fundamental differences. But they are not in opposition, are not mutually exclusive, and are not isolated one from the other; on the contrary, they are closely correlated and are developing as a single whole.

12. *The Military Balance 1975-76* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), Table 1, pp. 71-72.

13. Laurence Martin, "Theatre Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *Survival*, November/December 1974, p. 268.

14. "Report to Congress by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Documentation: Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe," *Survival*, September/October 1974, p. 235.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

16. James Schlesinger, "Hearings on Strategic Doctrine," March 1974, p. 11, quoted in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Limited Nuclear Options*, Adelphi Papers, No. 121 (London: Winter 1975-1976), p. 7.

17. Martin, "Theatre Nuclear Weapons in Europe," p. 268.

18. Armand Clesse of Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science de Paris in commenting on General Pierre Gallois' book, *La Grande Berne* [The Big Deceit] (Paris: Plon, 1975), in *Survival* January/February 1976, pp. 40-41.

19. The magnitude of the U.S. Command, Control and Communications System is indicated by the statement of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's *Report to the Congress on FY 1977 Budget and Its Implications for the FY 1978 Authorization Request and the FY 1977-1981 Defense Program* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 222:

Our complex requirements that we must impose on our C³ system are complicated further by the possibility of worldwide use of our forces as well as by the global nature of potential sources of vital intelligence information. To meet these needs, we are requesting \$3.7 billion for the FY 1977 Telecommunications and Command and Control program. This is an increase over the \$3.3 billion approved for FY 1976, and is necessary if we are to address shortcomings and sustain our initiatives for the future.

CHAPTER VI—LIMITED WAR AND CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

1. Harrison Salisbury wrote one of the few published accounts of this war published in the United States, "Russians to Mark '39 Mongolia War," *The New York Times*, 24 May 1965, p. 8.

2. *The Center Magazine*, March-April 1976, pp. 2-69.

3. Personal letter to author from Lyman Kirkpatrick, 18 January 1974.

4. *Year Book of United Nations 1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 87-95.

5. Paul Hoffman, "Terrorism or Liberation Struggle? Violence Begets Many New Nations," *The New York Times*, 31 October 1974, p. 5.

6. Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975).

7. Office of Chief of Military History, "Cross Channel Attack," Appendix B, "Overlord, Directive to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 31 January 1944," *United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1951):

2. Task. You will enter the Continent of Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the continent is the month of May 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy

6. *Coordination of Operations of Other Forces and Agencies.* In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, sea and air force agencies of

sabotage, subversion and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.

8. Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., *The U.S. Intelligence Community* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1973). The jacket lists 13 U.S. Government agencies engaged in intelligence work: CIA, FBI, NSA, DIA, INR, Treasury, AEC, NSC, OSI, ONT, ACSI, A-2, G-2. Thereafter, he discusses their structure, accountability and control, pp. 45-81.

9. This was written by Dr. Herbert Rosinski in September 1955, following informal discussions with the President of the Naval War College, Vice Adm. Lynde McCormick, and his Chief of Staff, Rear Adm. Thomas H. Robbins, Jr.

10. Régis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution," *Monthly Review* (Special Issue) July-August 1967, p. 58:

To risk all means that, having risen in the mountains, the fighters must wage a war to the death, a war that does not admit of truces, retreats, or compromises. To conquer is to accept as a matter of principle that life, for the revolutionary, is not the supreme good.

CHAPTER VII—CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1. Arthur D. Larson, *Civil-Military Relations and Militarism*, A Bibliography, Bibliography Series No. 9 (Manhattan, Kans.: University Library, 1971), p. 31.

2. The behavior and control of dynamic adaptive systems lies in the realm of cybernetics and involves forms of analysis far beyond the scope of this work.

3. Sir John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: The London Times, 1962), Lees Knowles Lectures, pp. 3, 63.

4. One example is Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions, A Book of Case Studies* (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963). Nine scholars have analyzed 11 important cases from 1931 to 1951 in which difficult substantive civil-military issues were at stake. Seven of these involved major problems with allies of the United States.

5. *Ibid.*, Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," pp. 466-567. This is a fine analysis of a bitter struggle that, among other things, resulted in the resignation of the Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan in April and the removal of Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Louis Denfeld in October 1949. In particular, the summary of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee of 1 March 1950 is a splendid exposition of many of the fundamentals of sound civil-military relations and of civilian control of the military. See the National Defense Program Unification and Strategy Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, 81st Congress, 1st Session.

6. John C. Ries, *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). This is an excellent, relatively brief account of the problems inherent in the postwar reorganization in the United States, together with some comments on the administrative philosophy and the consequences which have been experienced.

7. While the question of how changes in defense management were related to national and worldwide economic and sociological changes is important, it is beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, two major points are significant. The period was characterized by enormous cost overruns in all forms of government procurement and construction, including not only military weapons systems but also in such wholly civilian projects as the Senate and House Office buildings, the John F. Kennedy Center for the Arts in Washington, and the Albany Civic Center complex. The assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, his brother Senator Robert Kennedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King had a cumulative shock effect that reverberated throughout the sociopolitical structure of the Western World, changing peoples perceptions, with both short-range and long-range effects on the conduct of affairs.

8. Robert Art, *The TFX Decision, McNamara and the Military* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. x.

9. Henry E. Eccles, "The TFX F-111 Aircraft, A Perspective in Military Command and Management," *Naval War College Review*, April 1971, pp. 66-87.

10. U.S. Army War College, "Study on Military Professionalism," Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 30 June 1970, pp. B-1-10.

11. Henry L. Trewhitt, *McNamara* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 226-227.

12. U.S. Dept. of the Army, *U.S. Army Staff Officer's Field Manual*, FM 101-5 (Washington: July 1960).

13. Ries, p. 197.

14. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), particularly Chapter 4, "Vietnam: How We Became Involved," is a splendid discussion of this controversial subject.

15. This topic is further developed by David J. Mooney in a paper, "The Roles of the Military Industrial Complex," a research project for The George Washington University at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 6 February 1973, and published in *Logistic Spectrum* (the technical journal of the Society of Logistic Engineers), April 1974, pp. 9-15.

16. For example: John W. Finney describes the discussion as to the size of the next year's defense budget as depending on a "political chess game being played between two young and ambitious officials—Donald H. Rumsfeld, the new Secretary of Defense, and James T. Lynn, the director of the Office of Management and Budget." The article went on to discuss the maneuverings for influence with President Ford and other aspects of the personal power struggle among civilian officials in the government. John W. Finney, "Rumsfeld Fights Lynn on Arms Budget Cuts," *The New York Times*, 6 December 1975, pp. 1, 16.

17. This decision has of course been the subject of much controversy in recent years as shown by the Cooper-Church Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1970-71 and the Joint War Powers Resolution of 7 November 1973. The issue, however, is one between the Legislature and the President rather than between the civilian and the military professional.

18. Malcolm Cagle, "Task Force 77 in Action off Vietnam," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1972, pp. 108-109.

19. For those who wish to further explore these subjects, I highly recommend: Morton H. Halperin, *The President and the Military*, Reprint No. 224 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications*, Reprint No. 246 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972); Morton H. Halperin, et al., *The "X" Factor in Foreign Policy (Highlights of Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy)*, Research Report No. 140 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975); William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, *The Organizational Politics of Defense*, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Association, 1974).

20. Halperin, *The President and the Military*, p. 320.

CHAPTER VIII—THE MILITARY, THE MEDIA, AND PUBLIC OPINION

1. Ferment—a state of agitation, intense activity—a process of active often disorderly development. I consider it unrealistic for the people of any nation to expect to achieve simultaneously a state of freedom, peace, prosperity, and domestic tranquillity. In a winery the fermentation of the grape produces noise and noxious gaseous stench. But, finally, beneath the obvious disagreeable scum, there may be a clear liquid which can be further distilled into an intoxicating liquor or matured to a great wine. Is this the democratic process?

2. Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962-1966), p. 47.

3. Lucien Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead* (Boston: Little, Brown, Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1954), p. 276. Further development of this theme is to be found on pp. 279, 302, and 306.

4. These matters have been thoroughly developed by Morton Halperin, particularly in Chapter Ten of his *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, in which he explores the techniques bureaucrats employ in using the press and the use of "leaks" as a standard bureaucratic behavior. He lists the following reasons for leaking information—to get the message through, to undermine rivals, to attract the attention of the President, to build support, to ensure implementation, to alert foreign governments, to get outside the executive branch in order to influence Congress and public opinion, to alert outside supporters, to affect public information, to inform a constituency, to announce a policy, and as a "trial balloon." In discussing the policymaking process in our government, he writes: "Participants with varying interests and constrained by the rules plan strategies to

get the decisions they want. Part of the strategy relates to information content and dissemination of information." Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 195.

5. Roy Reed, "Humphrey Active After X-Ray Ordeal," *The New York Times*, 15 April 1974, pp. 1, 26.

6. Sir Richard Livingstone, *Some Tasks for Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). These four lectures, "Education for the Modern World," "Education and the Training of Character," "Education for a Civilized Democracy," and "On Speaking the Truth," show that classical thought is indeed imperishable. The last is a superb commentary on the fundamental faults in the conduct of the Vietnam war and the U.S. Presidential election of 1972.

7. *Ibid.*, "On Speaking the Truth," pp. 74, 76, and 81.

8. Eugene P. Dvorin, ed., *The Senate's War Powers, Debate on Cambodia from the Congressional Record* (Chicago: Markham, 1971), p. 239. (Final Text of the Cooper-Church Amendment.)

9. Hedrick Smith, "Pentagon Acknowledges that Americans Landed at Phnom Penh Airport," *The New York Times*, 27 January 1971, p. 1.

10. Seymour Hersh, "U.S. Admits Rain-Making, 1967 to 1972, in Indochina," *The New York Times*, 19 May 1974, pp. 1, 11.

11. As a consequence of the public controversy arising from these and other events, the U.S. Congress on 7 November 1973, passed the Joint War Powers Resolution:

U.S. Congress on November 7, 1973, enacted into Law over President Nixon's veto a bill HJ Res 542 to place restrictions on the Executive's warmaking powers, the House by a vote of 284-135 four votes over the two-thirds majority needed. Four hours later the Senate voted 75 to 18 to override—a 13-vote margin.

The President's press secretary, R.L. Ziegler, commented that the President felt: "the action seriously undermines this nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis."

This HJ Res 542 offered a clear-cut vote on executive versus congressional powers. Congress with the Vietnam war and the showdown over continued bombing in Cambodia behind it, evidently was anxious to reassert itself over the country's foreign affairs.

It is still too soon to appraise the full consequences of this Joint War Powers Resolution. Obviously, it will greatly complicate the conduct of affairs in a military emergency.

12. *The New York Times*, 22 July 1973, p. E-3; 23 July 1973, p. 31; 24 July 1973, p. 35M; 31 July 1973, p. 1.

13. "General Wheeler's Testimony to Senate Committee," *The New York Times*, 31 July 1973, p. 4.

14. Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), pp. 500-501.

15. Turner C. Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Fidelis, 1966), pp. 173-174.

16. In a free society this control is exercised by persuasion; in a totalitarian society, by coercion.

17. Epistle of Paul to the Galatians, Chap. 6, verse 7.

CHAPTER IX—MILITARY LAW, JUSTICE, AND DISCIPLINE

1. These forces arising from the electronic/nuclear phase of the industrial revolution were previously discussed in Chapter I.

2. The search for and establishment of leading principles—always few—around which considerations of detail group themselves, will tend to reduce confusion of impression to simplicity and directness of thought, with consequent facility of comprehension.

3. Gerald Clarke, "When Terrorists Become Respectable," *Time*, 25 November 1974, pp. 44-45. This essay points out the irony of the Israeli suffering from Palestinian terrorism when the State of Israel itself might not have been established had it not been for the terrorists of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang who between 1944 and 1948, among other deeds, assassinated the British Administrator, Lord Moyne, the U.N. Mediator, Count Bernadotte, and murdered 254 Arabs in the village of Deir Yassin. He

states that the head of the Irgun was Menachem Begin. He concludes his comment: "The world appears willing to forget—if not forgive—most crimes of terrorism and to eventually honor those it once called criminal . . . after they have sheathed the knife and washed off the blood."

4. For purposes of this work, it is sufficient to list two authoritative references as sources for specific matters of international law to which, under the sanctions of the UCMJ and the Service Regulations, the military are bound. These references cover the Law of the Sea, The Hague Convention, and the Geneva Conventions. They govern the conduct of war and the relations between belligerents and neutral states. Burdick H. Brittin and Liselotte B. Watson, *International Law for Seagoing Officers* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972); *The Law of Land Warfare* (Washington: Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, 1956).

5. Second Corinthians, Chap. III, verse 6. Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, wrote an article in which he agreed with the comments of Chief Justice of the United States, Warren E. Burger, to the effect some members of the legal profession lacked the capacity to perform their functions well, not knowing how to try a lawsuit. Professor Kurland stated: "For certainly the judiciary—whether state or federal—is not, as it should be, made up of the most competent lawyers. It is, rather, a group chosen by politicians as a reward for political services The problem with both the bar and the bench is that in an egalitarian age, we have no zest for quality or excellence." He then went on to quote the late Judge Learned Hand who, after urging judges dealing with constitutional law to have an acquaintance with the works of the great philosophers and poets, wrote: " . . . For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions before him" Philip B. Kurland, "Polishing the Bar," *The New York Times*, 24 April 1975, p. 35.

6. Four Webster definitions seem to indicate that such exploitation is not a post-World War II invention! *Chicanery*: To prevent justice, trick, cheat; *Pettifog*: To engage in legal chicanery; *Pettifogger*: A lawyer whose methods are petty, underhanded, or disreputable; *shyster*; *Shyster*: (1840) One who is professionally unscrupulous especially in the practice of law—Pettifogger.

7. Jerrold K. Footlick, "Too Much Law?" *Newsweek*, 10 January 1977, p. 43:

The deluge of lawsuits is swamping the courts. The number of civil suits filed in Federal courts has doubled since 1960 and increased by more than one-third since 1970. From 1970 to 1975, the average number of cases pending before a U.S. district judge climbed from 285 to 355. The clog in state courts is worse. Since 1960, the total of lawsuits has more than tripled in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and doubled in Los Angeles County. In Cook County (Chicago), a negligence case can take four years to get to trial

This extraordinary rise in civil litigation comes at a time when the courts are already inundated by criminal cases. The number of violent crimes has increased by 199 percent since 1960 and the total number of crimes by 180 percent. The overload has increased pressure on the justice system to settle criminal cases through plea bargaining; the defendant usually pleads guilty to a lesser crime and the government avoids the expense and difficulty of taking him to trial.

William J. McGill, "Is Federal Regulation a Threat to Academic Freedom?" *Columbia Today*, March 1977, p. 34:

During a recent session of the American assembly at Columbia, a St. Louis banker, Leonall C. Anderson, noted that the *Federal Register*, where agencies publish their regulations, had grown from 3,450 pages in 1937 to 35,591 pages in 1973, 45,422 pages in 1974 and 60,221 pages in 1975. Not long ago a colleague pointed out to me that during the past year Congress enacted 402 laws, whereas in the same period 7,496 new federal regulations appeared.

Today any enterprise dependent on federal funds must, as a matter of course, organize itself to furnish a continuous flow of documentation to regulatory agencies in any of these areas. The paper flow is truly stupendous. I would estimate that Columbia University spends easily in excess of \$1 million each year just in meeting its various federal reporting obligations.

Wayne L. Hinthorn, "Findings Applicable to Industry and the Military," *Defense Systems Management Review*, Winter 1976, p. 66:

Similarly, the military program manager works in the midst of a myriad of governmental rules, regulations, reporting requirements, and audits of his

actions. Again, as necessary as all of these bureaucratic requirements may be, they must, of necessity, stifle innovation and retard progress.

8. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., *Justice and the Military* (Washington: A Project of the Public Law Education Institute, published in conjunction with the *Military Law Reporter*, 1972), p. 16.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 18, quoting Bishop, *Military Law*, 10th *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 312, D. Sills, ed., 1968.

10. *United States Law Week*, 42 LW 4979-4996; Jacob J. Parker, Warden, et al., v. Howard B. Levy, On Appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, #73-206, 19 June 1974.

11. Sir John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: The London Times, 1962), Lees Knowles Lectures, p. 63.

12. Robert Sherrill, *Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

13. Fred Gardner, *The Unlawful Concert—An Account of the Presidio Mutiny Case* (New York: Viking, 1970).

14. Three books written in laymen's language are recommended to those who wish to pursue this subject:

Sherrill. This is a scathing indictment of the military and the military justice system.

Joseph W. Bishop, *Justice Under Fire, a Study of Military Law* (New York: Charterhouse, 1974). This is a brief, clear history and defense of military justice which in referring to Sherrill's book and its popularity says: "I doubt that books of equal badness on any other legal topic would have found so ready a market. Why this peculiar receptiveness to worthless works on military law?" p. xiii.

And finally, Macklin Fleming, *The Price of Perfect Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Among other matters, he makes the points that the U.S. system of criminal justice has bogged down in legalistic and judicial technicalities designed to produce a perfect trial, but which lose sight of the fair trial and as a result the fundamental substance of guilt or innocence is lost.

15. This effort to emphasize the civil rights of members of the armed forces included organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Pacific Counselling Services that specialized in two legitimate general activities: first, providing legal counsel for servicemen in various cases before the courts; and second, providing counsel and education in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the various forms of military discharge. The New York-based GI Civil Defense Committee provided lawyers and publicists for eight U.S. Army enlisted men at Ft. Jackson, S.C., who in March 1969 were charged with disrespect, holding an illegal demonstration, and disobeying an order. In his book, *GIs Speak Out Against the War, The Case of the Ft. Jackson 8* (New York: Pathfinder, 1970), Fred Halstead discusses in detail "how a broad based multinational group of GIs was organized first at Ft. Jackson and then at other posts, to oppose the war in Vietnam.

16. This rejection took the form of destruction by burning, bombing, or vandalism of R.O.T.C. and Military Study facilities, forcible obstruction and personal assaults on speakers and forcible occupation of buildings.

17. In addition to the extensive reporting of My Lai in the press, the periodicals, and the law journals and reports, two books give accounts of the trials of Lieutenant Calley and Captain Medina that give a sense of the state of public opinion and reactions to the affair. Richard Hammer, *The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1971); Mary McCarthy, *Medina* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972). The former book is a 398-page factual account of Calley's trial with personal observations based on Hammer's extensive discussion with witnesses. The latter is a sketchy, highly emotional, sarcastic, and illuminating discussion of the acquittal of Calley's immediate superior.

18. "Excerpts From Secret Army Inquiry Into Mass Killings of Vietnamese at My Lai," *The New York Times*, 4 June 1972, p. 58.

19. *Ibid.*

20. "Events in Investigation," *The New York Times*, 18 March 1970, p. C-15.

21. *Ibid.*

22. M.B. Ridgway, "The Ordeal of the Army," *The New York Times*, 2 April 1971, p. 37.

23. *Military Law Reporter*, IMLR 2488 (Washington: Public Law Education Institute, September-December 1973).

24. Hammer, pp. 379-380.

25. "Text of Calley Prosecutor's Letter to the President," *The New York Times*, 7 April 1971, p. C-12.

26. *United States Law Week*, Court Decisions, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C., v. 43, no. 16, 43LW2158, 22 October 1974; Historic Documents 1974, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 857.

27. On 5 April 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the court-martial conviction of former Lt. William L. Calley, Jr. Thus, for all practical purposes the legal aftermath of the My Lai incident was ended. Lesley Delsner, "High Court Denies Appeal by Calley," *The New York Times*, 6 April 1976, p. 1.

28. William F. Long, Jr., "My Lai—A Matter of Nerves and Muscle," a paper written about 1970 at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

29. Fleming, pp. 4, 5, 9, and 67.

30. Howard L. Oleck, "Letters," *The New York Times*, 7 May 1975, p. 38.

31. Leonard Sloane, "Dishonest as Fact of Business," *The New York Times*, 11 May 1974, p. 43.

32. "Making Police Crime Unfashionable," *Time*, 6 May 1974, pp. 88-89.

33. "Kerner to Seek a Parole Soon," *The New York Times*, 28 August 1974, p. 33.

34. For example: *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington: Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense [DOD Pam. 1-20], 29 December 1960); Russell B. Reynolds, *The Officer's Guide* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, January 1966) 31st ed.; Harley F. Cope, revised by Howard Bucknell III, *Command at Sea* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1966), 3rd ed.

35. The term "Mickey Mouse" has been frequently used to denote the alleged trivia of military discipline.

36. T.E. Lawrence provides a striking illustration of discipline in his account of the pursuit of the retreating Turkish 4 Army between Deraa and Damascus on 27 September 1918.

The enemy had tried to halt and camp at sunset, but Khalid had shaken them again into movement. Some marched, some stayed. Many dropped asleep in their tracks with fatigue. They had lost order and coherence, and were drifting through the blast in lorn packets, ready to shoot and run at every contact with us or with each other; and the Arabs were as scattered, and nearly as uncertain.

Exception were the German detachments; and here, for the first time, I grew proud of the enemy who had killed my brothers. They were two thousand miles from home, without hope and without guides, in conditions mad enough to break the bravest nerves. Yet their sections held together, in firm rank, sheering through the wrack of Turk and Arab-like armoured ships, high-faced and silent. When attacked they halted, took position, fired to order. There was no haste, no crying, no hesitation. They were glorious.

T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City, 1938), pp. 633-634.

37. Lawrence C. Allin, "Abel Parker Upshur and the Dignity of Discipline," *Naval War College Review*, July 1970, pp. 87-88; quoting from *Taking Possession of Monterey*, House Executive Document 166, 27th Congress, 3d sess., v. V, pp. 60-64.

38. Project One Hundred Thousand was a policy that lowered the standards of entry to the armed forces in order to offer underprivileged men the opportunity for education. Sherrill discusses it on p. 219. Secretary McNamara wrote enthusiastically about it in his book, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 127-138.

It is interesting to note, however, that Project One Hundred Thousand was initiated at a time that the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense of the U.S. Government were confident that the situation in Vietnam was favorable, and the war would soon conclude. Furthermore, the Project was initiated by men who, by their previous and subsequent actions, showed either ignorance of or indifference to the operation of the logistic snowball.

William F. Long, Jr., "Project Advance," *Naval War College Review*, March 1971, p. 17, pointed out that Project One Hundred Thousand was an innovative program to help

disadvantaged young men, that while it was a worthwhile social improvement effort, it had reduced overall military operational efficiency in the following specific areas: reduced unit combat readiness; increased administrative overhead in order to cope with the high number of early discharges and courts-martial; overloaded the unit leadership and management structure; and reduced unit morale.

39. The *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, by Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian guerrilla who was killed by police in Sao Paulo in 1969, was republished as an appendix to Adelphi Paper no. 79, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, in August 1971, as part of an important series dealing with civil political violence.

40. The issue of unions in the U.S. Armed Forces developed quietly about 1973 and became widespread in 1976 and 1977. There is active discussion in the armed forces, the Congress and within established labor unions. While opinions differ widely, it is noteworthy that most of the discussion concerns the effect on the welfare and satisfaction of the members of the armed forces with little or no analysis of how such unions would affect the welfare of the nation or how it would influence the use of military power and force. Because the armed forces of those states in Northern Europe that have military unions have not been tested in combat, which is the central issue, citation of their experience can in no way justify their acceptance by the United States. For a more detailed discussion of unionization in the military, see Henry E. Eccles, "Military Unionization: The Central Issues," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, pp. 18-26.

CHAPTER X—MARITIME POWER

1. William Reitzel, "Mahan on the Use of the Sea," *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1973, pp. 73-82.

2. Geoffrey J. Marcus, *The Age of Nelson, The Royal Navy 1793-1815* (New York: Viking Press, 1971).

3. *Seapower*, official publication of the Navy League of the United States, September 1974, p. 38.

4. "Civilian Shipbuilders Revolt Against Navy," *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 September 1974, p. 51.

5. John W. Finney, "Budget Cuts and Inflation May Curb Arms Projects," *The New York Times*, 19 September 1974, p. 1.

6. The author expanded these points in a paper, "The Russian Maritime Threat," which was the introductory article in the *Naval War College Review* of June 1969, an issue devoted entirely to the development and use of Russian seapower.

7. Malcolm Brown, "Expert Says World Has 27 Days Food and U.S. Asks Population Parley to Agree on World Growth Curb," *The New York Times*, 21 August 1974, p. 2.

8. Mark W. Janis, *Sea Power and the Law of the Sea* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976). This short book, dedicated to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, Newport, and the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, discusses these matters in terms of the naval interests and national ocean policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the coastal navy states. This work describes the history of these U.N. Conferences and analyzes the role of seapower as the new legal order develops.

9. An excellent discussion of the problems for discussion and their major implications is in Seyom Brown and Larry L. Fabian, "Diplomats at Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1974, pp. 301-321.

10. "New Law of the Sea is so Far All Talk," *The New York Times*, 1 September 1974, p. 10.

11. Flora Lewis, "A Sea-Law Draft Ready at Parley," *The New York Times*, 9 May 1975, p. C5.

12. John G. Laylin, "Emerging Customary Law of the Sea," *International Lawyer*, Fall 1976, pp. 669-670.

13. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 5th Session, New York, 2 August, 17 September 1976. Reports of Committee Chairman on the Work of the Session (Washington: Department of State, Office of Law of Sea Negotiations, 20 September 1976), Committee I, p. 5.

14. *Ibid.*, Committee II, pp. 2, 3, and 10.

15. *Ibid.*, Committee III, p. 1.

16. Stansfield Turner, "Opening Remarks to Third International Seapower Symposium, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., October 15, 19, 1973," p. 3.

17. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Peacetime Oceanic Reality," Third International Seapower Symposium, p. 5.

18. Benjamin F. Engel, "U.S. Coast Guard—A Naval Service with Peacetime Missions," Third International Seapower Symposium, p. 23.

19. This question was partially discussed in Chapters IV, VII, and VIII. It is difficult and complex. There has been inadequate research and almost no informed public discussion of the degree to which U.S. Government procurement processes and budget fluctuations have reduced the readiness and effectiveness of the U.S. defense system and, at the same time, greatly increased its costs. This whole problem comes in the category of the "politically sensitive" which is openly discussed only at professional peril.

20. For example, the word *détente* is so imprecise and is subject to such differing interpretations in the United States and the Soviet Union that it should be used very cautiously.

21. In this respect it is noteworthy that, in the interest of greater public understanding, in 1974 the U.S. Naval Institute published a series of articles by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, with comments on each article by highly qualified U.S. naval officers.

22. Text of President Carter's address to the nation on the energy problem, *The New York Times*, 19 April 1977, p. 24.

CHAPTER XI—FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

1. Associated Press Report, "Officials Stymied on Controlling 'Killer Kids,'" *The Newport (Rhode Island) Daily News*, 30 May 1975, p. 3. This Associated Press Report is only one of many citing increasing examples of totally senseless killings by juveniles. It reported FBI statistics that in 1973, 44.7 percent of all serious crimes were committed by persons under 18 years old.

2. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Joint Resolution concerning the War Powers of this Congress and the President," *United States Statutes at Large*, Public Law 93-148, 93d Congress (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), v. 87, p. 555.

3. Cdr. Leo Coughlin, the then legal advisor to the President of the Naval War College, on 11 January 1974 described the War Powers Resolution as follows:

... The War Power legislation ... is directed toward the introduction of armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. In such instances, the President must file within 48 hours a report with Congress which sets forth the circumstances, authority, and estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. The President must then terminate the use of U.S. forces within 60 days thereafter unless Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for the use of such forces or (2) has extended by law the 60 day period. However, the 60 day period may also be extended without Congressional action for an additional 30 days if the President determines and certifies to Congress that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces." Notwithstanding the foregoing 60 and 90 day provisions, the President will be obliged to withdraw forces engaged in hostilities outside the U.S. if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

In summary, absent any Congressional action, U.S. forces must be withdrawn from the hostilities within 60 days unless the President certifies to Congress that he needs an additional 30 days to safely remove them.

The law has several other provisions of lesser importance, such as consultation requirements, reporting requirements for the introduction of forces into foreign territory under certain nonhostile situations, the establishment of procedures to expedite Congressional action, and the interpretation of the law in relation to constitutional authority . . .

4. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by O.J. Mattjis Jolles (New York: Random House Modern Library, 1943), Book I, p. 18. Clausewitz' statement to the effect that the most decisive act of judgment that a statesman or a commander performs is recognizing the kind of war his is undertaking, is pertinent.

5. This was written by Dr. Herbert Rosinski in September 1955, following informal discussions with the President of the Naval War College, Vice Adm. Lynde McCormick, and his Chief of Staff, Rear Adm. Thomas H. Robbins, Jr.

6. According to many officers who studied under me at the Naval War College from 1963 to 1973, these expressions have been frequently used to justify either concealment of adverse information or factual misrepresentation, not only in Vietnam but in many commands in all services.

CHAPTER XII—CONCLUSIONS

1. Adapted from Jan Smart, "Committee Discussions on the Utility of Military Force: Report to the Conference," *Force in Modern Societies*, Adelphi Papers, no. 102 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 26.

APPENDIX A—COMMENTS FROM THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1. Samuel H. Day, Jr., "We Re-Set the Clock," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1974, pp. 4-5.

APPENDIX B—POWER

1. Leslie H. Gelb, "Script for Resignation," *The New York Times*, 16 February 1976, p. 6.

2. *Ibid.*

3. John W. Finney, "Pentagon Admonishes 38 on Northrop Lodge Visits," *The New York Times*, 24 January 1976, p. 1.

4. Ann Crittenden, "Closing in on Corporate Payments Overseas," *The New York Times*, 15 February 1976, sec. 3, pp. 1 and 7.

5. Robert M. Smith, "The Lockheed Letter: How and Why of Bribery," *The New York Times*, 8 February 1976, sec. 4, p. 6. (Cumshaw is a word of Chinese origin meaning present or gratuity.)

6. "The Big Payoff—The Lockheed Scandal, Graft Around the World," *Time*, 23 February 1976, p. 28.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

10. Robert Lindsay, "In Burbank, Many Workers Defend Lockheed Payments," *The New York Times*, 17 February 1976, p. 45.

APPENDIX C—ETERNAL VERITIES

1. Wilder Penfield, "The Mind and the Highest Brain-Mechanism," *The American Scholar*, Spring 1974, p. 243.

2. Sir Richard Livingstone, "Education for a Civilized Democracy," *Some Tasks for Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 53.

3. George Bernard Shaw, *Man and Superman* (New York: Penguin Books, n.d.).

4. *Ibid.*

5. William Blackstone, *The Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 2d ed. (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1766), pp. 40-41.

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